The Perils of PAGA

Starks v. Vortex Indus., Inc., No. B288005 (D2d1 Aug. 25, 2020)

Yet again, the Court of Appeal finds that a judgment in a PAGA case is res judicata to another PAGA case alleging the same violations by a different aggrieved employee. That’s not particularly controversial.

This case, however, illustrates how treating PAGA claims as a qui tam and not a class action can yield some pretty funky results. Plaintiff #1 and Plaintiff #2 both have PAGA claims over the same violations. Because Plaintiff #1 was the first to file by about six monts, Plaintiff #2’s case got stayed. 

During the stay, Plaintiff #1 settled. The settlement should have raised some red flags. Plaintiff #1’s lawyers got $630k. Plaintiff #1 got a $10k incentive award. And then $25k was allocated as the penalty for the PAGA violation, which get split 75/25 between the LDWA and the aggrieved employees. So that’s $18,750 for the LWDA and $6,250 for the aggrieved employees, with each aggrieved employee getting $33.30 each. Suffice it to say, a settlement like that that would probably never get approved for a class action. 

But this isn’t a class action. PAGA requires notice to the LDWA and that the court  review and approve any settlement. See Labor Code § 2699(l)(2). So after the deal was struck, Plaintiff #1 mailed the settlement agreement to the LDWA. None of the other aggrieved employees got notice. The parties moved for approval of the settlement on an ex parte basis. The ex parte didn’t explain the potential value of the claims and it did not give any information that would have permitted a loadstar calculation for Plaintiff #1’s attorney’s fees. And it included a specific request that Plaintiff #2 didn’t need to be informed of the settlement. The LDWA never objected, and the trial court approved the settlement and entered judgment. 

Eventually Plaintiff #2 got word of the settlement. About three weeks after the judgment effectuating the settlement had been entered, Plaintiff #2 filed a motion to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure § 663. A few days later, he also filed a motion to intervene. While all this was going on, the LDWA cashed its $18,750 check. Also, Plaintiff #2’s wife got his $33.30 check in the mail and cashed it without telling Plaintiff #2.

The trial court denied Plaintiff #2’s intervention motion as untimely. It denied his § 663 motion because the LDWA—on whose behalf Plaintiff #2 was purporting to act—had cashed its check and thus waived any ability to object to the judgment. And then it granted summary judgment in Plaintiff #2’s case on because of the preclusive effect of the judgment in Case #1. 

Plaintiff #2 appeals in both cases. The Court of Appeal affirms. If you think of a PAGA as a qui tam, each step of its analysis basically makes sense. It’s generally not ok to wait till judgment to intervene. And if a principal (LDWA) accepts the benefit of a settlement, it should not be able to object through some other agent (like Plaintiff #2). And as I said at the top, the res judiciata effect over successive PAGA actions based on the same violations is not controversial.

But treating the analysis as a purely qui tam question leaves out one group of constituents: the other aggrieved employees, who split 25 percent of the penalties. In this case, they got screwed. Because the LDWA is chronically underfunded, it does not have the resources to examine the merits of proposed settlements. So nobody, at any point in the case, was looking out for the interests of the other aggrieved employees. Indeed, although they had money on the line, they didn’t get so much as a notice.

That, generally, is the gist of Justice Bendix’s dissent. She agrees that the intervention was untimely, but she thinks the court should have reached the merits of the § 663 motion and vacated the judgment. As she sees it, because the LDWA is so understaffed, its cashing of a settlement check isn’t really indicative of approval of anything. It is certainly not knowing and voluntary enough to make out a waiver. Nor, for that matter, was Plaintiff #2’s wife’s act of cashing his check enough to show that Plaintiff #2 knowingly accepted the settlement’s benefits. 

And given that Plaintiff #2 had a pecuniary interest that was affected by the terms of the settlement, he should have been considered a “party aggrieved” for both the purposes of § 663 and § 902, which governs standing on appeal. So his objections should have been taken on the merits. And given that the terms of the settlement were so uneven they suggested collusion, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “review and approve” the agreement. Thus, the trial court should have vacated the judgment and conducted further inquiry. And without that judgment, nothing precluded Plaintiff #2’s case.

