Supershuttle Int’l, Inc. v. Labor & Workforce Dev. Agency, No. B292054 (D2d8 Oct. 7, 2019)
Supershuttle won a case in Sacto Superior against various state labor agencies, which resulted in a ruling that some of its drivers were independent contractors, not employees. But then the Labor Commissioner served Supershuttle with a bunch of so-called Berman notices in administrative wage claims brought by drivers in LA.
The whole Berman procedure doesn’t apply to independent contractors. But the Labor Commissioner indicated she didn’t intend to be bound by the Sacto ruling. So Supershuttle filed an action in LA Superior, seeking dec relief that the agencies were collaterally estopped from re-litigating the IC/employee issue on behalf of the drivers in the Berman hearings.
The Commissioner filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. The Commissioner appeals.
This is all a little hard to follow, because Supershuttle’s moves are kind of procedurally screwy. As the Court points out, Supershuttle could have just argued collateral estoppel in the trial de novo it gets in superior court on appeal of an adverse Berman ruling. So it’s not clear why this declaratory relief action is procedurally legit. (The collateral estoppel point also seems a little fraught, given that the drivers who are making the wage claims weren’t parties to the Sacto case. “Due process prohibits estopping [non-parties to prior cases] despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position.” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).)
In any event, just because a case is dumb or procedurally flawed doesn’t make it a SLAPP. Here, the action arises from and challenges the Commissioner’s official quasi-judicial act of declining to apply preclusive effect to the prior judgment. Although official acts of government bodies are sometimes preceded or conveyed in communications, the acts themselves are not exercises of speech or petitioning. They are thus not subject to anti-SLAPP treatment. The Supreme Court was pretty clear on that in both Park and City of Montebello.
Affirmed.
Showing posts with label wage and hour. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wage and hour. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 29, 2019
Wednesday, November 14, 2018
FYI: A Pot-Dealing Child Sex Offender Is Not an Ideal Class Rep.
Payton v. CSI Elec. Contractors, Inc., No. B284065 (D2d2 Sept. 28, 2018)
The trial court in this wage-and-hour case denied class cert because: (1) individual questions predominated regarding whether class members actually received the rest breaks at issues; and (2) Plaintiff’s trial plan was insufficient; (2) Plaintiff, who had a non-class wrongful discharge claim and whose criminal record includes a sex offense against a minor, wasn’t an adequate class rep. The court further declined to let Plaintiff find a new rep because the case had already been pending for a long time and class cert was likely not going to happen in any event.
The trial court in this wage-and-hour case denied class cert because: (1) individual questions predominated regarding whether class members actually received the rest breaks at issues; and (2) Plaintiff’s trial plan was insufficient; (2) Plaintiff, who had a non-class wrongful discharge claim and whose criminal record includes a sex offense against a minor, wasn’t an adequate class rep. The court further declined to let Plaintiff find a new rep because the case had already been pending for a long time and class cert was likely not going to happen in any event.
Friday, October 19, 2018
Tolling Accrues to the Diligent
Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants, No. B278513 (D2d7 Aug. 28, 2018)
This wage and hour class action, filed in 2007, got dismissed under the five-year rule in Code of Civil Procedure § 583.310. Plaintiffs don’t argue that five years haven’t passed. But there’s potential tolling for four different periods.
This wage and hour class action, filed in 2007, got dismissed under the five-year rule in Code of Civil Procedure § 583.310. Plaintiffs don’t argue that five years haven’t passed. But there’s potential tolling for four different periods.
Tuesday, May 22, 2018
Wage-and-Hour Double Dip Rejected
Castillo v. Glenair, Inc., No. B278239 (D2d2 Apr. 16, 2018)
Plaintiffs here are temps. They brought a wage-and-hour class action against their Temp Service and got a settlement. Now, they want to bring another class action against the Company they were tempted out. They allege the same claims, for the same work done, during the same time frame, based on a theory is that the Company was a joint employer with or alter ego or agent of the Service. But the court put the kybosh on that.
Under Plaintiffs own theory, the Service and the Company were in a privy relationship. The privity means a judgment* against the Service is a judgment against the Company, which means claim preclusion bars this case. Or alternatively, Plaintiffs also claimed the Company acted as the Service’s agent. Since the release in the settlement released Service’s “agents,” it also released the claims against the Company.
Affirmed.
*Under Rule of Court 3.769(h), a class action settlement must be entered as a judgment.
