Showing posts with label claim preclusion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label claim preclusion. Show all posts

Monday, July 11, 2022

Wage and Hour Double-Dip, the Sequel

Grande v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., No. S261247 (Cal. Jun. 30, 2022)

Nurse works for a Temp Service, which placed her in a Hospital. She brought a class action against the Temp Service for employment stuff and got a settlement. The Temp Service got a release. Then Nurse then sued Hospital, again as a class action. Hospital argued that it was within the scope of Temp Service’s release and that claimed that claim preclusion from the settlement barred the action. First the trial court, then the Court of Appeal disagreed, which I first wrote about in the blissful weeks before the onset of the pandemic. But because this opinion was in tension with an earlier case—the 2018 Castillo decision—the Supreme Court granted review.

First, as to the scope of the release, it, as releases often do, listed the Temp Service, and then a long list of categories (officers, directors, etc.) which included agents. The trial court held a bench trial, and, after hearing parol evidence, found that the parties’ use of the term agents did not indicate any mutual intent to release the Hospital. There was substantial evidence in support of that finding, so it is affirmed. Court also notes a that is questionable, from a legal perspective, whether a temp service’s client is it agent. Certainly the employee can be both the temp service’s and the client’s agent, but a the relationship between a temp service and a client doesn’t have the kinds of indicia of control that are the hallmarks of an agency. 

Moving on res judicata, the Court makes the interesting point that there’s a good argument that the preclusive effect of a consent settlement should be defined by the scope of the parties’ consent. That is, if the release didn’t cover the Hospital, it’s not clear why the common law of res judicata should either. It cites a bunch of federal cases for the point. But ultimately finds it unnecessary to decide it.

After some background discussion of claim preclusion, the Court gets to the main issue. Unlike issue preclusion, claim preclusion requires mutuality of parties. They need to be either precisely the same, or in privity. If this is starting to sound like DKN Holdings, that’s because it is, just applied in reverse. And as DKN points out parties that are subject to joint and several liability are not in privity. As the Court here explains, “DKN Holdings makes clear that privity does not exist merely because two entities are allegedly liable for the same wrong to the same plaintiff.”

Court of Appeal affirmed.

Friday, September 25, 2020

The Perils of PAGA

Starks v. Vortex Indus., Inc., No. B288005 (D2d1 Aug. 25, 2020)

Yet again, the Court of Appeal finds that a judgment in a PAGA case is res judicata to another PAGA case alleging the same violations by a different aggrieved employee. That’s not particularly controversial.

This case, however, illustrates how treating PAGA claims as a qui tam and not a class action can yield some pretty funky results. Plaintiff #1 and Plaintiff #2 both have PAGA claims over the same violations. Because Plaintiff #1 was the first to file by about six monts, Plaintiff #2’s case got stayed. 

During the stay, Plaintiff #1 settled. The settlement should have raised some red flags. Plaintiff #1’s lawyers got $630k. Plaintiff #1 got a $10k incentive award. And then $25k was allocated as the penalty for the PAGA violation, which get split 75/25 between the LDWA and the aggrieved employees. So that’s $18,750 for the LWDA and $6,250 for the aggrieved employees, with each aggrieved employee getting $33.30 each. Suffice it to say, a settlement like that that would probably never get approved for a class action. 

But this isn’t a class action. PAGA requires notice to the LDWA and that the court  review and approve any settlement. See Labor Code § 2699(l)(2). So after the deal was struck, Plaintiff #1 mailed the settlement agreement to the LDWA. None of the other aggrieved employees got notice. The parties moved for approval of the settlement on an ex parte basis. The ex parte didn’t explain the potential value of the claims and it did not give any information that would have permitted a loadstar calculation for Plaintiff #1’s attorney’s fees. And it included a specific request that Plaintiff #2 didn’t need to be informed of the settlement. The LDWA never objected, and the trial court approved the settlement and entered judgment. 

