Not Very Hard Road to Arb.

Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc., C082841 (D3 Jan. 28, 2020)

Entity X claims coverage under an insurance policy as an additional insured. The policy has an arbitration clause. Even though X never signed the policy, it can be compelled to arbitration, whether as a third party beneficiary or under an estoppel theory. 

Reversed.

Codefendant Collateral Estoppel

Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, No. B289452 (D2d1 July 2, 2019)

Landlord and Tenant were parties to an eminent domain proceeding brought by the LAUSD. As part of the judgment in that proceeding, the court decided the allocation of just compensation between them. Now, Landlord sued Tenants over the lease agreement, purporting to have the right to further adjustment. 

But Landlord is collaterally estopped from doing so, because the allocation issue was decided in the prior case. The fact that both Landlord and Tenant were on the same side of the v. in the prior case doesn’t preclude the application collateral estoppel. Because the parties in the prior case don’t necessarily need to be adverse, the issue just needs to be decided against the party to be estopped.

Affirmed.

Hollywood Accounting Runs Out the Clock

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. Superior Court, No. B289109 (D2d8 Nov. 20, 2018)

Actors and other talent sometimes get an interest in the “profits” to movies and TV shows. Unless you've got huge juice, however, “profit” does not mean actual profit, like how the IRS or Scrooge McDuck would calculate it. “Profit,” instead, is contractually a defined term that permits a studio to deduct all sorts of “costs.” Under this Hollywood accounting, projects that made large amounts of money wind up being in the red forever, at least so far as the accounting for the participation interests of the talent go.

Harley Dealer Can't Ride Free (With or Without Being Hassled by the Man) on Bank's Arb Clause

Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc., No. E066242 (Aug. 23, 2018)

Plaintiff bought a Harley. He brought a CLRA/UCL/FAL class action against the Dealer for various misrepresentations in its sales practices. His sales contract does not have an arb clause. But his finance agreement does. Although Plaintiff didn’t sue the bank, Dealer tries to enforce the arbitration rights in that agreement anyway. But none of the theories that permit a non-party to compel arbitration apply. The Court here goes through incorporation, agency, third party beneficiary, and estoppel. But there’s also alter ego, which apparently is not an issue here. So the trial court correctly denied Dealer’s motion to compel arbitration.

Affirmed.

Accord The Wild Angels.

Arb Clause Can't Stick to Signatory’s Employee

Jensen v. U-Haul of Cal. Co., No. E065887 (D4d2 Dec. 11, 2017)

Plaintiff was injured when a tire blew out on a rental truck he was driving, so he sued the rental company for negligence. But Plaintiff’s boss, not Plaintiff, had rented the truck. Boss also signed the rental contract, which had an arbitration agreement in it. The Rental Company sought to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied because Plaintiff wasn’t a signatory. 

Easy Cases ...

Ryder v. Lightstorm Entm’t, No. B254922 (D2d8 Apr. 22, 2016)

This is mostly a case about the merits (or the lack thereof) of a Desny claim alleging that James Cameron stole the idea for Avatar from Plaintiff's idea for a film called KRZ. According to the court, he didn’t. But I don't blog on idea submissions cases, although I've done some in my time. There is, however, a single paragraph that deals with an interesting evidentiary issue.

You Can Only Ask Once.

Hi-Desert Med. Cntr. v. Douglas, No. 253268 (D2d2, as modified, Sept. 15, 2015)

Some hospitals challenged the enforcement of a state Medicaid law. They took a two-pronged attack. First, they filed mandamus proceedings in Superior Court, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. They did not, however, seek damages in mandamus. Instead, they also filed administrative actions with the California Department of Health Care Services, seeking to have certain funds refunded, based on their theory that the law was unenforceable. They agreed to stay their admin proceeding pending the action on their writ.

Sometimes Tricky Doesn't Pay

Womack v. Lovell, No. G049587 (D4d3 Jun. 15, 2015)

This seems substantive, but it’s really procedural.

Fee Estoppel Under Civil Code § 1717

Brown Bark III LP v. Haver, No. G047198 (D4d3 Sept. 13, 2013)

Plaintiff sued defendant for failure to repay money owed on a line of credit. Defendants weren’t a party to the credit agreement; plaintiff pursued them on alter ego and successor liability theories as well as for conversion and fraud. Defendants won at trial. Because the underlying credit agreement had an attorneys’ fees provision, defendant sought a fee award, which the trial court denied. Defendants appealed.