Lewis v. Ukran, No. B290128 (D2d4 Jun. 26, 2019)
Interesting question, somewhat procedural.
Question is: When a damage award includes damages for future injuries such as lost wages or future medical expenses, who bears the burden of justifying a reduction to present value? State law is silent on the issue, and federal courts are split. The court here decides that the burden should fall on the party that wants to alter the status quo from the face value of the verdict. So a defendant seeking a reduction based on a discount factor bears the burden of production and proof to establish present value. But in the event that inflation ever becomes an issue again, a plaintiff seeking to increase an award to offset future inflation would bear that burden. Here, neither party put in any evidence on discount. So in the absence of that, the trier of fact was neither required nor permitted to discount the future award to current value.
Affirmed.
Showing posts with label damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label damages. Show all posts
Sunday, July 21, 2019
Thursday, July 11, 2019
Can't Collect on Half a Judgment
Newstart Real Estate Inv. LLC v. Huang, No. B292417 (D2d8 Jul. 3, 2019)
P wins a money judgment that includes punitive damages. The Court, however, issues a remittitur on punitives under Code of Civil Procedure § 662.5. P rejected it, resulting in a granted motion for a new trial. P appeals under § 904.1(a)(4). And while that’s proceeding, P starts to make efforts to collect on the compensatory part of the judgment.
The trial court shuts that down, reasoning that a grant of a new trial has the effect of vacating the whole judgment until retrial occurs and a single final judgment can be entered. The Court of Appeal agrees. You can only collect on a final judgment. When a new trial motion is granted, that vacates the judgment as a matter of law. That a retrial might ultimately be addressed only to the punitives and not to liability or compensatory damages is not relevant to the collectability issue.
Affirmed.
P wins a money judgment that includes punitive damages. The Court, however, issues a remittitur on punitives under Code of Civil Procedure § 662.5. P rejected it, resulting in a granted motion for a new trial. P appeals under § 904.1(a)(4). And while that’s proceeding, P starts to make efforts to collect on the compensatory part of the judgment.
The trial court shuts that down, reasoning that a grant of a new trial has the effect of vacating the whole judgment until retrial occurs and a single final judgment can be entered. The Court of Appeal agrees. You can only collect on a final judgment. When a new trial motion is granted, that vacates the judgment as a matter of law. That a retrial might ultimately be addressed only to the punitives and not to liability or compensatory damages is not relevant to the collectability issue.
Affirmed.
Friday, April 12, 2019
Just Demand a Billion Dollars
Sass v. Cohen, No. B283122 (D2d2 Apr. 4, 2019)
Plaintiff brought Marvin and other claims against her ex-paramour, claiming to be entitled to half the value of various items of real and personal property acquired during the relationship. Defendant defaulted. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), which limits relief on a default judgment to that demanded in the complaint, the trial court awarded plaintiff almost $3 million, plus a constructive trust over one house. Defendant appeared and moved to vacate the judgment. But the trial court upheld the award, finding that § 580(a)’s limits don’t apply to an accounting-type claim where the defendant already has sufficient information to calculate an exposure.
Plaintiff brought Marvin and other claims against her ex-paramour, claiming to be entitled to half the value of various items of real and personal property acquired during the relationship. Defendant defaulted. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), which limits relief on a default judgment to that demanded in the complaint, the trial court awarded plaintiff almost $3 million, plus a constructive trust over one house. Defendant appeared and moved to vacate the judgment. But the trial court upheld the award, finding that § 580(a)’s limits don’t apply to an accounting-type claim where the defendant already has sufficient information to calculate an exposure.
Tuesday, July 3, 2018
Be Careful What You Don't Pray For
Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Techs., Inc., No. D072624 (D4d1 May 25, 2018)
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
Tuesday, June 6, 2017
Obamacare Is All up in the Specials
Cuevas v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. A143440 (D1d1 Apr. 27, 2017)
We’ve discussed before how the facial amounts of medical bills aren’t good evidence of an insured plaintiff’s damages because insurers never pay the facial amounts of the bills. Same goes for doctors’ rack rates in computing future bills. Damages have to be computed based on what is reasonably likely to actually be paid. This case holds that, in figuring the impact of insurance on these costs, a jury can consider benefits obtainable under the Affordable Care Act. That’s the case even though the long-term legislative future of that law is not entirely certain, poor CBO score of its erstwhile replacement notwithstanding.