Eventually Plaintiff #2 got word of the settlement. About three weeks after the judgment effectuating the settlement had been entered, Plaintiff #2 filed a motion to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure § 663. A few days later, he also filed a motion to intervene. While all this was going on, the LDWA cashed its $18,750 check. Also, Plaintiff #2’s wife got his $33.30 check in the mail and cashed it without telling Plaintiff #2.

The trial court denied Plaintiff #2’s intervention motion as untimely. It denied his § 663 motion because the LDWA—on whose behalf Plaintiff #2 was purporting to act—had cashed its check and thus waived any ability to object to the judgment. And then it granted summary judgment in Plaintiff #2’s case on because of the preclusive effect of the judgment in Case #1. 

Plaintiff #2 appeals in both cases. The Court of Appeal affirms. If you think of a PAGA as a qui tam, each step of its analysis basically makes sense. It’s generally not ok to wait till judgment to intervene. And if a principal (LDWA) accepts the benefit of a settlement, it should not be able to object through some other agent (like Plaintiff #2). And as I said at the top, the res judiciata effect over successive PAGA actions based on the same violations is not controversial.

But treating the analysis as a purely qui tam question leaves out one group of constituents: the other aggrieved employees, who split 25 percent of the penalties. In this case, they got screwed. Because the LDWA is chronically underfunded, it does not have the resources to examine the merits of proposed settlements. So nobody, at any point in the case, was looking out for the interests of the other aggrieved employees. Indeed, although they had money on the line, they didn’t get so much as a notice.

That, generally, is the gist of Justice Bendix’s dissent. She agrees that the intervention was untimely, but she thinks the court should have reached the merits of the § 663 motion and vacated the judgment. As she sees it, because the LDWA is so understaffed, its cashing of a settlement check isn’t really indicative of approval of anything. It is certainly not knowing and voluntary enough to make out a waiver. Nor, for that matter, was Plaintiff #2’s wife’s act of cashing his check enough to show that Plaintiff #2 knowingly accepted the settlement’s benefits. 

And given that Plaintiff #2 had a pecuniary interest that was affected by the terms of the settlement, he should have been considered a “party aggrieved” for both the purposes of § 663 and § 902, which governs standing on appeal. So his objections should have been taken on the merits. And given that the terms of the settlement were so uneven they suggested collusion, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “review and approve” the agreement. Thus, the trial court should have vacated the judgment and conducted further inquiry. And without that judgment, nothing precluded Plaintiff #2’s case.

I get the feeling that a petition for review is in the future here.

Affirmed.

Tuesday, September 15, 2020

PAGA Judicata

Robinson v. So. Counties Oil. Co., No. A158791 (D1d4 Aug. 13, 2020)

The fact that a plaintiff bringing a PAGA claim stands in the shoes of a state agency is generally useful to plaintiffs, since, for instance, it lets them get around arbitration agreements and class action waivers. But in this case it isn’t. Here, a different employee brought and settled a prior PAGA claim, basically for the same violations. And since both claims are effectively brought by the DFEH, this new plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata. 

Affirmed.

Saturday, November 17, 2018

Res Judicata in Ronhert Park

Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park, No. A151896 (D1d1 Sept. 26, 2018)

The Sierra Club sued to stop the construction of a Wal-Mart in Rohnert Park because of something CEQA and alleged violations of zoning laws. A trial court granted a writ on the CEQA issue. But the zoning claim never really got litigated. 


Monday, July 9, 2018

Res Estoppel? Collateral Judicata?

Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., No B277513 (D2d4 May 29, 2018)

Named Plaintiff in this class action was a class member in Class Action #1, a prior wage and hour case against his Employer. Class Action #1 settled and, as a member of the settlement class, Plaintiff got some money. But now he’s a Named Plaintiff in Class Action #2, another wage and hour class action, against the same employer, with roughly the same class period, but on a new legal theory that wasn’t really litigated in Class Action #1. So the question is, do claim or issue preclusion, or the release entered in Class Action #1, bar Class Action #2?


