That's Not a Debate

Taylor v. Tesla, No. A168333 (D1d4 Aug. 8, 2024)

Plaintiffs in this case are also members of a class in a race discrimination class action brought against Tesla. There is a lot of discovery fighting in the class action, including over how much Tesla needs to produce regarding prior employee complaints of race discrimination. 

Outside of the litigation, Plaintiffs demanded their employment records from Tesla under some provisions of the Labor Code. Tesla stiffed them. So Plaintiffs sued Tesla under the PAGA for violating the Labor Code provisions.

Tesla responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied because the trial court found that the PAGA case—which was premised on Tesla’s failure to produce the employment records—did not arise from any protected activity.

The Court of Appeal agrees. Although there is some overlap between the class action litigation and the documents requested here, Tesla’s refusal to produce the documents is not a “written or oral statement,” so neither Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(1) or (2) apply. 

Tesla thus turns to (e)(4), which has been construed to encompass conduct. But that provision requires the conduct to be in connection with a public issue. The class action might address a significant public issue—allegations of racism at an enormous public company. But under the test in FilmOn, the conduct from which the claim arises must contribute, further, or participate in the debate on the public issue. Withholding employees’ personnel files in violation of statutory obligations to produce them does not meaningfully contribute to the public debate about racism at Tesla, so it does not satisfy that test.

Affirmed.

The Real Stepsons of Tulare County

Grenier v. Taylor, No. F067263 (D5 Feb. 18, 2015)

A megachurch pastor’s stepson and another congregant started accusing the pastor and his wife of some pretty bad stuff on the Internet. Stuff like child molestation, tax evasion, dealing drugs, and stealing money from the church. Pastor and wife sued for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As one would expect, that was met with an anti-SLAPP motion, which was denied because plaintiffs established a likelihood of success.

Applying the two-step anti-SLAPP analysis, the court first holds that the Internet postings were protected activity as defined by Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(3), which addresses statements made in public fora on issues of public concern. As the court explains, public concern doesn’t need to be world-wide concern. As the large volume of anti-SLAPP litigation involving homeowners associations shows, public concerns can address an issue of significant concern to a discrete community. A mega-church with 500 to 1,000 members counts, and allegations of child abuse and stealing church funds would clearly be of community interest to the congregants.

But that doesn’t matter because the pastor and his wife made the requisite prima facie showing that their claims would succeed. The pastor wasn’t a public figure, so no proof of New York Times malice was required. Ministers aren’t automatic public figures, and the pastor here was, as the trial court remarked, “no Jerry Falwell, Jesse Jackson, or Louis Farrakhan.” Nor did he inject himself into the controversy over the Internet remarks in a way that made him a limited purpose public figure. So the elements of ordinary private defamation applied. And because plaintiffs met their burden of coming forward with evidence of these elements, as well as the elements of IIED, so the motion was properly denied.

Affirmed.

It's Harmless Error Week

Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, No. B241916 (D2d6 Jan. 13, 2013)

Amongst a number of other substantive issues about employment law, the court holds that: (1) absent prejudicial error, an erroneous special verdict form does not merit reversal; and (2) that an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff’s lawyer was reasonable.