Showing posts with label u.s. bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label u.s. bank. Show all posts

Friday, June 10, 2022

Steady Targets

Field v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. B309111 (D2d8 Jun. 9, 2022)

In a wrongful foreclosure case, the Bank propounded an interrogatory on Plaintiff, asking whether it was her contention that she did not receive the appropriate form of notice, and if so, to explain the facts in support. Plaintiff answered, simply, but un-enlighentingly, “unsure.”

So the bank moved for SJ, arguing in part that there was no evidence of any notice violation. In response, Plaintiff “claim[ed] with new-found certainty that she had never received th[e] notice.” The trial court granted summary judgment nonetheless. 

Plaintiff appeals, in part based on the idea that her rog response shouldn’t have precluded her from introducing evidence that the appropriate notice was not, in fact, given. But the Court of Appeal, in a characteristically blunt opinion by Justice Wiley, calls bullshit. 

Responding to Plaintiff’s assertion that it was unjust to grant SJ based on her one-word answer to a basic interrogatory asking for information clearly with her knowledge, the Court responds that “[w]hat is unjust is discovery abuse.” “What Field should have done was answer this simple contention interrogatory unambiguously, forthrightly, and truthfully. If her contention was she never got notice of the trustee’s sale, she had to say so and to provide the facts related to this contention.”

And then the money quote to be quoted in many a future brief : “A party opposing summary judgment may not move the target after the proponent has launched its arrow.”

Affirmed.

Having been in this spot as a defendant moving for SJ, this opinion is awesome. 

But, as the Court points out “section 2030.310 provides a mechanism for parties to amend responses to interrogatories under certain circumstances, yet Field did not attempt to amend.” What if, the day before Plaintiff filed her opp, she amended her reg responses to incorporate what she would claim in opposition? I have, over the years, written about cases that say that would have been good enough to beat summary judgment. 

There needs to be a clearer rule here. As I discussed in my prior posts, at minimum, whether a moving defendant can meet its burden should be ascertained based on the rog responses in effect at the time an SJ motion is filed, not those on file two months-plus later when the opposition comes in. To say that the movant retroactively failed to meet its burden, based on some post-motion amendment, is a recipe for gamesmanship. 

And then if, once an SJ is on file, the opponent wants to amend its responses to support the existence of disputes of fact, § 2030.310(c) is implicated. It says that a party answering an interrogatory can be forced to stick with a prior response only if:

“(1) The initial failure of the responding party to answer the interrogatory correctly has substantially prejudiced the party who propounded the interrogatory.

 (2) The responding party has failed to show substantial justification for the initial answer to that interrogatory.

 (3) The prejudice to the propounding party cannot be cured either by a continuance to permit further discovery or by the use of the initial answer [for impeachment].”

It seems to me, in the SJ context, when a non-moving party gives junky original responses to interrogatories, elements (1) and (3) of § 2030.310(c) should basically follow axiomatically, provided element (2) is established. 

That is, if at the time a party moves for SJ, the opponent has made only obviously and unjustifiably deficient responses but tries to amend around them without a good reason to do so, the moving party is substantially prejudiced. After all, it can’t get its meritorious motion decided under the prevailing standard due to its opponent’s discovery abuse. And if there’s no substantial justification for the belated amendment, a continuance doesn’t fix that prejudice. Because the issue is not that the non-moving party didn’t have time to take adequate discovery, but instead, that it was just playing games. As the Court puts it here: “Trial courts encountering such an abuse are free to disregard a later declaration that hopes to supplant tactical or slothful ambiguity with tardy specificity.”

On the other hand, if the moving party was late to produce discovery, or if previously unknown evidence legitimately comes to light after an SJ is filed, of course it is substantially justifiable to permit amendment and not stick the non-moving party with its original interrogatory answers. In that case, (1) and (3) don’t even need to come into play.


 

 

 

Sunday, August 30, 2020

Grounds vs. Reasons

King v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. C085276 (D3 Jul. 28, 2020)

Plaintiff, an employee of a Bank, won a $24.4 million jury verdict in a wrongful termination and defamation action based on the Bank’s having trumped up a bunch of fake grounds for discipline. The damages award has several elements: front and back pay, occupational harm, reputational injury, and emotional distress. Plus $15.6 million in punitives. On a new trial motion, the trial court issued a remittur on various grounds, reducing the judgment to $5.6 million, which Plaintiff accepted. 

The Bank appeals on the insufficiency of the evidence on a host of different issues. As is generally the case, it loses.

Plaintiff appeals the grant of the new trial motions and remittitur. Generally, a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur can’t appeal. But he can cross-appeal if the defendant does. The rationale is that the appeal deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of the remittitur.

The Court of Appeal reverses part of the new trial grant, where the trial court ruled that some of the categories of damages were repetitive. The reasons stated in the trial court’s order weren’t supported by the record.

It also reverses a reduction of the $1 million emotional distress award to $25k, but on a procedural grounds. As I have discussed elsewhere, the Code of Civil Procedure imparts very specific requirements on a trial court judge who grants a new trial on certain grounds, including excessive damages. Under § 657, the court needs to issue an order that states both the statutory grounds for the order as well as its reasons. A statement of reasons doesn’t need to be a tome. But it does need to make at least some reference to the evidence that is sufficient to facilitate appellate review. And if the order is procedurally inadequate, the new trial is reversed and the original judgment automatically reinstated. There’s no chance to fix anything on remand.

On the emotional distress reduction, the court’s order stated only that it “finds that the evidence does not clearly support the emotional distress damages award and the award is excessive,” and that the award should accordingly be reduced to $25k. That’s not good enough because it’s little more than a statement of grounds of excessive damages. To hold up, it needed to at least refer to what aspects of the evidence the trial court found to be inadequate.

Finally, in an order that was adequate to hold up under § 657, the trial court found that the evidence of the Bank’s misconduct was sufficient to withstand only a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. The Court of Appeal does not agree with certain aspects of that analysis. But, subjecting the award to the independent due process review required of punitive awards, the Court of Appeal nonetheless agrees that the evidence supports only a 1:1 ratio. Therefore, the punitives were reduced to about $8 million.

Affirmed on modified judgment of $17,179,392.

We've Moved ....

After a two-year hiatus,  111 North Hill Street  has decided to decamp for Substack. Thank you for your readership over the last twelve year...