Can't Collect on Half a Judgment

Newstart Real Estate Inv. LLC v. Huang, No. B292417 (D2d8 Jul. 3, 2019)

P wins a money judgment that includes punitive damages. The Court, however, issues a remittitur on punitives under Code of Civil Procedure § 662.5. P rejected it, resulting in a granted motion for a new trial. P appeals under § 904.1(a)(4). And while that’s proceeding, P starts to make efforts to collect on the compensatory part of the judgment. 

The trial court shuts that down, reasoning that a grant of a new trial has the effect of vacating the whole judgment until retrial occurs and a single final judgment can be entered. The Court of Appeal agrees. You can only collect on a final judgment. When a new trial motion is granted, that vacates the judgment as a matter of law. That a retrial might ultimately be addressed only to the punitives and not to liability or compensatory damages is not relevant to the collectability issue.

Affirmed.

Damages Remittitur Permitted for Partial Defect in Jury Award

Pearl v. City of L.A., No. B285235 (D2d7 Jun 18, 2019)

Plaintiff won a $17 million jury verdict against the City of LA on FEHA claims alleging that he had been harassed on the basis of his race and perceived sexual orientation. On the City’s motion for new trial, the trial court decided that at least part of the award for past non-economic damages was actually punitive. The Court believed the jury wanted to punish the City because so many of its witnesses committed perjury. It issued a remittitur under Code of Civil Procedure § 662.5, conditionally denying the new trial motion upon Plaintiff’s acceptance of a $5 million reduction in the verdict. Plaintiff took the deal.

On appeal, the City argues that once the trial court found that part of the jury’s verdict was improperly punitive, it was compelled to grant the new trial motion because that rendered the verdict defective as a matter of law. That’s not the case. In deciding a new trial motion on excessive damages, the trial court sits as an independent trier of fact. The court was entitled to find that only a portion of the award was improperly punitive, and to offer a remittitur to take that into account. 

Affirmed.

Unexpected Comeuppance for Jerky Trial Behavior

Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. No D063556 (D4d1 as modified on rehearing** Jan. 6, 2017)

This is a really loooonnnng opinion arising from an appeal of a products liability trial. Defendants sold, marketed, and prescribed a cold therapy device, But as the court explains—unlike normal cold therapy remedies like an icepack or “a bag of frozen peas”—this device managed to give plaintiff some kind of super awful infection due to constant application of cold. Defendants were, it appears, kind of a motley crew as far as the medical device industry goes and they got tagged with big-time damages, including $5 million in non-economic generals, plus punitives.

Applying Rule Change to Pending Case Isn't Retroactive

Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour, No. B251250 (D2d2 Jul. 9, 2015)

While a prior appeal in this case was pending, the Judicial Council amended Rule of Court 8.278 to permit a prevailing party on appeal to recover the fees and net interest expenses incurred in obtaining an appellate bond. On remand from the prior appeal, the trial court awarded those costs to the prevailing appellant, even though the amended rule didn’t come into effect until after the opinion in the first appeal issued. The application, however, wasn’t retroactive, much less impermissibly so, because the rule did come into effect before the remittitur issued. In the court of appeal, a case remains pending until that occurs. And since there was adequate evidence that the appellants did, in fact, incur expenses in securing the bond, the trial court’s award is affirmed.

It's Really Malice, Fraud "and/or" Oppression...

Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., No. B234271 (D2d3 Aug. 29, 2013)
 
In a case seeking punitive damages, the majority and dissent agree that the superior court should instruct on malice fraud or oppression as a single disjunctive concept instead of asking for separate special interrogatories.