Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. B293153 (D2d6 Jun. 29, 2020)
A UCSB Student who appears to have been shabbily treated in the Title IX disciplinary process. In administrative mandamus proceedings, he won a PI requiring the school to revoke a temporary suspension. The school ultimately gave up and the case was dismissed as moot. Student moved for fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which codifies the private attorney general doctrine. The trial court denied the motion.
A party can obtain fees under § 1021.5 when: (1) it is “a successful party” in an “action”; (2) the action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest”; (3) the action has conferred “a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, . . . on the general public or a large class of persons”; and (4) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.
The second part of the third element is the principal point of dispute here. How does an order that affects the college enrollment of a single student confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of people?
As the Court of Appeal explains, setting precedent on important constitutional issues can benefit the general public even when the relief sought is only individualized. Student’s litigation revealed a number of substantial due process problems with the way UCSB was handling Title IX investigations, and set an important precedent that a party could get a PI in an administrative mandamus case to enjoin a temporary suspension. Further, Student’s litigation will deter the school in failing to comply with it’s Title IX processes in the future, and appears to have motivated, so some degree, the Department of Education to get involved in obtaining a consent decree requiring USCB to promptly resolve investigations. Overall, the Court of Appeal says that’s enough to meet the third element.
Reversed.
Showing posts with label U.C. Regents. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.C. Regents. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 5, 2020
Wednesday, October 10, 2018
Livermore Lab Retirees Class Can Proceed Against UC on Liability Issues
Moen v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. A153386 (D1d5 Aug 1, 2018)
A class action against the UC brought by some Retirees at the Lawrence Livermore lab. Retirees claim that the UC system either implicitly or explicitly promised them health insurance and that the UC’s failure to honor those promises after the lab was privatized is an unconstitutional impairment of contract. The case has been pending for eight years. A class was ultimately certified, and a part of the case about the UC system’s authority to enter the alleged contracts was tried. Retirees won.
But the UC then moved to decertify the class, arguing that the rest of the case—about whether promises were actually made and relied upon—was too individualized to be addressed class-wide. The trial court agreed and decertified the class. Retirees appeal.
The Court of Appeal reverses, in part. Contract formation is typically an individualized question. But Retirees’ theory is that the UC had a uniform practice of offering the benefits and that the benefits were implicitly accepted by the retirees when they came and/or continued to work for the lab. Under the circumstances, there was enough commonality among the members of the class for the contract formation issues to be tried class-wide. Similarly, the mostly legal issue of whether contracts, if formed, were impaired, could be addressed by a class because it did not require specific proof of economic injury.
On the other hand, damages could not be decided on a class-wide basis. That would require an assessment of the value of the allegedly promised policy versus the value of what each Retiree ultimately received, which could have a great deal of variety of factors, including each Retiree’s actual use of the heath care benefits provided.
Reversed in part.
A class action against the UC brought by some Retirees at the Lawrence Livermore lab. Retirees claim that the UC system either implicitly or explicitly promised them health insurance and that the UC’s failure to honor those promises after the lab was privatized is an unconstitutional impairment of contract. The case has been pending for eight years. A class was ultimately certified, and a part of the case about the UC system’s authority to enter the alleged contracts was tried. Retirees won.
But the UC then moved to decertify the class, arguing that the rest of the case—about whether promises were actually made and relied upon—was too individualized to be addressed class-wide. The trial court agreed and decertified the class. Retirees appeal.
The Court of Appeal reverses, in part. Contract formation is typically an individualized question. But Retirees’ theory is that the UC had a uniform practice of offering the benefits and that the benefits were implicitly accepted by the retirees when they came and/or continued to work for the lab. Under the circumstances, there was enough commonality among the members of the class for the contract formation issues to be tried class-wide. Similarly, the mostly legal issue of whether contracts, if formed, were impaired, could be addressed by a class because it did not require specific proof of economic injury.
On the other hand, damages could not be decided on a class-wide basis. That would require an assessment of the value of the allegedly promised policy versus the value of what each Retiree ultimately received, which could have a great deal of variety of factors, including each Retiree’s actual use of the heath care benefits provided.
Reversed in part.