The answer is yes. And the opinion gets that right. But it’s rather hard to follow and it does some weird stuff to getting to a result. 


Friday, June 29, 2018

UC Whistleblower Needs Not Exhaust to Sue

Taswell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. G053960 (D4d3 May 14, 2018)

The Government Code contains a statutory scheme to protect UC employees who become whistleblowers. They can vindicate their rights in an administrative proceeding run by the university system. But the statute also expressly permits a victim of retaliation to file a damages suit “if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the complaint within 18 months.”

Plaintiff here participated in the admin proceeding and lost. He did not, however, seek review of that ruling by filing a writ of administrative mandamus. Instead, he filed a separate lawsuit in superior court. The question is, does his failure to seek review of the admin ruling doom his lawsuit, whether through res judicata or a failure to fully exhaust the prior administrative remedies?

Relying on a Supreme Court case that interpreted an almost identical scheme applicable to CSU employees, the Court of Appeal holds it doesn’t. Although administrative cases can sometimes have preclusive effect, and a failure to seek administrative mandamus can sometimes bar a case for failure to exhaust, it all depends on the way the Legislature sets up the process. The statute here is specifically set up to permit an employee who doesn’t obtain a satisfactory administrative result to bring a de novo case. So Plaintiff’s loss in the prior case and his election not to seek writ review does not doom this one.

Reversed.

Monday, June 18, 2018

Is This Charles Guy Privy With Everyone?




This is a Prop. 65 case about whether there needs to be a disclosure about trace amounts of arsenic that appears in some wine. There’s already a disclosure about alcohol. But plaintiffs want a more general disclosure about other bad chemical stuff too. 

The issue is that most of the defendants in the case settled very similar claims in a prior litigation that resulted in a consent decree. The court holds that, for these defendants, the prior case is claim preclusive to this one.

Which seems mostly fine, except that the plaintiffs in this case aren’t the same plaintiffs who brought the the first case. As good should 1Ls know—and the Supreme Court made super duper clear a few years ago—claim preclusion (i.e., res judicata) only works when the same parties, or those in privity with those parties, are in both cases. Now, maybe there’s something about Prop. 65 litigation that makes every plaintiff privy with every other. Perhaps they are all bringing some quitamish thing on behalf of the public? I’m not a Prop. 65 guy, so I don’t know. But one would at least expect some discussion of the point, and there’s not any in the opinion here. So I’m confused.

Affirmed.

Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Wage-and-Hour Double Dip Rejected

Castillo v. Glenair, Inc., No. B278239 (D2d2 Apr. 16, 2018) 

Plaintiffs here are temps. They brought a wage-and-hour class action against their Temp Service and got a settlement. Now, they want to bring another class action against the Company they were tempted out. They allege the same claims, for the same work done, during the same time frame, based on a theory is that the Company was a joint employer with or alter ego or agent of the Service. But the court put the kybosh on that. 


Under Plaintiffs own theory, the Service and the Company were in a privy relationship. The privity means a judgment* against the Service is a judgment against the Company, which means claim preclusion bars this case. Or alternatively, Plaintiffs also claimed the Company acted as the Service’s agent. Since the release in the settlement released Service’s “agents,” it also released the claims against the Company.

Affirmed.


*Under Rule of Court 3.769(h), a class action settlement must be entered as a judgment.

Thursday, February 15, 2018

SOL Is Not OTM

Boyd v. Freeman, No. B279246 (D2d4 Dec. 20, 2017)

When a case is brought to judgment, res judicata bars litigation of all claims that were brought or could have been brought in the first action. But it applies only when the first judgment is “on the merits.” Interestingly, a demurrer granted on statute of limitations grounds is not, for claim preclusion purposes, on the merits. Not sure why that is the case, but the case law seems pretty clear on the point.

Which means no res judiciata in this case. Of course, given that the prior case was dismissed on the statute of limitations, and that this case was filed three years after that, it’s hard to conceive of how this case isn’t also time-barred. But that’s apparently a problem for the superior court on remand.