I get the feeling that a petition for review is in the future here.

Affirmed.

PAGA Judicata

Robinson v. So. Counties Oil. Co., No. A158791 (D1d4 Aug. 13, 2020)

The fact that a plaintiff bringing a PAGA claim stands in the shoes of a state agency is generally useful to plaintiffs, since, for instance, it lets them get around arbitration agreements and class action waivers. But in this case it isn’t. Here, a different employee brought and settled a prior PAGA claim, basically for the same violations. And since both claims are effectively brought by the DFEH, this new plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata. 

Affirmed.

Wage and Hour Double Dip

Grande v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., No. E068730 (D4d2 Feb. 6, 2020)

Plaintiff is a nurse who works for a Temp Service who assigned her to work at Hospital. She brought a wage and hour class action against Temp Service in Santa Barbara Superior. A year later, Nurse sued Hospital, in Riverside Superior, for basically the same violations, albeit with a slightly different class period. Hospital sent Temp Service a letter demanding indemnification under the terms of their staffing agreement.

Four years later, the Sana Barbara case settled. Nurse got paid and Temp Service got a release. The record seems to reflect that the settlement amount was low because Temp Service had solvency issues. The court entered the settlement as a judgment, as is required for class actions in California.
Temp Service—still facing Hospital’s indemnification demand—then intervened in the Riverside case and sought dismissal based on the release or res judicata. The trial court held a bench trial on these issues and ultimately denied both defendants. Hospital wasn’t a release, even under the typically expansive “agents, officers, affiliates, etc.” in the release. And Hospital and Temp Service weren’t in privity, which precludes res judicata. Temp Service appealed and Hospital took a writ. 

The Court of Appeal affirms. On res judicata, the Court—relying on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in DKN Holdings—explains how joint and several liability and privity are not the same thing. The distinction is particular evident here, given that each defendant was responsible only for its own wage and hour violations. Given that, for instance, Temp Service could have defended its case by claiming that the violations were as a result of on-site conditions put in place by Hospital, it’s hard to say that the two defendants’ interests were sufficiently enough aligned that they could be in privity. 

Nor did the existence of the indemnity create privity. Indeed, that created a dis-alignment of interests that actually pushes in the other direction. Interestingly, the Court’s result here puts this case in some tension with the 2D’s 2018’s decision in Castillo which the Court here (likely correctly) explains applied a test for privity that is inconsistent with DKN Holdings.

So far as the release goes, despite the expansive listing of categories of releasees, none of them really encompass the provider-client relationship between the Temp Service and the Hospital. The defendants make a play at arguing that they are “affiliates” or “agents” of each other. But affiliates generally connotes some level of common control or interlinking equity interests. And agency requires a fiduciary relationship coupled with a measure of control. A vanilla contractual relationship is not enough to meet those ordinary definitions. And broader, more unusual definitions aren’t called for under edjusdem generis and noscitur a sociis-type rules of contractual interpretation.

Justice Ramirez dissents. He does not believe that Castillo is so wrongly decided that it is not worth following on stare decisis grounds. 

Affirmed. 

Collateral Attack on Kansas Judgment Fails

Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers, No. B290492 (D2d6 Jan. 13, 2020)

Defendant got hit with a $3.825 million judgment in Kansas. He didn’t post a bond to stay enforcement on appeal. Plaintiff domesticated the judgment in San Luis Obispo Superior Court under the Sister State Money Judgment Act, Code Civ. Proc. § 1710.10, et seq. Defendant moved to vacate the California judgment, which the trial court denied. The trial court ordered that Defendant needed to post a bond of 150 percent of the judgment to stay execution in California. Defendant appealed, without posting the bond. While this appeal was pending, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Kansas Supreme Court denied review.
 
The finality of the Kansas case is res judicata in California. Under full faith and credit, a judgment debtor can’t collaterally attack a judgment of another state’s courts because it’s wrong, or it’s inconsistent with state policy. He can only challenge it on grounds under which he can challenge an in-state judgment. Like non-finality, lack of jurisdiction, prior satisfaction, or extrinsic fraud. Once the Kansas judgment was final, none of those grounds even potentially exist in this case.
 
Affirmed.

