Hassell v. Bird, No. S235968 (Cal. July 2, 2018)
Like me, the California Supreme Court found this 2016 opinion problematic. It granted review and now issues one of the more fractured opinions I've seen from the Court in recent years.
Showing posts with label injunctive relief. Show all posts
Showing posts with label injunctive relief. Show all posts
Monday, September 17, 2018
Thursday, April 7, 2016
Court for Me, but Arb for You, Means Court for Everyone.
Carbajal v. CWSP, Inc., No G050438 (D4d3 Feb. 26, 2016)
The Court of Appeal here affirms a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on a finding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable. The clause was contained in an adhesive employment contract, which made it mildly procedurally unconscionable. That was made worse by the fact that it called for the use of “the rules of AAA,” without identifying which of the 100+ sets of AAA rules were to apply. Nor did it include or provide a means of accessing the applicable rules.
But what really kills the deal is the one-sidedness of the substance. It let only the employer go to court to get injunctive relief, and specifically waived any bond requirement in doing so. And it waived the employee’s right to get statutory fees on her Labor Code claims. Balancing the procedural and substantive unconscionability, the trial court did not err in declining to enforce the provision. Nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to sever the problematic terms for the rest of the agreement. Given the number of substantively unconscionable terms, it was reasonable for the trial court to find the unconsionability to be too pervasive to merit severance.
Affirmed.
The Court of Appeal here affirms a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on a finding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable. The clause was contained in an adhesive employment contract, which made it mildly procedurally unconscionable. That was made worse by the fact that it called for the use of “the rules of AAA,” without identifying which of the 100+ sets of AAA rules were to apply. Nor did it include or provide a means of accessing the applicable rules.
But what really kills the deal is the one-sidedness of the substance. It let only the employer go to court to get injunctive relief, and specifically waived any bond requirement in doing so. And it waived the employee’s right to get statutory fees on her Labor Code claims. Balancing the procedural and substantive unconscionability, the trial court did not err in declining to enforce the provision. Nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to sever the problematic terms for the rest of the agreement. Given the number of substantively unconscionable terms, it was reasonable for the trial court to find the unconsionability to be too pervasive to merit severance.
Affirmed.
Friday, March 21, 2014
Dukes Proves Hazardous to Mandatory Class Settlements
Carter v. City of LA, No. B241060 (D2d1 Mar. 13, 2014)
California law has long been unclear about the conditions under which a mandatory settlement class—that is, a class where class members have a right to object, but not to opt out—can be certified for settlement. It’s an issue that probably doesn’t come up all that much, but it will be pretty significant for practitioners who litigate certain kinds of cases—disability discrimination, consumer UCL, and certain kinds of securities cases—where damages are nominally sought but the relief ultimately provided in a class settlement is often purely injunctive. The court here holds that if the named plaintiff demands monetary relief, and the settlement releases such claims on the class’s behalf, federal procedural due process requires affording class members an opportunity to opt out. Even if their realistic chances of obtaining a monetary recovery are slim to none.
California law has long been unclear about the conditions under which a mandatory settlement class—that is, a class where class members have a right to object, but not to opt out—can be certified for settlement. It’s an issue that probably doesn’t come up all that much, but it will be pretty significant for practitioners who litigate certain kinds of cases—disability discrimination, consumer UCL, and certain kinds of securities cases—where damages are nominally sought but the relief ultimately provided in a class settlement is often purely injunctive. The court here holds that if the named plaintiff demands monetary relief, and the settlement releases such claims on the class’s behalf, federal procedural due process requires affording class members an opportunity to opt out. Even if their realistic chances of obtaining a monetary recovery are slim to none.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
We've Moved ....
After a two-year hiatus, 111 North Hill Street has decided to decamp for Substack. Thank you for your readership over the last twelve year...
-
Soto v. Borgwarner Morse Tec Inc. , No. B252995 (D2d4, as modified August 20, 2015) Although some law-and-economics attuned federal judges...
-
The Rossdale Grp. v. Walton , No. H043476 (D6 Apr. 15, 2017) This is a weird and kind of narrow opinion about standing that is mostly shap...