Ayers v. FCA US, LLC, No. B315884 (D2d8 Feb. 27, 2024).
This is a Lemon Law case involving dueling offers under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. Manufacturer made one offer. Then it made a second higher offer. And then a third that was even higher. Years go by. Then the Court of Appeal decided a case that said that if the Consumer subsequently trades the car in, the trade in value gets deducted from the cost basis that (trebled) sets the maximum damages amount. If good law,* that would lower Plaintiff’s damages by about $40k. Plaintiff then made an offer of his own, which was higher than Manufacturer’s second offer but lower than its third. Manufacturer took the deal.
Plaintiff subsequently moved for attorneys fees, which in Lemon Law cases can significantly exceed the Consumer’s recovery. Manufacturer argued, however, that the fees should be cut of at the point of its third § 998 offer, because that offer was for more money than the Consumer actually got when his own offer was accepted. The trial court ruled that § 998’s cost-shifting rule does not apply to a case that is concluded by a settlement, as opposed to a trial, and declined to tax the fees. Manufacturer appealed.
There’s a case on this point from last year. See Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America, 90 Cal. App. 5th 385 (2023). Over a dissent, it held that § 998(c)(1)’s imposition of fee shifting if the plaintiff “fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award” applies when the “award” is obtained by plaintiff under a settlement, instead of a judgment. A concurring and dissenting opinion disagreed, reasoning that when parties resolve a case pursuant to a settlement nobody succeeds or fails at anything. A deal is just struck. The Supreme Court granted review of Madrigal last August.** The Court, as it now often does, ruled that pending review, Madrigal could be cited for both its persuasive value and for the existence of a conflict in the Court of Appeal under the Auto Equity Sales rule.
The Court here agrees with the Madrigal majority, finding that “a plain reading of section 998, subdivision (c)(1) compels the conclusion that it applies to any litigation that terminates with the plaintiff getting less than he would have if he had accepted the defendant’s earlier section 998 offer.” The Court goes through a number of policy rationales and rejects the Consumer’s assertion that applying § 998 to a case that ends in a settlement itself discourages settlement. Perhaps the most convincing point the court makes is that a settling party that doesn’t want to be subject to fee shifting based on a prior § 998 offer is always free to demand that fee shifting be excluded from the terms of any settlement.
Justice Viramontes concurs and dissents.
He largely agrees with the concurrence and dissent in Madrigal. He thinks, at minimum, that the majority’s “plain reading” of § 998(c)(1) is not dispositive because it is susceptible to a construction based on the idea that a settlement can’t be a failure. “[A]t the very least, the statute’s use of those words calls into question whether a settlement for less than the unaccepted offer equates to a failure to obtain a more favorable judgment under section 998(c)(1).” Looking into the purpose and legislative history animating § 998, he finds that the available evidence, albeit slim, suggests that the statute is intended to apply only when a settlement offer isn’t bested by a subsequent adjudication, not just a later settlement.
Affirmed.
*, ** A week after this case was decided, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Niedermeier v. FCA, holding that trade in value does not merit a deduction from Lemon Law damages. Entering a settlement based on assumptions about the law that subsequently change, however, does not generally invalidate the settlement. Of course, review has also been granted in Madrigal. Plaintiff here can likely get a grant-and-hold based on that and if Madrigal is reversed, Plaintiff can likely get a reversal of the ruling on § 998 fee shifting. But it is still really doubtful that he could blow up the whole settlement based on incorrect assumptions of pre-Niedermeier law.
No comments:
Post a Comment