Plaintiffs here are temps. They brought a wage-and-hour class action against their Temp Service and got a settlement. Now, they want to bring another class action against the Company they were tempted out. They allege the same claims, for the same work done, during the same time frame, based on a theory is that the Company was a joint employer with or alter ego or agent of the Service. But the court put the kybosh on that.
Under Plaintiffs own theory, the Service and the Company were in a privy relationship. The privity means a judgment* against the Service is a judgment against the Company, which means claim preclusion bars this case. Or alternatively, Plaintiffs also claimed the Company acted as the Service’s agent. Since the release in the settlement released Service’s “agents,” it also released the claims against the Company.
Affirmed.
*Under Rule of Court 3.769(h), a class action settlement must be entered as a judgment.
Tuesday, February 13, 2018
By this Point, It Seems Pretty Clear . . .
Lawson v. ZB, N.A, No. D071279 (D4d1 Dec. 21, 2017)
Shorter Court: PAGA claims aren’t arbitrable. However you want to slice and dice them. Period.
Writ granted.
Shorter Court: PAGA claims aren’t arbitrable. However you want to slice and dice them. Period.
Writ granted.
Friday, January 19, 2018
Abbott and Costello Do Wage and Hour
Turman v. Superior Court, No. G0511871 (D4d3 Nov. 19, 2017)
In a case where corporate structure is at issue, it’s mighty confusing when there’s a real live person named “Parent.” Arthur J. Parent, that is. Mr. Parent is the sole stockholder of A.J Parent, Inc. (Which for fun we’ll call the Parent Company.) He also owns a company called Koji’s, which was in the restaurant business, but is now bankrupt.
In a case where corporate structure is at issue, it’s mighty confusing when there’s a real live person named “Parent.” Arthur J. Parent, that is. Mr. Parent is the sole stockholder of A.J Parent, Inc. (Which for fun we’ll call the Parent Company.) He also owns a company called Koji’s, which was in the restaurant business, but is now bankrupt.
Tuesday, August 29, 2017
Common Injuries in Class Cert.
Kizer v. Tristar Risk Mgmt., No. G052558 (D4d3 Jul. 27, 2017)
The trial court denied class cert in a putative wage-and-hour class action brought by insurance claims examiners. The central issue is whether the members of the class were misclassified as exempt administrative employees under the pertinent wage order. Plaintiffs convinced the court that that issue could be tried class-wide. But what they failed to do was to convince the court that, if the class should have been non-exempt, they were subject to an official or de facto policy that required the class members to work overtime. Indeed, Plaintiffs didn’t present very much in the way of evidence that any of the class members worked overtime. Absent that proof, the court found that a common fact issue didn’t exist, much less predominate. It denied cert on that ground and because plaintiff’s claims weren’t typical.
On appeal, plaintiff tries to frame the issue of if and how much overtime each class member worked as addressed only to damages. Individualized damages issues, after all, don’t preclude certification, so long as liability is subject to class-wide resolution. But as the court explains here, that framing isn’t right because there’s a difference between the existence of a common injury and the amount of damages. Whether there was a company-wide overtime requirement goes to liability because misclassification alone doesn’t make the employer liable. (Technically speaking, the exemptions are an affirmative defense.) An employer violates the Labor Code only when an employee who has been misclassified as exempt is required to do stuff that Labor Code says non-exempt employees can’t be made to do. Stuff like working overtime hours without getting time-and-half. And without a company-wide policy (formal or not) imposing such a requirement, liability can’t really be addressed on a class-wide basis.
Affirmed.
The trial court denied class cert in a putative wage-and-hour class action brought by insurance claims examiners. The central issue is whether the members of the class were misclassified as exempt administrative employees under the pertinent wage order. Plaintiffs convinced the court that that issue could be tried class-wide. But what they failed to do was to convince the court that, if the class should have been non-exempt, they were subject to an official or de facto policy that required the class members to work overtime. Indeed, Plaintiffs didn’t present very much in the way of evidence that any of the class members worked overtime. Absent that proof, the court found that a common fact issue didn’t exist, much less predominate. It denied cert on that ground and because plaintiff’s claims weren’t typical.