Reversed.

Friday, October 27, 2017

The Dead Hand of the Past

Ly v. Cnty. of Fresno, No. F072351 (D5 Oct. 12, 2017)

Plaintiffs are some prison guards who claim employment discrimination. But along with their FEHA claims, they also filed a workers’ comp appeal for the emotional injuries that arose from the same alleged discriminatory acts. The workers’ comp cases—which are an ALJ proceedings—moved faster than the discrimination case in court. The ALJs found adversely to plaintiffs in each of the workers comp cases, with each case finding that the adverse actions were not motivated by discriminatory animus.


Monday, September 25, 2017

Some Tricky Stuff About Privity

Cal. Sierra Dev., Inc. v. George Reed, Inc., No. C080397 (D3 Aug. 22, 2017)

MineCo and SurfaceCo share rights to some land. Under their agreement, MineCo has the right to mine for gold and SurfaceCo has the right to the surface. SurfaceCo licenses its right to OppCo to build a plant on the surface. Problem is, that interferes with MineCo’s operations. 

Friday, March 10, 2017

There's No Intra-Case Res Judicata

Samara v. Matar, No. B2657525 (D2d7 Feb. 15, 2017)

P brings a dental malpractice claim against Dentist and against Dentist’s Employer. Employer was sued both on a respondeat superior theory and for negligently retaining Dentist, who supposedly had some licensing issues. Dentist wins SJ on the alternative grounds of the statute of limitations and lack of causation. The court of appeal affirms on the SOL, but expressly doesn’t reach causation. On remand, Employer moves for SJ, arguing that the prior no-causation ruling is preclusive in a way that prevents vicarious liability based on Dentist’s conduct. Trial court grants the motion.


There’s a bunch of case law that says that non-mutual collateral estoppel can’t apply to an adverse finding that is appealed, but which the appellate court expressly declines to reach. The trial court here, however, tried to sidestep those cases by claiming that the issue here was res judicata, not collateral estoppel. (Viz., claim, not issue, preclusion). But the preclusive power of res judicata applies only to separate lawsuits. As the judgment against Dentist was entered within the same case, res judicata doesn’t apply. 


Which means if there’s going to be preclusion, it will have to come from collateral estoppel. But collateral estoppel only applies to issues that are actually decided. And the cases are pretty clear that an issue isn’t “actually decided” when it’s appealed but the appellate court expressly declines to reach it. 


Reversed.

Tuesday, June 7, 2016

Having a Bankrupt Co-Fraudster Doesn't Get You Off the Hook

Patel v. Crown Diamonds, Inc., No. G051439 (D4d3 Apr. 29, 2016)
A bunch of guys and their company allegedly swindled a Widow out of her money. One of the guys went BK and had all his debts discharged, over Widow’s objection. But the others didn’t go BK. Nor did their company. The widow sued them for fraud. Defendants moved for sanctions, claiming that the case was frivolous because the rejection of Widow’s objection to the discharge of BK guy’s debts barred the claims under res judicata. For some crazy reason, the trial court agreed, struck plaintiff’s complaint, and awarded Defendants over $12k for their fees.

The Court of Appeal reverses. A discharge against one party to a multi-defendant tort does not discharge the others unless they are in privity. And as the Supreme Court recently explained in the DKN case, ordinary joint tortfeasors like co-fraudsters are not in privity for preclusion purposes. If three guys commit fraud and one of them gets out—whether by discharge in BK, settlement, release, or judgment—res judicata doesn’t bar claims against the others. Nor would collateral estoppel apply because there was no common issue decided adversely to Widow’s claim in that proceeding.

Reversed.

Monday, May 9, 2016

Palmetto State Hail Mary Falls Flat in D2d6.

