Showing posts with label jury misconduct. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jury misconduct. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 3, 2017

Manufacturing Juror Consent

Shanks v. Dept. of Trans., No B268459 (D2d6 Mar. 9, 2017)

Juror No. 7 in a wrongful death case got dimed out by Jurors 1 and 2 for refusing to deliberate. The court questioned the tattlers, but not No. 7. It then discharged No. 7 replaced her with an alternate. The newly constituted jury then quickly rendered a $12.6 million verdict after a less than a day of deliberation.

Not good enough.

No. 7 had been the source of some drama before deliberations when Plaintiff accused her of sleeping. (Defendant said it looked more like she just visibly hated Plaintiff’s case.) And then during deliberations, it came to light that No. 1 and No. 2 were miffed with No. 7 because they thought she came into the deliberations having prejudged the case. The court asked these jurors a series of narrow leading questions designed to suss out the situation without revealing any deliberations. Although Defendant asked the court to further inquire of the foreperson, the court didn’t do so, expressing some concern about undertaking a heavy-handed inquiry that could interfere with the deliberations. It then relieved No. 7 and replaced her with an alternate.

In a new trial motion, Defendant put in a declaration from No.7, which said she was not sleeping, that she listened to all the evidence and argument, and that she didn’t prejudge the case—she just simply strongly believed that there should be a defense verdict. She also said that Nos. 1 and 2—who had become chummy and wanted a plaintiff verdict—were just annoyed with her for having opposing views. The trial court denied a new trial; Defendant appealed.

A trial court can discharge a juror when she can’t perform her duties, which includes a failure to deliberate. But there’s a big difference between a non-deliberator and a holdout. Dismiss the latter and you’ve effectively deprived the losing party of a jury trial. So to protect from undue meddling, on appeal, a discharge can be affirmed only if the inadequacy is a “demonstrable reality” revealed in the record.

If there’s some indica of non-deliberation, the court needs to investigate in a non-cursory fashion, albeit in a way that does not reveal the status of ongoing deliberations. The court’s inquiry here wasn’t up to snuff. At minimum, the court needed to inquire of No. 7, if not all twelve jurors on the panel. It certainly should not have stopped its inquiry after questioning Nos. 1 and 2—the two jurors who took issue with No. 7. That slanted the inquiry towards discharge. Given the flawed inquiry, it wasn’t a demnostrable reality from the the record that No. 7 was a non-deliberator, instead of a holdout.

But unlike most of the precedent in this area, this trial was civil, not criminal. Plaintiff didn’t need a unanimous verdict to win, only a 9-3. So there’s a question of prejudice. Although the final verdict was 11-1 on most issues—suggesting that No. 7 wouldn’t have made a difference—it was 9-3 on the question of apportionment of fault. That issue will need to be retried.

Reversed.

Monday, December 29, 2014

A Federal Pair

This month, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on two significant federal procedure cases. Although they don't directly involve procedure in California, they bear in it, so they are worth a read, even for mostly state court practitioners.

Warger v. Shauers, No. 13-517 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2014)

Although it’s outside the regular scope of my coverage, in this unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the U.S. Supreme Court interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to preclude the use of a juror’s affidavit on a motion for new trial on the grounds that a juror lied during voir dire. The rule limits juror evidence to “extraneous” matters and “outside influence[s].” A juror’s unrevealed bias is not either of those. Notably, this very sensible rule is contrary to the completely insane practice in California’s state courts, where jurors are regularly hounded to present affidavits in order to show “jury misconduct,” which seems to include deliberations that didn’t go down the way the losing party wanted them to.



Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, No. 13-719 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2014)


In another federal opinion of note, the Court holds that a notice of removal is a pleading, and thus that a case is not subject to remand for failure to include evidence in the notice that substantiates the amount in controversy for diversity purposes. The notice needs only contain a plausible allegation that the amount exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. In passing, the court notes that there is no presumption against removal when the defendant invokes federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.

Friday, November 7, 2014

Guilty, Guilty, Guilty!

CB Richard Ellis v. Tera Nova Consultants, No. G049803 (D4d3 Oct. 7, 2014)

During an effort put a defunct LLC’s members on the hook for its debts, the trial court let the jury see an arbitral ruling—complete with reasoning and factual findings—against the LLC that was the basis of those debts. That was error in that it potentially suggested that the defendants—nonparties in the arbitration—might be bound by the award. The ruling was also hearsay. The court, however, finds the mistake harmless. 


There’s also a jury misconduct issue. Two jurors submitted very brief declarations under Evidence Code § 1150 that another juror had said he knew the defendants and that they were “guilty, guilty, guilty.” That juror, however, submitted a detailed declaration saying he did nothing of the sort, and the court finds that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on the detailed declaration to deny a new trial motion. That seems right. But as I’ve said before, our courts really need to get out of this business altogether.


Affirmed.

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After a two-year hiatus,  111 North Hill Street  has decided to decamp for Substack. Thank you for your readership over the last twelve year...