On appeal, plaintiff tries to frame the issue of if and how much overtime each class member worked as addressed only to damages. Individualized damages issues, after all, don’t preclude certification, so long as liability is subject to class-wide resolution. But as the court explains here, that framing isn’t right because there’s a difference between the existence of a common injury and the amount of damages. Whether there was a company-wide overtime requirement goes to liability because misclassification alone doesn’t make the employer liable. (Technically speaking, the exemptions are an affirmative defense.) An employer violates the Labor Code only when an employee who has been misclassified as exempt is required to do stuff that Labor Code says non-exempt employees can’t be made to do. Stuff like working overtime hours without getting time-and-half. And without a company-wide policy (formal or not) imposing such a requirement, liability can’t really be addressed on a class-wide basis.
Affirmed.
Wednesday, December 21, 2016
Still Goin' . . .
Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corp., No. B244383 (D2d4 Nov. 21, 2016)
This is a really long-pending wage and hour class action. Way back in 2011, while the case was pending trial, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Dukes v. Walmart, which substantially raised the bar for class certification under the Federal Rules. Relying on Dukes, defendants moved to decertify. The trial court granted the motion back in 2012, and the case has been pending appeal since then. But then the California Supreme Court decided Brinker—which focuses the class cert inquiry in wage and hour claims on whether the employer had an illegal policy—and the U.S. Supremes decided Tyson—which permits the use of statistical proof in class actions, albeit only in certain contexts.
After examining a whole pile of precedent decided after the trial court’s decertification order, the Court of Appeal rules that the trial court erred in decertifying the class. The big issue in the case was whether Plaintiff employees—security guards—could be required to eat on-duty meals under the governing wage order. The resolution of that issue could be addressed, per Brinker, to whether the Employer had a policy that unlawfully required on-duty meals, even when they were not merited by the relevant test. Framed that way, common issues predominate. And other issues—such as whether employees signed agreements necessary to make the eligible for on-duty meals—could be decided broadly by dividing the class into subclasses depending on which of a few versions of the Employer’s employment agreement were signed by each class member.
The court goes on to apply the same analysis for plaintiffs rest break and wage statement claims.
Reversed.
This is a really long-pending wage and hour class action. Way back in 2011, while the case was pending trial, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Dukes v. Walmart, which substantially raised the bar for class certification under the Federal Rules. Relying on Dukes, defendants moved to decertify. The trial court granted the motion back in 2012, and the case has been pending appeal since then. But then the California Supreme Court decided Brinker—which focuses the class cert inquiry in wage and hour claims on whether the employer had an illegal policy—and the U.S. Supremes decided Tyson—which permits the use of statistical proof in class actions, albeit only in certain contexts.
After examining a whole pile of precedent decided after the trial court’s decertification order, the Court of Appeal rules that the trial court erred in decertifying the class. The big issue in the case was whether Plaintiff employees—security guards—could be required to eat on-duty meals under the governing wage order. The resolution of that issue could be addressed, per Brinker, to whether the Employer had a policy that unlawfully required on-duty meals, even when they were not merited by the relevant test. Framed that way, common issues predominate. And other issues—such as whether employees signed agreements necessary to make the eligible for on-duty meals—could be decided broadly by dividing the class into subclasses depending on which of a few versions of the Employer’s employment agreement were signed by each class member.
The court goes on to apply the same analysis for plaintiffs rest break and wage statement claims.
Reversed.
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Break Time ...
Safeway v. Superior Court, No. B255216 (D2d4 Jul. 22, 2015)
This is yet another class cert decision that turns on the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). The class is huge—like 200,000 grocery employees over five-and-a-half years. The theory is that Safeway had a consistent practice of not paying the premium wages required under Labor Code § 226.7 “when required,” i.e., whenever it caused the employee to miss a meal break. It’s pretty clear that the top-level theory is certifiable. If a company has a policy of not doing something it’s required to do under wage and hour law, that usually falls within the Brinker standard. The real point of contention is that a premium wage is only owed if the employee doesn’t actually get her break.
Does that mean that, in the absence of a policy not to allow breaks—no one contends that existed—the court will need to do an employee-by-employee assessment of whether breaks were missed? The court of appeal says no. All that has to be shown is a significantly common injury that is subject to class-wide proof. Here, a sampling of Defendants’ payroll records showed that it never paid premium wages under § 226.7, and that there were numerous instances where meal breaks were not clocked during shifts of five or more hours. (Indeed, plaintiffs’ expert said there were potentially tens of millions of them, based on statistical extrapolation.) Although that wouldn’t make Defendant liable per se—Brinker settled the point that an employer isn’t be liable if a meal break is offered but not taken—the records warrant a rebuttable presumption that the breaks were unlawfully withheld. Given that these points are subject to class wide-proof, the court holds that the trial court did not err in certifying a class.