Friday, June 29, 2018
UC Whistleblower Needs Not Exhaust to Sue
Taswell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. G053960 (D4d3 May 14, 2018)
The Government Code contains a statutory scheme to protect UC employees who become whistleblowers. They can vindicate their rights in an administrative proceeding run by the university system. But the statute also expressly permits a victim of retaliation to file a damages suit “if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the complaint within 18 months.”
Plaintiff here participated in the admin proceeding and lost. He did not, however, seek review of that ruling by filing a writ of administrative mandamus. Instead, he filed a separate lawsuit in superior court. The question is, does his failure to seek review of the admin ruling doom his lawsuit, whether through res judicata or a failure to fully exhaust the prior administrative remedies?
Relying on a Supreme Court case that interpreted an almost identical scheme applicable to CSU employees, the Court of Appeal holds it doesn’t. Although administrative cases can sometimes have preclusive effect, and a failure to seek administrative mandamus can sometimes bar a case for failure to exhaust, it all depends on the way the Legislature sets up the process. The statute here is specifically set up to permit an employee who doesn’t obtain a satisfactory administrative result to bring a de novo case. So Plaintiff’s loss in the prior case and his election not to seek writ review does not doom this one.
Reversed.
The Government Code contains a statutory scheme to protect UC employees who become whistleblowers. They can vindicate their rights in an administrative proceeding run by the university system. But the statute also expressly permits a victim of retaliation to file a damages suit “if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the complaint within 18 months.”
Plaintiff here participated in the admin proceeding and lost. He did not, however, seek review of that ruling by filing a writ of administrative mandamus. Instead, he filed a separate lawsuit in superior court. The question is, does his failure to seek review of the admin ruling doom his lawsuit, whether through res judicata or a failure to fully exhaust the prior administrative remedies?
Relying on a Supreme Court case that interpreted an almost identical scheme applicable to CSU employees, the Court of Appeal holds it doesn’t. Although administrative cases can sometimes have preclusive effect, and a failure to seek administrative mandamus can sometimes bar a case for failure to exhaust, it all depends on the way the Legislature sets up the process. The statute here is specifically set up to permit an employee who doesn’t obtain a satisfactory administrative result to bring a de novo case. So Plaintiff’s loss in the prior case and his election not to seek writ review does not doom this one.
Reversed.
Tuesday, September 6, 2016
I Feel a Little Less Alone in the Anti-SLAPP Universe
Nam v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C074796 (D3 Jul. 29, 2016)
A breath of fresh air in the anti-SLAPP arena. This is another case where an employer with a First Amendment-ish mission—here, a public university hospital that uses peer review—tries to pawn off alleged employment discrimination as “arising from protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. It has happened before. And on more than one occasion it has worked. But this time the court isn’t buying it. Even better, the court here does a commendable job of tracing the line of cases back to the 2011 Tuszynska v. Cunningham decision’s misreading of a 2002 Supreme Court case that had begun to lose track of its roots and propagate through the case law like a virus.
A breath of fresh air in the anti-SLAPP arena. This is another case where an employer with a First Amendment-ish mission—here, a public university hospital that uses peer review—tries to pawn off alleged employment discrimination as “arising from protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. It has happened before. And on more than one occasion it has worked. But this time the court isn’t buying it. Even better, the court here does a commendable job of tracing the line of cases back to the 2011 Tuszynska v. Cunningham decision’s misreading of a 2002 Supreme Court case that had begun to lose track of its roots and propagate through the case law like a virus.
Monday, June 23, 2014
Workers' Comp. Court Can't Peek for Privilege
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd., No. G048217 (D3 June 17, 2014)
The court here holds that the provisions of the Evidence Code dealing with privilege apply in workers’ comp. appeals. Since § 915 prohibits a presiding officer from ordering the in camera production of materials to see if they are privileged, the WCAB erred in so ordering in this case.
Reversed.
The court here holds that the provisions of the Evidence Code dealing with privilege apply in workers’ comp. appeals. Since § 915 prohibits a presiding officer from ordering the in camera production of materials to see if they are privileged, the WCAB erred in so ordering in this case.
Reversed.
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