Reversed.
We’ve discussed before how the facial amounts of medical bills aren’t good evidence of an insured plaintiff’s damages because insurers never pay the facial amounts of the bills. Same goes for doctors’ rack rates in computing future bills. Damages have to be computed based on what is reasonably likely to actually be paid. This case holds that, in figuring the impact of insurance on these costs, a jury can consider benefits obtainable under the Affordable Care Act. That’s the case even though the long-term legislative future of that law is not entirely certain, poor CBO score of its erstwhile replacement notwithstanding.
Reversed.
Tuesday, December 27, 2016
Claiming the Mantle of the 13th Juror
Ryan v. Crown Castle NG Networks, Inc., No. H041712 (Dec. 13, 2016)
A jury in this case rendered an apparently nonsensical damages verdict that could not be squared with the instructions and the verdict form. But in response to Plaintiff’s new trial motion on inadequate damages, the trial judge ruled that the court could not “substitute its judgment for that of the jury” and that “declarations were necessary to determine what the jury actually did.”
A jury in this case rendered an apparently nonsensical damages verdict that could not be squared with the instructions and the verdict form. But in response to Plaintiff’s new trial motion on inadequate damages, the trial judge ruled that the court could not “substitute its judgment for that of the jury” and that “declarations were necessary to determine what the jury actually did.”
Monday, November 14, 2016
These Bills Are Too Damn High...
Moore v. Mercer, No. C073064 (D3 Oct. 21, 2016)
Yet another case addressing the Howell rule for measuring past medical costs as and element damages in a PI case. Under that rule the initial rates billed to a patient by a healthcare provider aren’t dispositive because those rates are super-inflated, and pale in comparison to what ultimately gets paid, especially if paid by insurance. Plaintiff here wasn’t insured, and the hospital sold her bill to a collections agency. Defendant argued that what the hospital got from the agency is the true value of the services.
This is pretty much the same facts as the Uspenskaya case, decided almost exactly one year ago. And it has the same result: the collections bill is admissible, but not dispositive. Same rule that applies to the hospital’s initial bill. So the jury’s damages award—which was between the two figures—is affirmed.
There’s a second issue, though. Defendant tried to get the (third party) doctor’s contract with the collections agency in discovery. The court denied a motion to compel on the grounds that the agreement was irrelevant and issued discovery sanctions against Defendant. That was error. The terms of an agreement under which claims are sold “bear[s] some probative value” as to the true reasonable value of the services. But given that the trial court said it would have excluded the evidence at trial—which would not necessarily been erroneous—the discovery error was harmless. The sanctions, however, are reversed.
Notable quote: The “broad scope of permissible discovery is equally applicable to discovery of information from a nonparty as it is to parties in the pending suit.” (quoting Johnson v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2000). That’s correct as a matter of the language of the Discovery Act, but read broadly, it’s in some tension with with the oft-cited Calcor decision, which suggests you should exhaust efforts to get discovery from a party before you burden a third party with document demands.
Reversed in part.
Yet another case addressing the Howell rule for measuring past medical costs as and element damages in a PI case. Under that rule the initial rates billed to a patient by a healthcare provider aren’t dispositive because those rates are super-inflated, and pale in comparison to what ultimately gets paid, especially if paid by insurance. Plaintiff here wasn’t insured, and the hospital sold her bill to a collections agency. Defendant argued that what the hospital got from the agency is the true value of the services.
This is pretty much the same facts as the Uspenskaya case, decided almost exactly one year ago. And it has the same result: the collections bill is admissible, but not dispositive. Same rule that applies to the hospital’s initial bill. So the jury’s damages award—which was between the two figures—is affirmed.
There’s a second issue, though. Defendant tried to get the (third party) doctor’s contract with the collections agency in discovery. The court denied a motion to compel on the grounds that the agreement was irrelevant and issued discovery sanctions against Defendant. That was error. The terms of an agreement under which claims are sold “bear[s] some probative value” as to the true reasonable value of the services. But given that the trial court said it would have excluded the evidence at trial—which would not necessarily been erroneous—the discovery error was harmless. The sanctions, however, are reversed.