Affirmed.
This is yet another class cert decision that turns on the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). The class is huge—like 200,000 grocery employees over five-and-a-half years. The theory is that Safeway had a consistent practice of not paying the premium wages required under Labor Code § 226.7 “when required,” i.e., whenever it caused the employee to miss a meal break. It’s pretty clear that the top-level theory is certifiable. If a company has a policy of not doing something it’s required to do under wage and hour law, that usually falls within the Brinker standard. The real point of contention is that a premium wage is only owed if the employee doesn’t actually get her break.
Does that mean that, in the absence of a policy not to allow breaks—no one contends that existed—the court will need to do an employee-by-employee assessment of whether breaks were missed? The court of appeal says no. All that has to be shown is a significantly common injury that is subject to class-wide proof. Here, a sampling of Defendants’ payroll records showed that it never paid premium wages under § 226.7, and that there were numerous instances where meal breaks were not clocked during shifts of five or more hours. (Indeed, plaintiffs’ expert said there were potentially tens of millions of them, based on statistical extrapolation.) Although that wouldn’t make Defendant liable per se—Brinker settled the point that an employer isn’t be liable if a meal break is offered but not taken—the records warrant a rebuttable presumption that the breaks were unlawfully withheld. Given that these points are subject to class wide-proof, the court holds that the trial court did not err in certifying a class.
Affirmed.
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Wage & Hour Violations Aren't "Personal Inuries" for Default Purposes
Rodriguez v. Cho, No. B256985 (D2d8 May 7, 2015)
Plaintiff, who cleans offices, filed a wage and hour case against defendant, her employer. The prayer in her complaint demanded damages to be proven at trial and a $10,000 civil penalty. Along with the complaint, she served a “statement of damages” demanding $3.2 million in general, special and punitive damages. Defendant defaulted. At the damages prove up, plaintiff’s prove-up documents sought a little less than $300k. The court ultimately entered a default judgment for about $130k.
Plaintiff, who cleans offices, filed a wage and hour case against defendant, her employer. The prayer in her complaint demanded damages to be proven at trial and a $10,000 civil penalty. Along with the complaint, she served a “statement of damages” demanding $3.2 million in general, special and punitive damages. Defendant defaulted. At the damages prove up, plaintiff’s prove-up documents sought a little less than $300k. The court ultimately entered a default judgment for about $130k.
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Class Cert Denied for Sephora Specialists
Mies v. Sephora USA, Inc., No. A139410 (D1d1 Feb. 26, 2015)
Assistant managers at makeup retailer Sephora—called “Specialists” in Sephora-ise—bring a class action alleging that they are misclassified as exempt from the wage and hour laws. The big issue is whether they spend more than half their time on nonexempt work. Problem for plaintiffs is that “Specialist” turns out to be a pretty broad category at Sephora. Some of them spend the bulk of their time dealing with customers on the sales floor (which is not exempt work). Others spend most of their time on management and training activities (which can be exempt).
The trial court quite reasonably determined that while there might be some simple common legal questions about what work was and was not exempt, the key issue in the case under the relevant legal standard—how did the class members actually spend their time at work—was “heavily individualized.” The court here holds that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “[g]iven the evidence before it, the trial court here could reasonably view the likely disputes at trial as being less about how to classify certain tasks (such as selling) and the impact of company policies, and more about how individual Specialists spend their time.”
Affirmed.
Assistant managers at makeup retailer Sephora—called “Specialists” in Sephora-ise—bring a class action alleging that they are misclassified as exempt from the wage and hour laws. The big issue is whether they spend more than half their time on nonexempt work. Problem for plaintiffs is that “Specialist” turns out to be a pretty broad category at Sephora. Some of them spend the bulk of their time dealing with customers on the sales floor (which is not exempt work). Others spend most of their time on management and training activities (which can be exempt).
The trial court quite reasonably determined that while there might be some simple common legal questions about what work was and was not exempt, the key issue in the case under the relevant legal standard—how did the class members actually spend their time at work—was “heavily individualized.” The court here holds that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “[g]iven the evidence before it, the trial court here could reasonably view the likely disputes at trial as being less about how to classify certain tasks (such as selling) and the impact of company policies, and more about how individual Specialists spend their time.”
Affirmed.
