Shiheiber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. A160188 (D1d2 Jul. 26, 2022)
Plaintiff, in violation of a local rule, failed to file her trial docs on time, which caused considerable delay. The trial court, relying on Code of Civil Procedure § 575.2, sanctioned her counsel $950. It found, however, that she had not acted in bad faith and thus declined to award more extensive sanctions under § 128.5. Attorney appealed.
Section 575.1 broadly authorizes superior courts to enact local rules “designed to expedite and facilitate the business of the court.” The rules can “provide for the supervision and judicial management of actions from the date they are filed.” Section 575.2, in turn, permits a trial court to issue sanctions for violations of local rules. Attorney argues that these statutes are irrelevant because they are in a title in the code purportedly devoted to pretrial conferences. But code headings are not actually part of the law. Since the unambiguous text of the rulemaking authority conveyed in § 575.1 is far more expansive than just rules for pretrial conferences, the heading can’t limit the statute. So the trial court had authority under § 575.2 to issue a sanction for violation of a local rule promulgated under § 575.1.
Attorney also argues she shouldn’t be sanctioned because the court specifically found that she didn’t act in bad faith. But § 575.2 doesn’t require bad faith. It just requires a failure to comply with a valid local rule. Of course, § 575.2 doesn’t necessarily say that any sanction can be levied for any violation of a local rule. Presumably, a court can’t issue terminating sanctions because counsel made a minor mistake in the formatting of proposed jury instructions. See L.A. Super. L.R. 3.171. Indeed, the rule instead implies that trial courts exercise their discretion to impose sanctions commensurate with the violation at issue. Which the $950 sanction here clearly was.
The Court concludes with an observation about the poor quality of the Attorney’s appellate briefing. She made only conclusory and undeveloped arguments. She didn’t bother to cite, much less distinguish a key case on point. The Court goes on to discuss the burden that poor briefing in civil cases puts on the Court and the litigants before it.
For all of the many potentially meritorious cases that come before us on appeal, this case, regrettably, reminds us once again of the futility and costs of aggressive but ultimately empty advocacy in the appellate courts. There are presumptively innocent individuals—who could be any one of us—who have been incarcerated for crimes they say they did not commit, because of errors in the conduct of their prosecution. There are parents—who could be any one of us—who have been separated from their children, because of errors in the application of our juvenile dependency laws. There are children—who could be any one of ours—who, often against the backdrop of difficult life circumstances, have made errors of judgment that have brought them to the attention of our juvenile delinquency courts, sometimes resulting in the imposition of terms of rehabilitation that may be unwarranted, excessive or unduly harsh. We could go on. When counsel files an appellate brief in a civil case such as this that is so utterly lacking in content sufficient to persuade us of the claims they raise on appeal—by presenting arguments in conclusory fashion, failing to engage in any meaningful analysis, citing no potentially relevant authorities and failing to address authorities that plainly are relevant—it not only dooms their client’s appeal. It also clogs our appellate docket and inhibits our ability to timely review and decide other cases, including those involving interests of the utmost personal urgency and importance.
Affirmed.
