F.P. v. Monier, No. S216566 (Cal. Nov. 27, 2017)
After a bench trial, and despite a proper request, the court in this case failed to issue a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure § 632. Everyone agrees that’s error. The question presented to the Supreme Court in this case, however, is whether it’s a structural error requiring per se reversal, or whether it’s a procedural error that merits reversal only upon proof of prejudice to the appellant. See Code Civ. Proc. § 475; Cal. Const. Art. IV, § 13. The Court of Appeal said prejudice is required. And the Supreme Court agrees.
After reviewing the lengthy history of the amendments to the statute currently codified in § 632, the Court admits its jurisprudence on the topic has been somewhat inconsistent. But particularly given the removal of a mandatory retrial requirement from earlier versions of § 632, the Court holds that proof of prejudice is, in fact, required to merit a reversal for failure to follow § 632. And since the trial record contained evidence sufficient to sustain a ruling in plaintiff’s favor and the trial court did, in fact, rule in favor of the plaintiff, there’s no prejudice her that would permit a reversal for the trail court’s procedural error in failing to follow § 632.
Affirmed.
Showing posts with label 475. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 475. Show all posts
Thursday, January 11, 2018
Monday, February 16, 2015
Everyone Prevails. Now Go Home.
Macquiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No B251752 (D2d8 Jan 29, 2015)
This is a Song-Beverly Warranty Act case about a lemon Mercedes. Mercedes refused to replace the car after numerous failed attempts to repair it. When plaintiff brought suit, however, Mercedes admitted liability in its answer and the parties stipulated as to what the appropriate restitution would be. Mercedes then made a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer for the full value of the restriction, plus costs and fees, but plaintiff decided to roll the dice to try to win a statutory penalty, which is available only when the defendant’s violation is proven willful. The jury found no willfulness and thus no penalty was awarded. Based on that verdict, the trial court found that plaintiff could not recover statutory attorneys’ fees because he was not a “prevailing party,” and that costs (not including fees) were awardable to Mercedes. Plaintiff appealed the fee and cost decisions, as well as a related discovery order.
On the discovery issue, the trial court denied a motion to compel and granted a protective order over a bunch of discovery propounded by plaintiff, on the grounds that it was essentially irrelevant because liability wasn’t contested. The court here ducks the question of whether the discovery may have proven relevant to the disputed question of willfulness. Instead, it holds that when a plaintiff challenges a discovery ruling on an appeal of final judgment (as opposed to taking a writ), Art. 6 § 13 of the California Constitution and § 475 require him to substantiate that he was prejudiced by the denial of discovery. Here, plaintiff failed to establish how, had the trial court permitted the discovery, there was a reasonable chance that it would have resulted in a different outcome, so the appeal fails on this issue.
On the attorneys’ fee issue, the Song-Beverly Act affords attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See Civil Code § 1794(d). Prevailing party is not defined. Although § 1032, the costs statute—which permits awards of fees when awardable as costs—defines a prevailing party as someone who secures a net monetary recovery, § 1794(d) does not adopt that definition. The court—citing authority to the effect that when prevailing party is undefined, an assessment should turn on pragmatic considerations—holds that plaintiff did not prevail in this case. Although he secured a net monetary recovery, he did so over only the part of the case that was essentially uncontested. Because the plaintiff did not obtain his main litigation objective—the penalty award—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that he was not the prevailing party.
The Court holds, however, that the § 998 offer was invalid because it was too uncertain. Although the amount offered was clear, the offer was conditioned on the car being returned in an “undamaged condition, save normal wear and tear.” Because that condition was undefined and essentially subjective, the offer was insufficiently certain to be enforceable. And because the § 998 ruling is reversed, the trial court also erred in awarding Mercedes its costs under § 1032. With the § 998 offer invalid, costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party based on the normal statutory standard. As noted, that standard deems the party that receives a net monetary recovery to have prevailed. Here, that was plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded, in part.
This is a Song-Beverly Warranty Act case about a lemon Mercedes. Mercedes refused to replace the car after numerous failed attempts to repair it. When plaintiff brought suit, however, Mercedes admitted liability in its answer and the parties stipulated as to what the appropriate restitution would be. Mercedes then made a Code of Civil Procedure § 998 offer for the full value of the restriction, plus costs and fees, but plaintiff decided to roll the dice to try to win a statutory penalty, which is available only when the defendant’s violation is proven willful. The jury found no willfulness and thus no penalty was awarded. Based on that verdict, the trial court found that plaintiff could not recover statutory attorneys’ fees because he was not a “prevailing party,” and that costs (not including fees) were awardable to Mercedes. Plaintiff appealed the fee and cost decisions, as well as a related discovery order.
