Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC, No. A142321 (D1d4 May 21, 2015)
The parties in this Prop 65 class action agreed to a consent judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, which included injunctive relief as well as a specific attorney fee award to plaintiff. The trial court cut the fee award in half and then entered the judgment as modified. Section § 664.6, however, does not permit it to do that. The trial court can’t just alter the terms of the deal and enter judgment as it sees fit. It could refuse to enter the judgment and send the parties back the table, but it could not add or modify any express term.
Reversed.
It seems like this result could have been avoided with some minor drafting tweaks to the settlement papers. The parties in this case agreed that the defendant “shall pay” a fixed sum of money for plaintiff's fee. That put the court in the position of being required to effectively modify the agreement in order to reduce the fees. But the agreement could have stated that defendant would not oppose a motion for fees so long as they did not exceed a certain amount—the kind of “clear sailing” provision that has been approved by California Courts in class action settlements, see In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 552 (2009). Were that the language, the court’s reduction of the award shouldn’t constitute an amendment of the agreement, so there would be no issue under § 664.6. Of course, that would subject plaintiff to some additional risk, and maybe she wouldn’t have agreed.
Showing posts with label settlement approval. Show all posts
Showing posts with label settlement approval. Show all posts
Monday, June 15, 2015
Wednesday, August 6, 2014
This Settlement Is Really Just a Sale . . .
Luckey v. Superior Court, No. B253892 (July 22, 2014)
Plaintiff brings a class action against a retailer for violating FACTA, which prohibits the printing of certain credit card information on a customer receipt. After an early mediation before a retired judge, a class action settles. The class had not yet been certified.
The terms of the settlement look—ahem—a little shady. The plaintiff attorneys get $300,000 and the members of the class get $5 off any $25 purchase from the defendant during a particular week. Apparently, every other customer of the defendant who shops during that week also gets the same deal. In exchange, the class releases its FACTA claims, which carry statutory damages of $100-1,000 per count.
The parties stipulate that a temporary judge can hear the motion to approve the settlement. Coincidentally, the temporary judge they agree to is the same judge that conducted the mediation. Because, surely the retired judge who brokered the settlement is in a perfectly objective position to opine upon whether he got the parties to a fair deal! The trial court, however, refuses to approve the stip, reasoning that the class representative has no authority to consent to a temporary judge on behalf of the absent members of an as-yet-uncertified class. Both parties seek writ relief.
Interestingly, because both sides agree that the trial court should be reversed, there is effectively no real party in opposition to the writ. The court of appeal, however, requested a response from the superior court itself. Although the superior court is generally only a nominal party on a writ, in certain limited circumstances—those addressing the court’s procedures or uses of its resources—it can provide a response. This was one of those circumstances.
The court goes on to agree with the superior court. The state constitution, the rules of court, and concerns of public policy require all “parties litigant” to consent to the appointment of a temporary judge. If a class has not been certified, the putative class rep does not have the authority to bind absent members of the class to such an agreement.
Writ denied.
Plaintiff brings a class action against a retailer for violating FACTA, which prohibits the printing of certain credit card information on a customer receipt. After an early mediation before a retired judge, a class action settles. The class had not yet been certified.
The terms of the settlement look—ahem—a little shady. The plaintiff attorneys get $300,000 and the members of the class get $5 off any $25 purchase from the defendant during a particular week. Apparently, every other customer of the defendant who shops during that week also gets the same deal. In exchange, the class releases its FACTA claims, which carry statutory damages of $100-1,000 per count.
The parties stipulate that a temporary judge can hear the motion to approve the settlement. Coincidentally, the temporary judge they agree to is the same judge that conducted the mediation. Because, surely the retired judge who brokered the settlement is in a perfectly objective position to opine upon whether he got the parties to a fair deal! The trial court, however, refuses to approve the stip, reasoning that the class representative has no authority to consent to a temporary judge on behalf of the absent members of an as-yet-uncertified class. Both parties seek writ relief.
Interestingly, because both sides agree that the trial court should be reversed, there is effectively no real party in opposition to the writ. The court of appeal, however, requested a response from the superior court itself. Although the superior court is generally only a nominal party on a writ, in certain limited circumstances—those addressing the court’s procedures or uses of its resources—it can provide a response. This was one of those circumstances.
The court goes on to agree with the superior court. The state constitution, the rules of court, and concerns of public policy require all “parties litigant” to consent to the appointment of a temporary judge. If a class has not been certified, the putative class rep does not have the authority to bind absent members of the class to such an agreement.
Writ denied.
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