"This Vexatious Litigant Refuses to Stop Biting."

Colombo v. Kinkle, Rodiger & Spriggs, No. G055823 (D4d3 May 16, 2019)

Plaintiff here is a pro se that lost a case a long time ago and has been suing his attorneys over and over again since then. Four years ago, he got tagged with a pre-filing order under Code of Civil Procedure § 391.7. So he needs to get the presiding judge to sign off before he files any more cases pro se. He tried to sue the attorneys again. But the PJ said no, his claims were time-barred. He sought reconsideration, filed an appeal (which was deemed a writ) and came up zero on everything.

Meanwhile, he filed another lawsuit against the same lawyers. The PJ had turned over in the interim and current PJ (no doubt unawares of the last case) let him proceed. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata. The trial court granted the motion, but on the ground the case was time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirms, but on res judiciata grounds. The first prefiling denial was a final decision on the merits, so it operates as a bar.

Affirmed.

Class Action Tolls Only Individual Claims

Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant, No. D071904A (D4d1, Feb. 15, 2019)

When this case was first decided last year, I noted that the opinion seemed sideways with the U.S. Supreme Court’s very recent decision in China Agritech. That case held that although under the so-called American Pipe doctrine, a pending class action tolls the statute of limitations for class members’ individual claims, but it does not do so for other class actions. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the 4/1, ordering it to reconsider in light of China Agritech. 

Post-transfer, the Court of Appeal agrees that the rule in China Agritech should also be adopted as a matter of California state class action procedure. So no tolling for the prior class action. The Court, however still can’t tell what’s time barred from the face of the complaint, so it remands for the trial court to deal with that issue. 

In getting there, the Court decides an alternative issue. Apparently, the prior class action was dismissed after a class was certified for failure to bring it to trial within five years under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 583.310 and 583.360. Defendant claims that the current class claims are barred from the res judicata effect of that dismissal. But they aren’t. A dismissal under the five-year rule is not with prejudice and thus not preclusive. Practically, since five years is longer than most statutes of limitations, a plaintiff dismissed under the five-year rule won’t be able to refile. But it is nonetheless theoretically possible, particularly if some post-filing tolling like American Pipe is in the mix.

Reversed.

Res Judicata in Ronhert Park

Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park, No. A151896 (D1d1 Sept. 26, 2018)

The Sierra Club sued to stop the construction of a Wal-Mart in Rohnert Park because of something CEQA and alleged violations of zoning laws. A trial court granted a writ on the CEQA issue. But the zoning claim never really got litigated. 

Res Estoppel? Collateral Judicata?

Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., No B277513 (D2d4 May 29, 2018)

Named Plaintiff in this class action was a class member in Class Action #1, a prior wage and hour case against his Employer. Class Action #1 settled and, as a member of the settlement class, Plaintiff got some money. But now he’s a Named Plaintiff in Class Action #2, another wage and hour class action, against the same employer, with roughly the same class period, but on a new legal theory that wasn’t really litigated in Class Action #1. So the question is, do claim or issue preclusion, or the release entered in Class Action #1, bar Class Action #2?

The answer is yes. And the opinion gets that right. But it’s rather hard to follow and it does some weird stuff to getting to a result. 

UC Whistleblower Needs Not Exhaust to Sue

Taswell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. G053960 (D4d3 May 14, 2018)

The Government Code contains a statutory scheme to protect UC employees who become whistleblowers. They can vindicate their rights in an administrative proceeding run by the university system. But the statute also expressly permits a victim of retaliation to file a damages suit “if the university has not satisfactorily addressed the complaint within 18 months.”

Plaintiff here participated in the admin proceeding and lost. He did not, however, seek review of that ruling by filing a writ of administrative mandamus. Instead, he filed a separate lawsuit in superior court. The question is, does his failure to seek review of the admin ruling doom his lawsuit, whether through res judicata or a failure to fully exhaust the prior administrative remedies?

Relying on a Supreme Court case that interpreted an almost identical scheme applicable to CSU employees, the Court of Appeal holds it doesn’t. Although administrative cases can sometimes have preclusive effect, and a failure to seek administrative mandamus can sometimes bar a case for failure to exhaust, it all depends on the way the Legislature sets up the process. The statute here is specifically set up to permit an employee who doesn’t obtain a satisfactory administrative result to bring a de novo case. So Plaintiff’s loss in the prior case and his election not to seek writ review does not doom this one.