On the discovery issue, the trial court denied a motion to compel and granted a protective order over a bunch of discovery propounded by plaintiff, on the grounds that it was essentially irrelevant because liability wasn’t contested. The court here ducks the question of whether the discovery may have proven relevant to the disputed question of willfulness. Instead, it holds that when a plaintiff challenges a discovery ruling on an appeal of final judgment (as opposed to taking a writ), Art. 6 § 13 of the California Constitution and § 475 require him to substantiate that he was prejudiced by the denial of discovery. Here, plaintiff failed to establish how, had the trial court permitted the discovery, there was a reasonable chance that it would have resulted in a different outcome, so the appeal fails on this issue.
On the attorneys’ fee issue, the Song-Beverly Act affords attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See Civil Code § 1794(d). Prevailing party is not defined. Although § 1032, the costs statute—which permits awards of fees when awardable as costs—defines a prevailing party as someone who secures a net monetary recovery, § 1794(d) does not adopt that definition. The court—citing authority to the effect that when prevailing party is undefined, an assessment should turn on pragmatic considerations—holds that plaintiff did not prevail in this case. Although he secured a net monetary recovery, he did so over only the part of the case that was essentially uncontested. Because the plaintiff did not obtain his main litigation objective—the penalty award—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that he was not the prevailing party.
The Court holds, however, that the § 998 offer was invalid because it was too uncertain. Although the amount offered was clear, the offer was conditioned on the car being returned in an “undamaged condition, save normal wear and tear.” Because that condition was undefined and essentially subjective, the offer was insufficiently certain to be enforceable. And because the § 998 ruling is reversed, the trial court also erred in awarding Mercedes its costs under § 1032. With the § 998 offer invalid, costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party based on the normal statutory standard. As noted, that standard deems the party that receives a net monetary recovery to have prevailed. Here, that was plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded, in part.
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Another Per Se Reveral Rule Bites the Dust
Robert v. Stanford University, No. H037514 (D6 Feb. 25, 2014)
After plaintiff brought and lost an apparently frivolous employment discrimination case against Stanford University, the trial court awarded Stanford $100,000 for its fees. Although the trial court never made any express written findings in support of the fee award, it made oral findings on the record that supported an award under the governing Christiansburg/Cummings standard. Plaintiff appealed the fee award, relying on Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, 91 Cal. App. 4th 859 (2001), an earlier court of appeal case holding that a court commits per se reversible error when it awards fees to a prevailing defendant in a FEHA case without making express written findings to support the award. But continuing a notable trend, the court departs from prior precedent and holds that Rosenman’s procedural error per se rule—like most rules mandating automatic reversal for procedural error—runs afoul of Article VI § 13 of the state constitution and Code of Civil Procedure § 475, which permit reversal of trial court rulings only when there is a miscarriage of justice or prejudice to the appealing party. Because it was clear from the trial court’s oral findings that it did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Stanford, reversal was not merited.
Affirmed.
Further coverage here.
After plaintiff brought and lost an apparently frivolous employment discrimination case against Stanford University, the trial court awarded Stanford $100,000 for its fees. Although the trial court never made any express written findings in support of the fee award, it made oral findings on the record that supported an award under the governing Christiansburg/Cummings standard. Plaintiff appealed the fee award, relying on Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, 91 Cal. App. 4th 859 (2001), an earlier court of appeal case holding that a court commits per se reversible error when it awards fees to a prevailing defendant in a FEHA case without making express written findings to support the award. But continuing a notable trend, the court departs from prior precedent and holds that Rosenman’s procedural error per se rule—like most rules mandating automatic reversal for procedural error—runs afoul of Article VI § 13 of the state constitution and Code of Civil Procedure § 475, which permit reversal of trial court rulings only when there is a miscarriage of justice or prejudice to the appealing party. Because it was clear from the trial court’s oral findings that it did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Stanford, reversal was not merited.
Affirmed.
Further coverage here.
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
It's Harmless Error Week
Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, No. B241916 (D2d6 Jan. 13, 2013)
Amongst a number of other substantive issues about employment law, the court holds that: (1) absent prejudicial error, an erroneous special verdict form does not merit reversal; and (2) that an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff’s lawyer was reasonable.
Amongst a number of other substantive issues about employment law, the court holds that: (1) absent prejudicial error, an erroneous special verdict form does not merit reversal; and (2) that an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff’s lawyer was reasonable.
Error Per Se? No Way!
F.B. v. Monier, No. C063239 (D3 Jan. 9, 2014)
The court of appeal—departing from a consistent line of cases going back thirty years—holds that although it is error for a trial court not to enter a statement of decision, it is not reversible error per se. Because the failure to enter a statement of decision in this case did not prejudice the defendant, no reversal was merited. The court further holds that the plaintiff was entitled to a setoff against a prior settlement with a different defendant who allegedly caused the same injury, and on that ground substantially reduces the verdict.
The court of appeal—departing from a consistent line of cases going back thirty years—holds that although it is error for a trial court not to enter a statement of decision, it is not reversible error per se. Because the failure to enter a statement of decision in this case did not prejudice the defendant, no reversal was merited. The court further holds that the plaintiff was entitled to a setoff against a prior settlement with a different defendant who allegedly caused the same injury, and on that ground substantially reduces the verdict.
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