Carlsbad Police Officers Assoc. v. City of Carlsbad, No. D075723 *D4d1 (May 18, 2020)
This is a “reverse public records act” lawsuit brought by some cop unions to prevent the disclosure of excessive force complaints, which are now subject to disclosure under a law passed in 2018. The ACLU and several media outlets sought to intervene. The trial court granted intervention, but conditioned it on the intervenors disclaiming any right to obtain fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which codifies the private attorney general doctrine. Ultimately the court agreed with intervenors’ position that the law required disclosure of the records. Intervenors then appealed the condition.
Under § 387(d)(1)(B), the intervenors were entitled to intervene as a matter of right. They had previously filed PRA requests to obtain the disputed documents, had the cops prevailed, intervenors’ ability to obtain the documents would have been impaired, and the real defendants in the case—various police departments—were essentially agnostic to the merits of the cops’ case. As the Court of Appeal explains, that didn’t necessarily preclude the court from subjecting the intervenors to appropriate conditions to ensure the efficiency of the litigation. But because intervenors of right have an interest in the controversy equivalent to that of a party, courts have less leeway to impose conditions than they do for permissive intervenors. Generally conditions on as of right intervenors are limited to “housekeeping” conditions aimed to prevent duplicative litigation.
The Court of Appeal holds that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the condition. Indeed, “the analysis here is not close.” It is settled law that a successful intervenor in a reverse PRA case is entitled to a fee award under § 1021.5. Forcing the intervenors here to give that up impaired their substantive rights and ran contrary to the public policy justification for § 1021.5. The trial court went too far.
Reversed.
Showing posts with label intervention. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intervention. Show all posts
Thursday, June 11, 2020
Tuesday, October 15, 2019
Procedural Footfault Dooms Objector's Appellate Standing
Eck v. City of L.A., No. B289717 (D2d7 Oct. 15, 2019)
In Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, the California Supreme Court held that a class action settlement objector cannot appeal the overruling of her objections unless she becomes a “party aggrieved” of record under Code of Civil Procedure § 902. As the Court explained, the two ways to do that are (1) to move to intervene before the judgment is final or (2) to file a § 663 motion to vacate the judgment. If she does either and her motion is denied, she can raise the issue on an appeal from the denial.
Objector here filed a motion to intervene, which was denied. And then she filed a § 663 motion, which was also denied. Problem for her is that while she filed a notice of appeal on the intervention motion, she didn’t file a second notice to appeal the denial of her post-judgment § 663 motion. Yet, she didn’t argue in her brief that intervention was wrongly denied.
Objector contends that just filing of a § 663 motion was sufficient to give her standing under § 902 to reach the merits of her objections, even in her intervention appeal. But that doesn’t make sense, and it isn’t supported by authority.
You can’t appeal an order outside of your notice of appeal, although the notice is construed liberally. Here, Objector’s notice on the intervention was filed before her § 663 motion was denied, so it couldn’t have encompassed that order, however liberally construed.
So because Objector appealed only the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene, the merits of the intervention motion posed a gating procedural issue. Objector had to convince the Court of Appeal that intervention was wrongly denied before it could reach the merits of her objection. And since she didn’t even try to do that, she lacked appellate standing.
Appeal dismissed.
In Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, the California Supreme Court held that a class action settlement objector cannot appeal the overruling of her objections unless she becomes a “party aggrieved” of record under Code of Civil Procedure § 902. As the Court explained, the two ways to do that are (1) to move to intervene before the judgment is final or (2) to file a § 663 motion to vacate the judgment. If she does either and her motion is denied, she can raise the issue on an appeal from the denial.
Objector here filed a motion to intervene, which was denied. And then she filed a § 663 motion, which was also denied. Problem for her is that while she filed a notice of appeal on the intervention motion, she didn’t file a second notice to appeal the denial of her post-judgment § 663 motion. Yet, she didn’t argue in her brief that intervention was wrongly denied.
Objector contends that just filing of a § 663 motion was sufficient to give her standing under § 902 to reach the merits of her objections, even in her intervention appeal. But that doesn’t make sense, and it isn’t supported by authority.
You can’t appeal an order outside of your notice of appeal, although the notice is construed liberally. Here, Objector’s notice on the intervention was filed before her § 663 motion was denied, so it couldn’t have encompassed that order, however liberally construed.
So because Objector appealed only the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene, the merits of the intervention motion posed a gating procedural issue. Objector had to convince the Court of Appeal that intervention was wrongly denied before it could reach the merits of her objection. And since she didn’t even try to do that, she lacked appellate standing.