Reversed.

If It Evades Review, It Evades Preclusion

Samara v. Matar, No. S240918 (Cal. Jun. 25, 2018)

The Supreme Court here upholds a 2017 Court of Appeal ruling, albeit on slightly different grounds.

Is This Charles Guy Privy With Everyone?

Charles v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc., No. B275295 (D2d4 May 9, 2018)

This is a Prop. 65 case about whether there needs to be a disclosure about trace amounts of arsenic that appears in some wine. There’s already a disclosure about alcohol. But plaintiffs want a more general disclosure about other bad chemical stuff too. 

The issue is that most of the defendants in the case settled very similar claims in a prior litigation that resulted in a consent decree. The court holds that, for these defendants, the prior case is claim preclusive to this one.

Which seems mostly fine, except that the plaintiffs in this case aren’t the same plaintiffs who brought the the first case. As good should 1Ls know—and the Supreme Court made super duper clear a few years ago—claim preclusion (i.e., res judicata) only works when the same parties, or those in privity with those parties, are in both cases. Now, maybe there’s something about Prop. 65 litigation that makes every plaintiff privy with every other. Perhaps they are all bringing some quitamish thing on behalf of the public? I’m not a Prop. 65 guy, so I don’t know. But one would at least expect some discussion of the point, and there’s not any in the opinion here. So I’m confused.

Affirmed.

SOL Is Not OTM

Boyd v. Freeman, No. B279246 (D2d4 Dec. 20, 2017)

When a case is brought to judgment, res judicata bars litigation of all claims that were brought or could have been brought in the first action. But it applies only when the first judgment is “on the merits.” Interestingly, a demurrer granted on statute of limitations grounds is not, for claim preclusion purposes, on the merits. Not sure why that is the case, but the case law seems pretty clear on the point.

Which means no res judiciata in this case. Of course, given that the prior case was dismissed on the statute of limitations, and that this case was filed three years after that, it’s hard to conceive of how this case isn’t also time-barred. But that’s apparently a problem for the superior court on remand.

Reversed.

The Dead Hand of the Past

Ly v. Cnty. of Fresno, No. F072351 (D5 Oct. 12, 2017)

Plaintiffs are some prison guards who claim employment discrimination. But along with their FEHA claims, they also filed a workers’ comp appeal for the emotional injuries that arose from the same alleged discriminatory acts. The workers’ comp cases—which are an ALJ proceedings—moved faster than the discrimination case in court. The ALJs found adversely to plaintiffs in each of the workers comp cases, with each case finding that the adverse actions were not motivated by discriminatory animus.

A Hot Mess of Preclusion

F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim, No. G052460 (D4d3 Sept. 19, 2017)

This is a civil rights case over a police shooting with a complicated procedural history. Plaintiff first filed in federal court, bringing a § 1983 claim as well as several pendant state claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the § 1983 and declined ongoing supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). A three judge 9th Circuit panel upheld the district court’s opinion on appeal. Plaintiff sought review en banc.

In the meantime, plaintiff refiled his state claims in state court. But since they were premised on the same factual scenario as the federal claims and governed by similar standards, the superior court found that the state claims were barred by the collateral estoppel effect of the federal judgment, even though the appeals were not final. (Federal preclusion applies from the entry of judgment, even when appeals are pending.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

But then the 9th Circuit granted review en banc and eventually reversed its the panel decision and the district court as well. Cert was eventually denied.

So plaintiffs filed a new state court case and moved to have the prior judgment vacated. The superior court denied the motion and the Court of Appeal denied a writ. The superior court then dismissed the new case, on res judicata grounds—the prior dismissal barred the new case, even though the preclusion that served as the basis of that case’s dismissal would no longer apply. Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff first argues that the en banc opinion automatically wipes out the first state court judgment. But that’s not consistent with the law. Under § 16 of the Restatement of Judgments—which is generally followed in California—when a judgement in case #2 is based on a judgment in case #1, the vacation of judgment #1 does not automatically nullify judgment #2. Instead, it subjects judgment #2 to being set aside through a procedurally appropriate vehicle. 

