Let's Talk Standing

People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer, No. G057546 (D4d3 Aug. 12, 2020)

Plaintiffs here bring a taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a and a writ of mandate, challenging the legality of a confidential informant program the OC Sheriff is alleged running in the county jails. 

The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. But that’s wrong. 

Section 525a conveys broad standing in taxpayers to sue to enjoin unlawful government activity. And although § 3369 prohibits injunctions to “enforce a penal law,” against criminal conduct, it doesn’t apply here, even though some of the allegations implicate the OC DA and Sheriff in violating the provisions of the Penal Code that codify the Brady doctrine. As the Court explains § 3369’s reference to penal law is to criminal conduct, not criminal procedure. 

There’s also standing for the writ claim. Mandamus standing generally requires the plaintiff to be beneficially interested. But there’s an exception for public interest claims. The exception is subject to some prudential limitations. For instance, it can’t be used to collaterally attack other proceedings. But none of them apply here.

Reversed.

Taxpayers Have Standing to Litigate Consitutional Claims

Cal. DUI Lawyers Assoc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. B278092 (D2d4 Mar. 2, 2018)

The California DUI Lawyers Association brought a taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, alleging that the DMV’s administrative license suspension procedures for DUI arrestees violate procedural due process. In particular, the CDLA argued that the hearing officers who adjudicate license suspension claims are not independent of the DMV and tasked with a hybrid investigative/adjudicatory function that makes them insufficiently neutral to satisfy due process. The DMV argued, and the trial court agreed, that CDLA didn’t have taxpayer standing because the DMV procedure was “legal,” i.e., consistent with the Vehicular Code. But that’s not right. A taxpayer can sue under § 526a to enjoin public agency acts that constitute “waste.” And “waste” includes not only acts that contravene statutory authority, but also acts that are unconstitutional. Since the CDLA made a colorable constitutional challenge, they had standing to bring their claims under § 526a. 

Reversed and remanded.

No Property Tax Required for Taxpayer Standing; Else Unresolved

Weatherford v. City of San Rafael, No. S219567 (Cal. Jun. 6, 2017)

Code of Civil Procedure § 526a gives taxpayers standing to bring claims to enjoin wasteful or unlawful expenditures by government entities. The question presented to the Supreme Court here is: What kind of taxes need to be paid to have taxpayer standing? 

In Which the Author Outs Himself as a (Soft) Textualist ...

Leider v. Lewis, No. S232622 (Cal. May 25, 2017)

The trial court in this case issued an injunction against certain practices involving the elephant enclosure at the LA Zoo. The Court of Appeal affirmed, in a split decision, over the Zoo’s challenge that Civil Code § 3369 prohibited the issuance of an injunction against acts of animal cruelty that were prohibited only by criminal laws in the Penal Code. The Court of Appeal held that the argument was barred by the resolution of a prior appeal under the law of the case doctrine, and that, in any event, it was wrong on the merits. But the Supreme Court granted review and now unanimously disagrees.

Running from the Text

Leider v. Lewis, No. B244414 (D2d8 Feb 10, 2016)

This is a long-running dispute about the treatment of the elephants at the LA Zoo. Plaintiff brought his case under the taxpayer standing statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, asking the court to enjoin violations of various animal cruelty statutes in the Penal Code. This is the second appeal in the case; a prior summary judgment for defendant was reversed. The court held a bench trial, rejecting plaintiff’s demand to close the exhibit. But it granted a limited injunction regarding appropriate elephant discipline, exercise time, and requiring rototilling of the soil in the elephant exhibit. Both sides appeal.

The procedural issue comes up in the zoo’s appeal. The zoo argues that Civil Code § 3369's prohibition on issuing injunctions to enforce criminal laws bars plaintiff’s taxpayer standing claim. A split decision finds two problems with that argument. 

Cops Don't Have Standing to Challege Orders

L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A., No. B251796 (D2d8 Dec. 26, 2014)
 
So the police trade association and some random citizen are challenging an LAPD directive that limits the cops’ discretion to impound vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers. They argued that the directive conflicted with some provisions in the state vehicle code. The trial court—after finding that the association and the citizen had taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a—agreed. But the court here reverses.

Section 526a can be used to enjoin a facially illegal or unconstitutional expenditure of pubic funds. But it cannot impinge executive or legislative direction. While the statute speaks to “waste” it does not provide an avenue for taxpayers to second guess the manner a government body has chosen to address a problem, so long as it does not violate a clear legal standard.