Notable quote: The “broad scope of permissible discovery is equally applicable to discovery of information from a nonparty as it is to parties in the pending suit.” (quoting Johnson v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2000). That’s correct as a matter of the language of the Discovery Act, but read broadly, it’s in some tension with with the oft-cited Calcor decision, which suggests you should exhaust efforts to get discovery from a party before you burden a third party with document demands.
Reversed in part.
Friday, May 20, 2016
Just Specific Enough...
Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assoc. v. Carson, No. H041030 (D6 Apr. 19, 2016).
This is a dispute between some property owners and their HOA. Which, true to form, means the case looks pretty ugly. The substance is specific to HOA cases, but there is an interesting issue regarding the role of a trial court’s statement of decision in deciding a bench trial.
This is a dispute between some property owners and their HOA. Which, true to form, means the case looks pretty ugly. The substance is specific to HOA cases, but there is an interesting issue regarding the role of a trial court’s statement of decision in deciding a bench trial.
Friday, November 20, 2015
From Now on, Just Demand $1 Trillion . . .
Dhawan v. Biring, No. B257977 (D2d5 Oct. 28, 2015)
Plaintiff here what I and every lawyer who has filed a state court complaint arising from a business dispute has probably also done. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a)(2)—which says that “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded [in a non-personal injury case] the amount demanded shall be stated”—Plaintiff’s prayer for relief said only that he was entitled to damages “according to proof.” After all, in a case where the damages calculation likely depends on the testimony an expert who might not even be hired for many months, who wants to commit?
Generally it makes no difference. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), in a contested case the court can grant any relief consistent with the complaint, regardless of what’s in the prayer. But when defendant defaults, it becomes a bigger deal, because in those circumstances § 580(a) expressly prohibits any award of relief not demanded in the complaint.
Defendant here did default, however, and that put Plaintiff in a pickle. Amending his complaint to state the now-absolutely necessary damages demand would require Plaintiff to serve Defendant anew and thus effectively relieve Defendant from the entered default on the original complaint. What’s the chance a defendant defaults twice? So to avoid that option, Plaintiff served Defendant with a “statement of damages” under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11—which authorizes this practice in personal injury cases where, as an exception to the general rule, a plaintiff is not allowed to plead a damages number. The trial court ultimately entered a default judgment on the amount in the notice.
More than a year later, Defendant moved to vacate the judgment as void under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) because the damages exceeded those pleaded in the complaint. The court of appeal agrees, and reverses.
Because of the due process issues implicated in defaults, § 580 gets strictly construed. Prior cases have held, for instance, that if the number isn’t in the complaint, it’s not enough even if Defendant had actual notice of the damages. Given that, the court isn’t inclined to let § 425.11 serve as an end-around of the facial requirement under § 580 that an ordinary plaintiff plead his damages in his complaint. For the same reason, Plaintiff couldn’t smuggle notice of his regular damages onto his statement of his punitive damages—the amount of which which also can’t be pleaded—as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.115.
Further, a default judgment for more than demanded damages isn’t just voidable; it’s full-blown void. So it is subject to collateral attack under § 473(d), which doesn’t have the same time limits and factual predicates that apply to an attack on a merely voidable judgment under § 473(b).
Reversed.
Plaintiff here what I and every lawyer who has filed a state court complaint arising from a business dispute has probably also done. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a)(2)—which says that “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded [in a non-personal injury case] the amount demanded shall be stated”—Plaintiff’s prayer for relief said only that he was entitled to damages “according to proof.” After all, in a case where the damages calculation likely depends on the testimony an expert who might not even be hired for many months, who wants to commit?
Generally it makes no difference. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), in a contested case the court can grant any relief consistent with the complaint, regardless of what’s in the prayer. But when defendant defaults, it becomes a bigger deal, because in those circumstances § 580(a) expressly prohibits any award of relief not demanded in the complaint.
