Edwards v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. B284000 (D2d8 Nov. 30, 2018)
There are three overlapping wage and hour class actions against the same employer: Case #1, Case #2, and Case #3. Cases ## 1 and 2 were filed on the same day. Case #3 was filed two months later. The complaints get amended a bunch of times. Case #1 settles at a mediation where counsel for all three cases are present. Cases ##2 and 3 don’t settle. At the time of the settlement, Case #1 lacked a few of the claims that were alleged in Cases ##2 and 3. Post settlement, the Case #1 complaint was amended to add in these claims.
Plaintiffs in Case #3 moved to intervene in Case #1. A few days later, Case #1 Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval. The court denied intervention, finding that any of the Case #3 plaintiffs who didn’t like the settlement could adequately protect their rights by objecting or opting out. Case #3 Plaintiffs took an appeal. While the appeal was pending, Case #3 plaintiffs briefed a number of issues related to the adequacy of the settlement in Case #1. Eventually, the overall settlement fund went up by $115k. Then the Court of Appeal entered a stay.
So the question is whether the trial court erred in finding that a right to object or opt out is a good as a full blown intervention to protect the rights of absent class members. The Court holds it is. Plaintiff’s main point is that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 4 Cal. 5th 260 (2018) a class member needs to intervene to preserve a right to appeal the approval of a settlement. But Hernandez gave a second option—an objecting class member’s right to appeal can be preserved by filing a motion to vacate the final judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 663, which permits a motion by any “party aggrieved.” With that post-judgment option available, the class members could protect their interests, including their right to appeal, by opting out or objecting.
Affirmed.
Showing posts with label objections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label objections. Show all posts
Monday, December 3, 2018
Friday, August 19, 2016
Speak Up, Or Lose Your Appeal
Morales v. 22d Dist. Agric. Assoc., No. D067247 (D4d1 Jul. 13, 2016)
This is an FLSA opt-in collective action largely beyond the scope of this blog. There are, however, two interesting procedural questions on appeal.
The first concerns the verdict form. But to preserve objections Plaintiffs needed to actually raise their objections in the trial court. Just submitting a form that gets rejected isn’t enough. They needed to make particular objections on the record to the form that gets used. Here, when the court proposed its own form, Plaintiffs said they had no objection. Nor, even after an adverse verdict, did they re-raise the issue in a new trial motion. Under the circumstances, they forfeited their right to dispute the jury form on appeal.
There’s also an issue of witness exclusion under Evidence Code § 777. Question is: Does § 777 apply to absent class members? But the court doesn’t reach that issue either, because it finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to make any record why it was inappropriate to exclude any particular witness. Moreover, there was no evidence that the exclusion had any detrimental impact on Plaintiff’s case. Since it is Plaintiff who is appealing here, not some witness with a claim of being denied public access, the absence of prejudice dooms the appeal.
Affirmed in relevant part.
This is an FLSA opt-in collective action largely beyond the scope of this blog. There are, however, two interesting procedural questions on appeal.
The first concerns the verdict form. But to preserve objections Plaintiffs needed to actually raise their objections in the trial court. Just submitting a form that gets rejected isn’t enough. They needed to make particular objections on the record to the form that gets used. Here, when the court proposed its own form, Plaintiffs said they had no objection. Nor, even after an adverse verdict, did they re-raise the issue in a new trial motion. Under the circumstances, they forfeited their right to dispute the jury form on appeal.
There’s also an issue of witness exclusion under Evidence Code § 777. Question is: Does § 777 apply to absent class members? But the court doesn’t reach that issue either, because it finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to make any record why it was inappropriate to exclude any particular witness. Moreover, there was no evidence that the exclusion had any detrimental impact on Plaintiff’s case. Since it is Plaintiff who is appealing here, not some witness with a claim of being denied public access, the absence of prejudice dooms the appeal.
Affirmed in relevant part.
Friday, May 20, 2016
Just Specific Enough...
Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assoc. v. Carson, No. H041030 (D6 Apr. 19, 2016).
This is a dispute between some property owners and their HOA. Which, true to form, means the case looks pretty ugly. The substance is specific to HOA cases, but there is an interesting issue regarding the role of a trial court’s statement of decision in deciding a bench trial.