The directive in this case did not create new law—it afforded instructions how police officers were to exercise discretion under the state statutory impoundment scheme. That is a decision well within the discretion of the chief of the LAPD.  Thus, because the directive was not facially unlawful, neither the citizen nor the association had taxpayer standing under § 526a.

Reversed.

A Bit Too Clever ...

Lyons v. Santa Barbara Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. B256041 (D2d6 Dec. 3, 2014)

Unsurprisingly, you can’t file a taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a to collaterally attack an unlawful detainer judgment on the grounds that the decision was unconstitutional.

Cops Took My Car. Unconstitutional!

Thompson v. Petaluma Police Dept., No. A137981 (Nov. 4, 2014)

Plaintiff contends that a provision in the Vehicle Code addressing vehicle impoundments is unconstitutional and that the City of Petaluma is acting unconstitutionally by expending funds to enforce it. The City demurred, both on the merits of the claim and on standing. The court here holds that plaintiff has standing to sue as a taxpayer under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, which permits a taxpayer to sue for illegal expenditures of government money or waste. Although plaintiff is not a resident of Petaluma, he owns a business and pays taxes there. That’s enough under established law. And although plaintiff’s unconstitutionality theory is a dead-ender, he appears to be able to claim that the way the city is enforcing the impoundment statute does not jibe with the statutory text and any pertinent judicial gloss. He thus should be permitted to amend on remand. 

Reversed and remanded.

Standing up for State Standing

Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary School Dist., No. D064035 (June 24, 2014)

A student who brought a writ of mandate against his school graduated while the litigation was pending. The trial court granted the school’s motion to dismiss for mootness and lack of standing. But state standing isn’t like federal Article III standing. In the mandamus context, longstanding California precedent recognizes the standing of citizens to litigate public rights in the public interest, so long it does not short-circuit important processes of governing meant to occur outside of litigation. Furthermore, Code of Civil Procedure § 526a gives taxpayers standing to sue to enjoin unlawful expenditures of public funds. That right has been construed broadly to include unlawful governmental actions with only incidental costs.

Reversed.

Standing Up for Associational Taxpayer Standing

Gilbane Building Company v. Superior Court, No. D063685 (D4d1 Jan. 23, 2014)

A community group brought a taxpayer suit against a contractor that had done business with a school district, alleging various causes of action to the effect that the contractor had made improper gifts to district officials in order to win the contracts. The contractor demurred, challenging the community group’s standing to sue on the grounds that it was not itself a district taxpayer, that its lawsuit was usurping the district’s discretionary functions and that it had not made a demand that the district sue on its own behalf. The trial court denied the demurrer and the contractor sought writ review.

Although it takes up the writ, the court of appeal denies relief. Citing to a recent case from the same division, Taxpayers for Accountable Sch. Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 215 Cal. App. 4th 1013, 1031–1033 (2013), the court of appeal holds that an association has standing to bring a taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, provided some of its members have standing to sue on their own behalf, even if the association itself does not pay taxes. And the rule prohibiting taxpayers from usurping a public agency’s discretion through taxpayer suits is inapplicable. Assuming that the complaint’s allegations that the district had expended funds illegally are true—as required on a demurrer—the contracts are void, not merely voidable. Under those circumstances, action by the district is mandatory; its governmental discretion is not implicated. Finally, requiring a demand would be futile, as district officials were alleged to be participants in the wrongdoing. It is doubtful that they would initiate a lawsuit to correct their own malfeasance. And even if a demand were required, the community group’s notification to the district that it intended to bring suit was sufficient to put the district on notice and to permit the district an opportunity to commence an action on behalf of its constituents.  If actual refusal of a demand were a requirement, a public agency could simply forestall taxpayer litigation by refusing to respond to a demand.

Writ denied.

Non-Taxpayer Can't Get Taxpayer Standing

Reynolds v. City of Calistoga, No. A136502 (D1d5 Feb. 3, 2014)

By statute, California conveys upon taxpayers general standing to sue government entities for injunctive relief resulting from illegal expenditures, injuries to public property, or waste. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 526a. But the plaintiff still needs to have paid some taxes to the defendant government in order to invoke the rule. Plaintiff here paid no taxes to the defendant. And the court declines his invitation to extend taxpayer standing even to non-taxpayers. Nor is he entitled to the sort of public interest standing that applies in some kind of mandamus proceedings; mandamus was not at issue in this case. Nor is he entitled to standing on a public trust grounds because he did not assert that the government action about which he was complaining resulted in harm to any resources held in trust for the public. So his complaint was properly dismissed for lack of standing.

Affirmed.