Inherent Power Reaches Beyond the Pale

Huang v. Hanks, No. C084702 (D3 May 10, 2018)

Plaintiff, who is apparently mentally ill, has sought civil harassment restraining orders against, inter alios, Tom Hanks, Monica Lewinski, and the Dali Lama. The trial court denied the applications and threw out the claims as patently frivolous. While there’s no statute that specifically authorizes a court to dismiss cases that are facially ludicrous, the court here holds the trial court had the inherent power to do so. And, for that matter, the appeal is frivolous too, given that the Plaintiff’s assertions of error have no support at all in the record.

Affirmed.

Angry, But Not Frivolous

Ponce v. Wells Fargo, No. C080680 (D3 Mar. 13, 2018)

Code of Civil Procedure §128.7(b)(1) authorizes sanctions against a party or attorney who signs a document “presented primarily for an improper purpose[.]” In this case—some kind of confusing mortgage mod/foreclosure dispute on its fourth iteration—the court found that Plaintiffs brought their complaint for an improper purpose and entered terminating sanctions under § 128.7(b)(1). 

Plaintiffs don’t seem to dispute that they might have been subjectively malicious. But they say they nonetheless can’t be sanctioned under § 128.7, because their lawsuit was based on an at least colorable theory. Relying mostly on federal authority interpreting Rule 11, the Court of Appeal agrees. The standard for “improper purpose” sanctions requires the signed paper to be without objective merit. If the paper—whether a motion, complaint, or otherwise—isn’t frivolous, it has not been brought for an “improper purpose,” as a matter of law.

Reversed.

Everything that's Old Is New Again

San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, No. D068421 (D4d1 Jun. 7, 2016)

In 1994, the Legislature changed California’s general civil sanctions rules to make them look and work more like Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 1994 amendments added Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7, which permits a court to sanction attorneys or parties for filing meritless pleadings that are “signed” by a party or its attorney. Like Rule 11, § 128.7(c)(1) includes a “safe harbor” requiring the service of a sanctions motion twenty-one days before filing and an opportunity to correct the sanctionable pleading before the motion can be heard. It also adopts an “objectively unreasonable” standard for sanctions—proof of bad faith or ill intent are unnecessary.

Sanctions Stuck, this Time

Peake v. Underwood, No. D061267 (D4d1 July 17, 2014)

In the published part of this opinion, the court affirms an order granting terminating sanctions and awarding attorney’s fees because plaintiff and her attorney for maintained a frivolous case. Not too much new here, although the case provides a useful overview of the various legal standards that go into a Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 motion. The court is very deferential to the trial court’s findings that the case lacked legal or factual merit. (I must say, on more than one occasion, I’ve seen summary judgment motions denied based on much weaker factual showings than plaintiff’s here.) 

One interesting point: As required by § 128.7(c)(1), the defendant served plaintiff with the motion twenty-one days before it was filed. Instead of withdrawing the challenged claims to avoid a sanction, the plaintiff added a few more. When the court ruled, it dismissed as frivolous the claims addressed in the original motion as well as the new claims. It did not require the defendant to serve a new motion addressing the new claims too and afford the plaintiff another safe harbor period. Although the court recognizes that “the statutory language does appear to support the need for an additional safe harbor period after an amended pleading is filed,” it nonetheless affirms. Because the new claims were “flawed for the same essential reason” as the original ones, an additional safe harbor would have been futile.

Affirmed.