Appeal dismissed.
Monday, December 3, 2018
Intervene, Object, Opt-Out
Edwards v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. B284000 (D2d8 Nov. 30, 2018)
There are three overlapping wage and hour class actions against the same employer: Case #1, Case #2, and Case #3. Cases ## 1 and 2 were filed on the same day. Case #3 was filed two months later. The complaints get amended a bunch of times. Case #1 settles at a mediation where counsel for all three cases are present. Cases ##2 and 3 don’t settle. At the time of the settlement, Case #1 lacked a few of the claims that were alleged in Cases ##2 and 3. Post settlement, the Case #1 complaint was amended to add in these claims.
Plaintiffs in Case #3 moved to intervene in Case #1. A few days later, Case #1 Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval. The court denied intervention, finding that any of the Case #3 plaintiffs who didn’t like the settlement could adequately protect their rights by objecting or opting out. Case #3 Plaintiffs took an appeal. While the appeal was pending, Case #3 plaintiffs briefed a number of issues related to the adequacy of the settlement in Case #1. Eventually, the overall settlement fund went up by $115k. Then the Court of Appeal entered a stay.
So the question is whether the trial court erred in finding that a right to object or opt out is a good as a full blown intervention to protect the rights of absent class members. The Court holds it is. Plaintiff’s main point is that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 4 Cal. 5th 260 (2018) a class member needs to intervene to preserve a right to appeal the approval of a settlement. But Hernandez gave a second option—an objecting class member’s right to appeal can be preserved by filing a motion to vacate the final judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 663, which permits a motion by any “party aggrieved.” With that post-judgment option available, the class members could protect their interests, including their right to appeal, by opting out or objecting.
Affirmed.
There are three overlapping wage and hour class actions against the same employer: Case #1, Case #2, and Case #3. Cases ## 1 and 2 were filed on the same day. Case #3 was filed two months later. The complaints get amended a bunch of times. Case #1 settles at a mediation where counsel for all three cases are present. Cases ##2 and 3 don’t settle. At the time of the settlement, Case #1 lacked a few of the claims that were alleged in Cases ##2 and 3. Post settlement, the Case #1 complaint was amended to add in these claims.
Plaintiffs in Case #3 moved to intervene in Case #1. A few days later, Case #1 Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval. The court denied intervention, finding that any of the Case #3 plaintiffs who didn’t like the settlement could adequately protect their rights by objecting or opting out. Case #3 Plaintiffs took an appeal. While the appeal was pending, Case #3 plaintiffs briefed a number of issues related to the adequacy of the settlement in Case #1. Eventually, the overall settlement fund went up by $115k. Then the Court of Appeal entered a stay.
So the question is whether the trial court erred in finding that a right to object or opt out is a good as a full blown intervention to protect the rights of absent class members. The Court holds it is. Plaintiff’s main point is that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 4 Cal. 5th 260 (2018) a class member needs to intervene to preserve a right to appeal the approval of a settlement. But Hernandez gave a second option—an objecting class member’s right to appeal can be preserved by filing a motion to vacate the final judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 663, which permits a motion by any “party aggrieved.” With that post-judgment option available, the class members could protect their interests, including their right to appeal, by opting out or objecting.
Affirmed.
Wednesday, May 23, 2018
To the Intervenors Go the Spoils
People v. Investco Mgm’t & Dev. LLC, No. A143307 (D1d4 Apr. 18, 2018)
The Department of Business Oversight settled a blue sky case against a real estate Scheme and its Promoters. The injunction that was entered entailed the appointment of a special master to sell some assets in order to generate cash to pay off the investors in the Scheme. But it left the Promoters in place to otherwise manage the Scheme.
The Department of Business Oversight settled a blue sky case against a real estate Scheme and its Promoters. The injunction that was entered entailed the appointment of a special master to sell some assets in order to generate cash to pay off the investors in the Scheme. But it left the Promoters in place to otherwise manage the Scheme.
Thursday, February 1, 2018
Stare Decisis Carries the Day
Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, No. S233983 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2018)
I wrote about this case when it was decided by the Court of Appeal in early 2016. Basically, the court held that because Code of Civil Procedure § 902 permits only a “party aggrieved” to appeal, a member of a certified class who objects to a settlement cannot appeal the overruling of her objection unless she formally intervenes and becomes a party. The court realized that result was inconsistent with a number of prior Court of Appeal decisions as well as federal class action practice. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). But it felt bound by Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 199 (1942), in which the California Supreme Court held, before the advent of modern class actions, that to have standing to appeal, a settlement objector needs to either formally intervene or file a motion to vacate the judgment under § 663.
