IT IS SOOOOO ORDERED!!

Machado v. Myers, No. D073824 (D4d1 Sept. 10, 2019)

This somewhat ugly boundary dispute between neighbors involves, among other things, encroaching tree roots and the placement of an air conditioning unit. It got resolved in a settlement, which was orally read into the record. The parties agreed the trial court would retain authority to enforce it under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. It seems, however, that the parties didn’t have the settlement entered as a formal judgment at that time.

A year later, a dispute broke out. Plaintiff moved under § 664.6 to enforce the settlement, including a proposed judgment that tracked the oral settlement. The court granted the motion, but still did not enter judgment. And then another dispute broke out. In connection with that motion, the Plaintiff again submitted a proposed judgment. But this judgment wasn’t the same as what the parties put on the record. The trial court signed it anyway.

That was error. Section 664.6 permits a court “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of [a] settlement.” The settlement needs to be either stated orally on the record or in a written agreement signed by the parties. Whatever judgment is entered needs to be identical to what was put on the record. A court has no power under § 664.6 to add or subtract from a settlement’s terms. Although a court has some leeway under § 664.6 to interpret a settlement, that’s not what happened here. 

The Court explains, however, that Defendant was not entitled to relief under § 473(d), which permits a court to vacate void judgments and those entered as a result of clerical error. The judgment here was legally erroneous. That doesn’t make it void. Or a clerical error.

Instead, Defendant should have been afforded relief under § 663, which permits a court to vacate a judgment that has been entered as a result of legal error. In so finding, the Court of Appeal rejects two of Plaintiff’s procedural arguments against relief under § 663. 

First, like a new trial motion, a § 663 motion has a special briefing and hearing procedure, codified in § 663a. Generally the motion is initiated by filing a “notice of intention” within a prescribed window of time, then the opening brief is due ten days later. See § 663(a), (d). But the Court of Appeal finds that filing a notice of motion with a brief attached is sufficient to satisfy the notice of intention requirement, so long as the filing is timely. And second, although the point of the motion is to have the court enter a different judgment, the Court of Appeal holds that there’s no per se requirement that a moving party submit a proposed judgment along with its motion. 

Thus, on remand, the trial court should vacate the judgment and enter a new one that conforms with the settlement that had been stated on the record.

Reversed.

Trial Court Must Show Work on Class Cert

Myers v. Raley’s, No. C086236 (D3 Mar. 12, 2019)

For reasons that are a little obscure, an appeal of an order denying class cert is  not reviewed for its results, but for the validity of the trial court’s reasoning. Unlike in most other appellate contexts, a reviewing court will not affirm for some other unstated reason that is nonetheless supported by the record. Which means in addressing a motion for class cert, a trial court is required set out its reasoning 

The court’s ruling here didn’t do that. It just recited the statutory standard under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. So the Court of Appeal, after implying that denial was wrong on the merits based on more recent authority, reverses the trial court for failing to state its reasons.

Reversed.

A Mistake in Service Is Not Extrinsic Fraud

Yolo Cnty. Dept. of Child Support Servs. v. Myers, No. C075671 (D3 Jun. 10, 2016)

Courts have equitable power to vacate default judgments—even really old ones—on certain narrow grounds, especially when a plaintiff established personal jurisdiction by filing a false proof of service. But to do that, the POS itself needs to be fraudulent; a motion to vacate does not lie simply because of some defect in service in the underlying action. Defendant didn’t satisfy that standard here. Nor could he challenge partiality of the judge in either this or the original case. In the original case, Code of Civil Procedure § 170.4 specifically says that a disqualified judge can still deal with defaults. So even if the old judge deserved a DQ—which the court here expresses some doubt—he still had power to sign the default order. And as to the current case, the challenge was based on disagreement with the merits of rulings, which is a legit not grounds to DQ the judge. And in any event, DQ motions aren’t appealable—they can be reviewed only by writ. Which plaintiff didn’t seek here.

Affirmed.