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
Duran Didn't Change the Scene
Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, No. B242807 (D2d7, as modified Dec. 3, 2014)
In this case, the panel had previously reversed a denial of class cert in an employment case. But after the California Supreme Court decided Duran— a case that involved proof by statistical sampling in the class action context—the Supreme Court, which had granted review, transferred the case back to the panel for reconsideration in light of its opinion. The court here modifies its prior option to address Duran but ultimately comes out the same door, particularly given the supreme court’s subsequent decision in Ayala.
In this case, the panel had previously reversed a denial of class cert in an employment case. But after the California Supreme Court decided Duran— a case that involved proof by statistical sampling in the class action context—the Supreme Court, which had granted review, transferred the case back to the panel for reconsideration in light of its opinion. The court here modifies its prior option to address Duran but ultimately comes out the same door, particularly given the supreme court’s subsequent decision in Ayala.
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Shady, Shady Stuff
Lofton v. Wells Fargo, No. A136626 (D1d3, as modified Nov. 20, 2014)
There are two wage-and-hour cases against Wells Fargo. One is a class action. The other is a 600 plaintiff mass joinder case with no certified class. One is in LA, the other in San Francisco. Although they are not coordinated, both cases allegedly resolve at the same mediation. The deal was that the class will settle for $19 million, the 600 plaintiffs will opt out, and then the 600 will settle for $6 million.
But when it comes time to get approval, the individuals don’t opt out. Instead, they file claims in the class settlement, apparently because that’s what their lawyers tell them to do. And nobody tells the court during the approval process that the individual case attorneys—the appropriately named “Initiative Legal Group”—now contend that the whole $6 million was to address their attorneys’ fees.
When one of the individual plaintiffs gets word of ILG’s initiative to steal the settlement fund from their clients, he sues ILG for breach of fiduciary duty. He also intervenes in the (already approved) class action case and gets a TRO from that court preventing ILG from dissipating the $6 million.
The court here affirms that injunction, finding: (1) that issuing the TRO was within the trial court’s ongoing jurisdiction over a class action settlement under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, which includes the authority to act in equity; (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO; (3) that ILG’s constitutional and privacy objections are bogus; and (4) that ILG’s Evidence Code § 1152 settlement privilege objections were harmless or unfounded.
Affirmed.
There are two wage-and-hour cases against Wells Fargo. One is a class action. The other is a 600 plaintiff mass joinder case with no certified class. One is in LA, the other in San Francisco. Although they are not coordinated, both cases allegedly resolve at the same mediation. The deal was that the class will settle for $19 million, the 600 plaintiffs will opt out, and then the 600 will settle for $6 million.
But when it comes time to get approval, the individuals don’t opt out. Instead, they file claims in the class settlement, apparently because that’s what their lawyers tell them to do. And nobody tells the court during the approval process that the individual case attorneys—the appropriately named “Initiative Legal Group”—now contend that the whole $6 million was to address their attorneys’ fees.
When one of the individual plaintiffs gets word of ILG’s initiative to steal the settlement fund from their clients, he sues ILG for breach of fiduciary duty. He also intervenes in the (already approved) class action case and gets a TRO from that court preventing ILG from dissipating the $6 million.
The court here affirms that injunction, finding: (1) that issuing the TRO was within the trial court’s ongoing jurisdiction over a class action settlement under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, which includes the authority to act in equity; (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO; (3) that ILG’s constitutional and privacy objections are bogus; and (4) that ILG’s Evidence Code § 1152 settlement privilege objections were harmless or unfounded.
Affirmed.
Friday, July 11, 2014
In Control ...
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, No. S206874 (Cal. June 30, 2014)
Yet again, a trial court gets reversed for denying cert in a wage and hour case. This time, the case involves newspaper delivery persons who claim to have been misclassified as independent contractors, which deprived them of overtime and other employee protections. The trial court focused on the degree of control the paper actually exerted over the workers performance of their duties. Based on the disparate results of its analysis—some were micromanaged while others left to their own devices—it found that common issues didn’t predominate so it declined to certify the class.
Yet again, a trial court gets reversed for denying cert in a wage and hour case. This time, the case involves newspaper delivery persons who claim to have been misclassified as independent contractors, which deprived them of overtime and other employee protections. The trial court focused on the degree of control the paper actually exerted over the workers performance of their duties. Based on the disparate results of its analysis—some were micromanaged while others left to their own devices—it found that common issues didn’t predominate so it declined to certify the class.