As I noted, the split was the kind of thing the Supreme Court needed to step in to sort out. And it did. And—somewhat surprisingly to me, at least—the Court affirms in an essentially unanimous opinion by Justice Chin. Basically, the general annoyingness of needing to move to intervene or vacate isn’t enough to overcome the stare decisis effect of Eggert, which rested on a reasonable interpretation of § 902. While federal courts and courts of other states might disagree, they don’t have § 902 to contend with.
Justice Liu concurs to note that Eggert is out of wack with current class action practice federally and in other jurisdictions, and to explain that the policy rationale for it doesn’t make a lot of sense. But since it’s based on the interpretation of a statute that the Legislature could fix were it so inclined, Justice Liu agrees that stare decisis carries the day.
Affirmed.
I wrote about this case when it was decided by the Court of Appeal in early 2016. Basically, the court held that because Code of Civil Procedure § 902 permits only a “party aggrieved” to appeal, a member of a certified class who objects to a settlement cannot appeal the overruling of her objection unless she formally intervenes and becomes a party. The court realized that result was inconsistent with a number of prior Court of Appeal decisions as well as federal class action practice. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). But it felt bound by Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 199 (1942), in which the California Supreme Court held, before the advent of modern class actions, that to have standing to appeal, a settlement objector needs to either formally intervene or file a motion to vacate the judgment under § 663.
As I noted, the split was the kind of thing the Supreme Court needed to step in to sort out. And it did. And—somewhat surprisingly to me, at least—the Court affirms in an essentially unanimous opinion by Justice Chin. Basically, the general annoyingness of needing to move to intervene or vacate isn’t enough to overcome the stare decisis effect of Eggert, which rested on a reasonable interpretation of § 902. While federal courts and courts of other states might disagree, they don’t have § 902 to contend with.
Justice Liu concurs to note that Eggert is out of wack with current class action practice federally and in other jurisdictions, and to explain that the policy rationale for it doesn’t make a lot of sense. But since it’s based on the interpretation of a statute that the Legislature could fix were it so inclined, Justice Liu agrees that stare decisis carries the day.
Affirmed.
Saturday, January 23, 2016
You Need Not Intervene Till You Expect You Were Sold Out
Ziani Homeowners Assoc. v. Brookfield Ziani LLC, No. G050284 (D4d3 Dec. 22, 2015)
Some condo owners sought to intervene in a construction defect litigation between their HOA and the condo developer. The trial court denied their motion as untimely because two years had passed since the complaint was filed. But even if its not clearly spelled out in the California case law (till now) that’s not the standard. California’s intervention statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 387 was somewhat modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. So the court relies on a body of analogous—and more of less uniform—federal authority to say that the intervention clock shouldn’t start running until interveners know or at least should have known that their interests weren’t being adequately represented by the current parties. Because the trial court incorrectly decided that the clock started ticking on the date of filing, the court reversed and remanded for timeliness findings based on the correct standard.
Reversed and remanded.
Some condo owners sought to intervene in a construction defect litigation between their HOA and the condo developer. The trial court denied their motion as untimely because two years had passed since the complaint was filed. But even if its not clearly spelled out in the California case law (till now) that’s not the standard. California’s intervention statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 387 was somewhat modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. So the court relies on a body of analogous—and more of less uniform—federal authority to say that the intervention clock shouldn’t start running until interveners know or at least should have known that their interests weren’t being adequately represented by the current parties. Because the trial court incorrectly decided that the clock started ticking on the date of filing, the court reversed and remanded for timeliness findings based on the correct standard.
Reversed and remanded.
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
Seal Spiel
Overstock.com v. Goldman Sachs, No. A133487 (D1d1 Nov. 13, 2014)
This is a magnum opus on the handling of sealed files and a must-read for anyone who litigates complex business cases in state court. Sorry in advance for the overly detailed procedural setup—the last thing I want is for my posts to read like bench memos—but for once, the background is quite germane to understanding the ultimate ruling in the case.
This is a magnum opus on the handling of sealed files and a must-read for anyone who litigates complex business cases in state court. Sorry in advance for the overly detailed procedural setup—the last thing I want is for my posts to read like bench memos—but for once, the background is quite germane to understanding the ultimate ruling in the case.
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