Nor can Plaintiff collaterally attack or obtain equitable relief from the earlier state court judgment. Restatement § 73 suggests that it is appropriate to give relief from a second judgment when it is based on an earlier judgment that is substantively vacated. That’s a grounds for relief from judgment that is specially enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). But for weird historical reasons, California does not have a clean Rule 60(b) analog.  

California does permit the equitable setting aside of a judgment—whether by motion filed in the original case or by filing a separate equitable action. But the grounds for that are very narrow. To vacate, a judgment needs to be facially void or the product of extrinsic fraud. While extrinsic fraud can be hard to define, there’s no way that the 9th Circuit’s en banc order turned the judgment in the first state case into a product of extrinsic fraud. So none of California’s procedural vehicles to set aside a judgment that was based on an earlier judgment that was reversed apply to the circumstances presented here.

At this point, the Court of Appeal is pretty boxed in. Because the judgment in the first case is final—indeed, affirmed on appeal—there isn’t any state law procedure to let plaintiff out from under that judgment. That’s the case even though the result is indisputably wrong, based as it is on the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment that was subsequently overturned.

So the court uses the only tool left. There’s an exception to res judicata when recognizing the effect of the first judgment would work a manifest injustice. An exception that is mostly recognized in cases that say that it doesn’t apply. But given the “highly unusual, even extraordinary” circumstances of the case, the court finds that the exception applies here. The essential concerns motivating preclusion doctrines aren’t present here. Indeed, applying preclusion runs contrary to the idea that cases deserve to be decided on the merits. And since the only merits decision in this case that informed the preclusion rulings was overturned as wrongly decided, the court declines to recognize the preclusive effect of the first judgment.

Reversed.

FWIW, I suppose there is a second option, but not in this court. The federal case is going back to the district court for trial. Given that there’s now a federal claim for the state claims to be pendent to, plaintiff could add the state claims back there, and they should relate back to the federal claim for staute of limitations purposes, since they are all based on the same conduct. But I get why the court here sees the need to step in to avoid an injustice.

Some Tricky Stuff About Privity

Cal. Sierra Dev., Inc. v. George Reed, Inc., No. C080397 (D3 Aug. 22, 2017)

MineCo and SurfaceCo share rights to some land. Under their agreement, MineCo has the right to mine for gold and SurfaceCo has the right to the surface. SurfaceCo licenses its right to OppCo to build a plant on the surface. Problem is, that interferes with MineCo’s operations. 

Not Claim Barred, But Time Barred

Ivanoff v. Bank of America, No. B271035 (Mar. 13, 2017)

Plaintiff is a pro se seeking to avoid a foreclosure. She already lost a breach of contract case against the bank, which was affirmed on appeal. Shortly thereafter, she filed a new case repackaging the same allegations as violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act, aka TILA. The superior court dismissed on claim preclusion grounds.

And the Court of Appeal affirms, albeit for different reasons. The court holds that the TILA claim was not barred by res judicata, because it arose from a different primary right. Nobody really understands what a primary right is, but apparently a claim for breach of contract arises from a different right than a claim for false disclosures under TILA. But regardless, the TILA claim was time barred. As were the other claims at issue in the appeal.

Affirmed.

There's No Intra-Case Res Judicata

Samara v. Matar, No. B2657525 (D2d7 Feb. 15, 2017)

P brings a dental malpractice claim against Dentist and against Dentist’s Employer. Employer was sued both on a respondeat superior theory and for negligently retaining Dentist, who supposedly had some licensing issues. Dentist wins SJ on the alternative grounds of the statute of limitations and lack of causation. The court of appeal affirms on the SOL, but expressly doesn’t reach causation. On remand, Employer moves for SJ, arguing that the prior no-causation ruling is preclusive in a way that prevents vicarious liability based on Dentist’s conduct. Trial court grants the motion.