Friday, June 6, 2014
Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., No. S200923 (Cal. May 29, 2014)
In this significant case that the wage-and-hour class action bar has been eagerly awaiting, the California Supreme Court reverses a wage-and-hour class action that actually went to trial. That makes it, as the court explains, “an exceedingly rare beast.” But it isn’t just the fact that this case was tried that is unusual. The way it was tried is also outside of the ordinary. The trial court selected twenty-one plaintiffs out of a total class of 260. It then tried those claims and extrapolated their results class-wide. It refused to admit any evidence outside of the sample plaintiffs. This all resulted in a finding that the entire class was erroneously misclassified as exempt, and a $15 million judgment ($57,000 per class member) against the defendant. While the court does not go so far to say that trial by sample can never be appropriate, what happened in this case can’t withstand scrutiny.
In this significant case that the wage-and-hour class action bar has been eagerly awaiting, the California Supreme Court reverses a wage-and-hour class action that actually went to trial. That makes it, as the court explains, “an exceedingly rare beast.” But it isn’t just the fact that this case was tried that is unusual. The way it was tried is also outside of the ordinary. The trial court selected twenty-one plaintiffs out of a total class of 260. It then tried those claims and extrapolated their results class-wide. It refused to admit any evidence outside of the sample plaintiffs. This all resulted in a finding that the entire class was erroneously misclassified as exempt, and a $15 million judgment ($57,000 per class member) against the defendant. While the court does not go so far to say that trial by sample can never be appropriate, what happened in this case can’t withstand scrutiny.
Wednesday, May 28, 2014
Court Stands up for Brinker in Decertification Appeal
Hall v. Rite Aid Corp., D062909 (D4d1 May 16, 2016)
This is a class action against Rite Aid for not giving seats to cashiers. The trial court originally certified a class on the issue of whether the nature work performed by the cashiers while stationed at their registers reasonably permits the use of seats—the standard under the relevant Wage Order 7-2001. But Rite Aid successfully moved to decertify the class right before trial, based on an argument that the Wage Order required an analysis of the nature the duties of the job as a whole. It successfully argued that individual issues predominated because there was a significant variety as to how much time its employees spent ringing up sales versus other duties that are clearly inconsistent with sitting down.
On appeal, like so many cases decided over the past year, the court reverses based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), which held that the class certification inquiry needs to focus on the plaintiff’s theory of liability without resolving the theory’s legal or factual merits. Plaintiff’s theory here was that the employees’ duties while at their registers were consistent with their use of seats. Under that theory, individual issues did not, in fact, predominate over classwide ones. The trial court thus abused its discretion in decertifying the class. Under Brinker, whether or not the plaintiff’s theory was based on a correct reading of the Wage Order was not an issue that could be resolved on a class cert motion. Instead, Rite Aid could test the theory based on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.
Reversed.
This is a class action against Rite Aid for not giving seats to cashiers. The trial court originally certified a class on the issue of whether the nature work performed by the cashiers while stationed at their registers reasonably permits the use of seats—the standard under the relevant Wage Order 7-2001. But Rite Aid successfully moved to decertify the class right before trial, based on an argument that the Wage Order required an analysis of the nature the duties of the job as a whole. It successfully argued that individual issues predominated because there was a significant variety as to how much time its employees spent ringing up sales versus other duties that are clearly inconsistent with sitting down.
On appeal, like so many cases decided over the past year, the court reverses based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), which held that the class certification inquiry needs to focus on the plaintiff’s theory of liability without resolving the theory’s legal or factual merits. Plaintiff’s theory here was that the employees’ duties while at their registers were consistent with their use of seats. Under that theory, individual issues did not, in fact, predominate over classwide ones. The trial court thus abused its discretion in decertifying the class. Under Brinker, whether or not the plaintiff’s theory was based on a correct reading of the Wage Order was not an issue that could be resolved on a class cert motion. Instead, Rite Aid could test the theory based on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.
Reversed.
Tuesday, December 10, 2013
Four for Four on Class Cert.
Williams v. Superior Court, No. B382577 (D2d8, as modified, Dec. 24, 2013)
For the fourth time in two months, the court of appeal reverses an order denying class certification in a wage and hour case where the plaintiff’s theory of liability was that the defendant maintained an unlawful overtime policy.
For the fourth time in two months, the court of appeal reverses an order denying class certification in a wage and hour case where the plaintiff’s theory of liability was that the defendant maintained an unlawful overtime policy.
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