Spotlight on Coastal Corruption v. Kinsey, No. D074673 (D4d1 Nov. 24, 2020)
This is a private action seeking civil penalties for violations of statutes requiring members of the Coastal Commission to disclose any ex parte communications they might have that bear on matters before them for decision. Plaintiffs are an entirely lawyer-driven outfit that has no actual business before the CCC—they just want a scalp and attorneys’ fees. Ultimately, that’s what they got. Although the trial court found that the Plaintiffs only proved a tiny fraction of the alleged violations, it fined the five Commissioners between $2,600 and $30,300 each and awarded Plaintiffs about $1 million in attorneys’ fees.
There’s an issue, however, with standing. Two of the three counts of the complaint sought direct enforcement of the statutes containing ex parte prohibitions. These statutes, however, do not include any private rights of action.
Plaintiffs claim “public interest” standing. I.e., that they can sue to enforce statutes that do not contain a private right of action. There is a public interest standing doctrine that applies to claims for a writ of mandate. But notwithstanding some labeling in Plaintiffs’ complaint and prayer, they are not actually seeking a writ. They are not trying to compel the CCC or its commissioners to abide by some non-discretionary duty. They are, instead, trying to get fines assessed for past conduct. That is not the province of mandate.
Beyond that, even under the relatively broad standing rules that apply in state court, there’s no generalized free-floating grant of standing for anyone who claims to be acting the public interest. Plaintiffs try to warp a rule that says trial courts have discretion to deny public interest standing (in mandamus cases) to suggest they they have the discretion to permit public interest standing in any kind of case. But that’s not what the law says.
There is statutory standing, however, for private citizens to pursue claims for certain civil penalties under the Coastal Act. (An enforcement fund keeps the fines, but Plaintiffs can get attorneys’ fees.) Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges just such claims. As the Court of Appeal sees it, however, the problem is that the provisions for which standing is conveyed are addressed to development violations. They don’t actually provide penalties against the commissioners for violating the ex parte prohibitions. Those violations are addressed by a separate statute, which apparently lacks a private right of action. So this claim gets reversed too.
Reversed.
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