There’s a bunch of case law that says that non-mutual collateral estoppel can’t apply to an adverse finding that is appealed, but which the appellate court expressly declines to reach. The trial court here, however, tried to sidestep those cases by claiming that the issue here was res judicata, not collateral estoppel. (Viz., claim, not issue, preclusion). But the preclusive power of res judicata applies only to separate lawsuits. As the judgment against Dentist was entered within the same case, res judicata doesn’t apply. 

Which means if there’s going to be preclusion, it will have to come from collateral estoppel. But collateral estoppel only applies to issues that are actually decided. And the cases are pretty clear that an issue isn’t “actually decided” when it’s appealed but the appellate court expressly declines to reach it. 

Reversed.

“Somewhere Along the Line, Litigation Must Cease.”

Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. B272427 (D2d6 Jan. 24, 2107)

Plaintiff in this case has successfully used serial litigation to delay foreclosure on his mortgage, which he stopped paying in 2009. He has already lost two state court cases (and appeals), a federal case (and appeal), and a case in bankruptcy court. The court here is not amused. It dutifully walks through and sustains the trial court's demurrer on each cause of action. It then (perhaps sua sponte) drops some knowledge on the import of res judiciata in a section called “The Sanctity and Integrity of Final Judgment.” The Court calls out plaintiff (an attorney) for treating “adverse final judgments as mere suggestions which allow him to perpetually file new lawsuits on new theories.” Explaining that “[h]e is wrong,” the Court of Appeal specifically points out that the doctrine will also bar any future claim brought by Plaintiff addressed to foreclosure on his house. 

Affirmed.

Having a Bankrupt Co-Fraudster Doesn't Get You Off the Hook

Patel v. Crown Diamonds, Inc., No. G051439 (D4d3 Apr. 29, 2016)
A bunch of guys and their company allegedly swindled a Widow out of her money. One of the guys went BK and had all his debts discharged, over Widow’s objection. But the others didn’t go BK. Nor did their company. The widow sued them for fraud. Defendants moved for sanctions, claiming that the case was frivolous because the rejection of Widow’s objection to the discharge of BK guy’s debts barred the claims under res judicata. For some crazy reason, the trial court agreed, struck plaintiff’s complaint, and awarded Defendants over $12k for their fees.

The Court of Appeal reverses. A discharge against one party to a multi-defendant tort does not discharge the others unless they are in privity. And as the Supreme Court recently explained in the DKN case, ordinary joint tortfeasors like co-fraudsters are not in privity for preclusion purposes. If three guys commit fraud and one of them gets out—whether by discharge in BK, settlement, release, or judgment—res judicata doesn’t bar claims against the others. Nor would collateral estoppel apply because there was no common issue decided adversely to Widow’s claim in that proceeding.

Reversed.

Three Generations of Vex Is Enough

Goodrich v. Sierra Vista Regional Med. Ctr., No. B259726 (D2d6 Apr. 27, 2016)

Plaintiff, pro per, keeps trying to re-litigate the denial of a writ of administrative mandamus in which she unsuccessfully sought to challenge a hospital’s termination of her staff privileges. (Notably, she never appealed the initial denial.) On her second go at it, the trial court warned her that any more meritless filings could result in her being declared a vexatious litigant. She nonetheless did it again. So the curt made good on its word. It found that Plaintiff was a vexatious litigatant, under Code of Civil Procedure § 391(b)(2) and (3), and required her to post a $25k bond and obtain pre-filing leave before filing any more motions or actions.

The Court of Appeal affirms over a substantial evidence challenge. Under § 391(b)(2), one way to be a vexatious litigant is to repeatedly attempt to relitigate an issue or claim that has been finally determined against the person. Plaintiff contents that “repeatedly” requires more than three. But the court—relying on dicta in Morton v. Wagner, 156 Cal. App. 4th 963 (2007)—holds that three can be enough. So long as the record supports that “repeatedly relitigating issues previously decided in [a prior] judgment unreasonably burdened both [the opposing party] and the court, which had to expend time and other resources addressing the motions and appearing at unnecessary hearings.” Which was the case here.

For belt and suspenders, the court also affirms the finding under § 391(b)(3), which alternatively defines a vexatious litigant as one who “repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” Filing repeated and fruitless motions to collaterally attack a final judgment meets that standard. Particularly when Plaintiff continued to do so even after being admonished by the trial court.

Affirmed.