Defendant here did default, however, and that put Plaintiff in a pickle. Amending his complaint to state the now-absolutely necessary damages demand would require Plaintiff to serve Defendant anew and thus effectively relieve Defendant from the entered default on the original complaint. What’s the chance a defendant defaults twice? So to avoid that option, Plaintiff served Defendant with a “statement of damages” under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11—which authorizes this practice in personal injury cases where, as an exception to the general rule, a plaintiff is not allowed to plead a damages number. The trial court ultimately entered a default judgment on the amount in the notice.
More than a year later, Defendant moved to vacate the judgment as void under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) because the damages exceeded those pleaded in the complaint. The court of appeal agrees, and reverses.
Because of the due process issues implicated in defaults, § 580 gets strictly construed. Prior cases have held, for instance, that if the number isn’t in the complaint, it’s not enough even if Defendant had actual notice of the damages. Given that, the court isn’t inclined to let § 425.11 serve as an end-around of the facial requirement under § 580 that an ordinary plaintiff plead his damages in his complaint. For the same reason, Plaintiff couldn’t smuggle notice of his regular damages onto his statement of his punitive damages—the amount of which which also can’t be pleaded—as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.115.
Further, a default judgment for more than demanded damages isn’t just voidable; it’s full-blown void. So it is subject to collateral attack under § 473(d), which doesn’t have the same time limits and factual predicates that apply to an attack on a merely voidable judgment under § 473(b).
Reversed.
Wednesday, July 22, 2015
Negligence vs. Causation
Bermudez v. Ciolek, No. G049510 (D4d3, as modified July 20, 2015)
In a car accident case with two defendants, the jury found both negligent, but that only Defendant #1 one was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury. Defendant #1 says that the verdict forms are inconsistent so she deserves a new trial. But they aren’t. The record showed that the jury could have easily found that Defendant #2 was negligent in that he was driving at slightly above the speed limit, but that his speeding wasn’t the cause of the accident.
Defendant #1 also challenges the plaintiffs’ medical damages. As we discussed last month hospital bills generally aren’t good evidence of medical expenses, because the billed amounts have so little bearing on what ultimately gets paid, which is the proper measure of damages. At least that’s the case with insured plaintiffs, because its the leverage of the insurers that gets the providers to reduce the check to the realm of the reasonable.
But plaintiff here isn’t insured. His bills have never been paid and the hospital still could technically try to collect on them in full. Nonetheless, the court finds that a plaintiff is generally entitled to the lesser of: (1) medical costs paid or incurred; or (2) their reasonable value. In an uninsured case, (2) requires a wide-ranging inquiry, in which the plaintiff must produce some evidence, independent of the bills, showing that the charges were reasonable. The bills aren’t per se inadmissible, but on their own they won’t carry the day. That ultimately wasn’t an issue here, because (other than a small conceded reduction) plaintiff did come forward with some other evidence.
Affirmed, except for amendment of judgment to make a minor reduction of damages.
In a car accident case with two defendants, the jury found both negligent, but that only Defendant #1 one was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury. Defendant #1 says that the verdict forms are inconsistent so she deserves a new trial. But they aren’t. The record showed that the jury could have easily found that Defendant #2 was negligent in that he was driving at slightly above the speed limit, but that his speeding wasn’t the cause of the accident.
Defendant #1 also challenges the plaintiffs’ medical damages. As we discussed last month hospital bills generally aren’t good evidence of medical expenses, because the billed amounts have so little bearing on what ultimately gets paid, which is the proper measure of damages. At least that’s the case with insured plaintiffs, because its the leverage of the insurers that gets the providers to reduce the check to the realm of the reasonable.
But plaintiff here isn’t insured. His bills have never been paid and the hospital still could technically try to collect on them in full. Nonetheless, the court finds that a plaintiff is generally entitled to the lesser of: (1) medical costs paid or incurred; or (2) their reasonable value. In an uninsured case, (2) requires a wide-ranging inquiry, in which the plaintiff must produce some evidence, independent of the bills, showing that the charges were reasonable. The bills aren’t per se inadmissible, but on their own they won’t carry the day. That ultimately wasn’t an issue here, because (other than a small conceded reduction) plaintiff did come forward with some other evidence.
Affirmed, except for amendment of judgment to make a minor reduction of damages.
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