Bond OK for PRA PI

Stevenson v. City of Sacramento, No. C08065 (D3 Oct. 6, 2020)

The City of Sacramento changed its record retention policy such that it would save email for only two years. Shortly before the policy went into place, Plaintiffs sought all documents subject to deletion under the Public Records Act. Plaintiffs brought suit and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing deletions. But the trial court ordered them to post an $80k undertaking, based on the City’s estimate of the cost of retaining the documents for a year. The amount was later reduced to $2,350 after a better cost estimate was provided. Plaintiffs appealed.

So the question is, does Code of Civil Procedure § 529, which requires the posting of an undertaking to offset the cost of an improvidently granted PI, apply to PRA cases? Various statutes permitting injunctive relief have express exceptions to the bond requirement, but the PRA isn’t one of them. Plaintiffs nonethless raise a bevy of arguments why § 529 shouldn’t apply. The Court of Appeal, however, doesn’t buy them. 

Among other things, there’s no actual conflict between the statutes. Cases interpreting similar silence have found that § 529 applies to other types of statutorily authorized injunctive relief. Section 529 doesn’t impinge on the rights of the indigent to access public records, because the bond and undertaking law already has an exception for indigency. Nor does the state Constitutional mandate to read limits on the right of public access narrowly license reading § 529’s unambiguous bond requirement out of the statute. Finally, although some amici contend otherwise, a bond requirement is not actually a prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment—it doesn’t stop anyone from saying anything.

Affirmed.

Not Status Quo Is Not Status No.

Integrated Dynamic Sols. v. Vitavet Labs, Inc., No. B268311, (D2d2 Dec. 22, 2016)

Plaintiff in this case won a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to specifically perform a contract under which Defendant was to give Plaintiff access to some computer code. Defendant claims that the injunction was “mandatory” in that it altered the status quo, and that effectively permitted the PI to usurp the final adjudication of the case. 

But that’s not right. While the preliminary injunction, in ordering delivery, might be construable as mandatory, that didn’t make it impermissible. If Defendant ultimately wins at trial, presumably Plaintiff will have to give back the code and pay out of the bond whatever loss was caused by an improvidently granted motion.

Affirmed.

Fun and Games with Interpleaders

S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery, No. B268298 (D2d5, as modified Dec. 13, 2016)

This case is an interpleader action that was the subject of a prior appeal affirming the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. The facts are a kind of complicated, but since interpleader doesn’t come up too much, it’s worth getting into it a little.

Applying Rule Change to Pending Case Isn't Retroactive

Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour, No. B251250 (D2d2 Jul. 9, 2015)

While a prior appeal in this case was pending, the Judicial Council amended Rule of Court 8.278 to permit a prevailing party on appeal to recover the fees and net interest expenses incurred in obtaining an appellate bond. On remand from the prior appeal, the trial court awarded those costs to the prevailing appellant, even though the amended rule didn’t come into effect until after the opinion in the first appeal issued. The application, however, wasn’t retroactive, much less impermissibly so, because the rule did come into effect before the remittitur issued. In the court of appeal, a case remains pending until that occurs. And since there was adequate evidence that the appellants did, in fact, incur expenses in securing the bond, the trial court’s award is affirmed.