Hawkins. v. Suntrust Bank, No. B264541 (D2d6, on denial of rehearing, April 4, 2016)

Plaintiff’s South Carolina residence got judicially foreclosed on by a court there. She tried to challenge that by filing a wrongful foreclosure case against the bank in Ventura County. But under res judicata principles, the South Carolina judgment is preclusive. Plaintiff tries to argue that there was no personal jurisdiction in the South Carolina case, which would be a legit ground to avoid preclusion. Her problem is that the South Carolina judgment contains a factual finding that she was, in fact, served with a summons and complaint in the judicial foreclosure case. And she can’t attack that factual finding by filing a new case here.

Plaintiff further objects to the taking of judicial notice of the order containing the findings, but that fails too. Generally speaking, court documents are subject to judicial notice of their existence, but not for the truth of any statements contained in them. Here, the service finding in the South Carolina judgment is not significant because it proves that plaintiff was, in fact served. To the contrary, it is significant because it shows that the South Carolina court found she was served, which meets the test for the purposes of preclusion, regardless of whether it is ultimately true or not. 

Affirmed.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Know when to Fold 'Em.

Bucur v. Ahmad, No. D068689 (D3d1 Jan. 26, 2016)

Plaintiffs in this case are on their fifth lawsuit over more or less the same operative facts. The court of appeal upholds dismissal on several theories, and also permits an award of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7.

 

Monday, April 27, 2015

Basta!

Boyce v. T.D. Serv. Co., No. B255958 (D2d6, Mar. 23, 2015)

This is a typical mortgage foreclosure avoidance case of the sort that have been clogging up the courts for quite a while now. Plaintiff in this case had previously went bankrupt, during which proceedings a federal bankruptcy court determined that a foreclosure wouldn’t be wrongful, which the federal district court affirmed. And a state court also made a similar finding in an unlawful detainer case that determined that plaintiff no longer had a right to occupy the home. So unsurprisingly, plaintiff’s case here was doubly barred by res judicata. 


The court—the Ventura panel that handles the D2 cases from Santa Barbara—concludes with sort of a tribute quote from Judge Aldisert, a recently departed judge of the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals who had for several decades located his his senior-status chambers in S.B.: “As the late eminent federal appellate jurist Rugierro Aldisert would say, ‘Basta,’ which translates from Italian to English as, Enough!”


Affirmed.


Update: Review granted, July 15, 2015.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

On the Merits...

Hardy v. America’s Best Home Loans, No. F067389 (D5 Dec. 22, 2014)

Plaintiff filed a pro se federal case against defendant, which was ultimately dismissed
“on the merits” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) because he failed to file an amended complaint after a motion to dismiss with leave to amend was granted by the federal district court. Plaintiff re-filed his claims in state court, based on the same factual allegations. On the eve of trial, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, on the grounds that the claims were barred by the collateral estoppel effect of the prior dismissal. The trial court granted the motion.

On appeal, the parties agree that a dismissal for failure to prosecute is has no preclusive effect under California law because they are not “on the merits.” But defendant argues that federal common law—the law of the venue entering the prior dismissal—controls the preclusivity of the order. It says that the court’s designation of the Rule 41(b) dismissal as “on the merits” means that the dismissal did have preclusive effect.


That is about one-third right. As the Supreme Court explained in Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001), federal law does control the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment. But Rule 41(b)’s designation of a dismissal as “on the merits” does not control the issue, federal common law does.  And when the judgment is a state law claim brought in diversity, the federal rule generally borrows the state rule of decision, absent some incompatibility with federal interests.  Because the claims at issue here were state law claims, there would be no preclusion because California law would not interpret the state equivalent of a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute as having a preclusive effect.


The court goes on to say that even if the federal rule applies, there would nonetheless be no collateral estoppel because plaintiff’s claims were not actually litigated in the prior case—a requirement for federal issue preclusion.  Even if a dismissal under Rule 41(b) as a penalty for failure to prosecute could give rise to preclusion under res judicata, since it does not actually litigate the merits of the claims, dismissing them based on collateral estoppel would have been inappropriate. (Which begs the question -- Why didn’t defendant move for judgment on the pleadings on res judiciata too?).


Reversed.

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