EADACPA v. MIRCA

Avila v. S. Cal. Specialty Care, No. G054269 (D4d3 Feb. 26, 2018)

On behalf of his incapacitated Father, Son signed papers admitting Father to a Nursing Home, in his capacity as Father’s agent under a statutory power of attorney. Father died in the home three days later, the apparent result of his aspirating due to a poorly installed feeding tube. Son sued for negligence, elder abuse and wrongful death, the first two claims brought as Father’s successor, and the latter brought on his own behalf.

Nursing Home moved to compel arbitration based on an arb clause contained in the admission documents, requiring the patient to arbitrate claims arising from the hospitalization, particularly including med-mal claims. The clause also specifically purported to bind anyone else who brought claims arising from the hospitalization. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the wrongful death claim was brought by Son, not Father, and that Son wasn’t a party bound to arbitrate. It then found that because the other two claims were so factually similar to the wrongful death, it would decline to compel arbitration of anything under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2, due to the risk of inconsistent verdicts.

So the issues on appeal are: (1) Does the FAA apply to the arbitration procedure here, such that § 1281.2 is inapplicable? (2) Does the claim fall within the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, such that a special rule based on § 1295 can be applied to bind heirs to arbitrate wrongful death claims if the contract says so? (3) Did the Agreement bind son, in his personal capacity, for the wrongful death claim? And (4) did the court abuse its discretion in applying § 1281.2(c) to deny the motion it its entirety?

The Court makes pretty quick work of it. 

First, although the FAA often governs substantive arbitrability, it only governs arbitration proceed when (a) claims are filed in federal court; (b) the agreement specifically invokes the FAA. Neither was true here. 

Second, MICRA—which applies some specific rules about arbitrating medmal claims against health care providers—didn’t apply because the Elder Abuse claims, to which MICRA doesn’t apply, predominated. Even on the negligence claim, “neglect” under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act means primarily that the Nursing Home failed to provide crucial services at all, not that it provided specific medical services below the standard of care. And since MICRA doesn’t apply, the ordinary rules about binding non-parties to arbitration agreements do.

Third, it was clear that Son signed the agreement only his capacity as Father’s agent, not his own, and thus didn’t agree to arbitrate the wrongful death. 

And fourth, the court was well within its rights to decline to order arbitration when the arbitrable claims overlapped so closely with the non-arbitrable ones.

Affirmed.