This is a dispute between some property owners and their HOA. Which, true to form, means the case looks pretty ugly. The substance is specific to HOA cases, but there is an interesting issue regarding the role of a trial court’s statement of decision in deciding a bench trial.
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
Reverend Unemployed Nazi Biker v. CALDOT, Fully Immune, but Poor
Martinez v. CALDOT, No. G048375 (D4d3 Jul. 7, 2015)
Except in the part at the beginning or end where counsel are listed, lawyers mostly don’t like to see their names in appellate opinions. Especially government lawyers. And especially in published opinions. For good reason. When it happens, somebody is usually in trouble.
Except in the part at the beginning or end where counsel are listed, lawyers mostly don’t like to see their names in appellate opinions. Especially government lawyers. And especially in published opinions. For good reason. When it happens, somebody is usually in trouble.
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Objector Overruled...
Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern., No. B249253 (D2d7 Nov. 21, 2014)
An objector appeals from an order approving a settlement in a wage and hour class action. The court of appeal affirms, finding each of the objections without merit.
First, the objector complained that the notice to the class, which explained that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were seeking a fee award of 33 percent of the $19 million settlement fund, was improper because the attorneys had not yet filed their fee motion. Although having a fee motion on file before objections are due is required under the federal rules, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Secs. Litig., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010), the California Rules of Court contain no such requirement. While a California notice must generally explain the settlement terms—including the fees sought by the attorneys—nothing in the rules requires that the fee motion to be on file at the time the notice is sent or before objections are due.
Second, the objector complained that the court’s fee award—calculated as a third of the common fund and cross-checked with a lodestar analysis—was improper. But nothing about the methodology was improper. California courts can permissibly use the percentage of fund calculation in a class action settlement and the 33 percent figure—while on the high end—was within the trial court’s discretion to award. Further the trial court’s award was bolstered by its lodestar analysis. In conducting that analysis, the court was permitted to rely upon general summaries of the plaintiffs attorneys’ rates and the number of hours worked on the ligation. The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require the plaintiffs’ attorneys to submit detailed billing documents. And the lodestar multiplier that was arrived at by the court—2.13—was within the norm for a reasonable attorneys’ fee.
Finally, the objector was dissatisfied that the settlement agreement included a clear sailing provision—an agreement that defendants would not object to a fee award within a negotiated limit. But California law does not prohibit clear sailing provisions, and in the absence of any evidence of collusion between the defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyer, there was nothing improper about agreeing to one in this case. Notably, the cases in which clear sailing clauses have come under fire involve non-monetary settlements for the plaintiff class. In contrast, this case entailed a significant monetary award to the plaintiff class so there was no reason to believe that the only beneficiary of the litigation would be the plaintiff lawyers.
Affirmed.
**Update: The Supreme Court granted review of this case on Feb. 26, 2015.
An objector appeals from an order approving a settlement in a wage and hour class action. The court of appeal affirms, finding each of the objections without merit.
First, the objector complained that the notice to the class, which explained that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were seeking a fee award of 33 percent of the $19 million settlement fund, was improper because the attorneys had not yet filed their fee motion. Although having a fee motion on file before objections are due is required under the federal rules, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h); In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Secs. Litig., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010), the California Rules of Court contain no such requirement. While a California notice must generally explain the settlement terms—including the fees sought by the attorneys—nothing in the rules requires that the fee motion to be on file at the time the notice is sent or before objections are due.
Second, the objector complained that the court’s fee award—calculated as a third of the common fund and cross-checked with a lodestar analysis—was improper. But nothing about the methodology was improper. California courts can permissibly use the percentage of fund calculation in a class action settlement and the 33 percent figure—while on the high end—was within the trial court’s discretion to award. Further the trial court’s award was bolstered by its lodestar analysis. In conducting that analysis, the court was permitted to rely upon general summaries of the plaintiffs attorneys’ rates and the number of hours worked on the ligation. The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require the plaintiffs’ attorneys to submit detailed billing documents. And the lodestar multiplier that was arrived at by the court—2.13—was within the norm for a reasonable attorneys’ fee.
Finally, the objector was dissatisfied that the settlement agreement included a clear sailing provision—an agreement that defendants would not object to a fee award within a negotiated limit. But California law does not prohibit clear sailing provisions, and in the absence of any evidence of collusion between the defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyer, there was nothing improper about agreeing to one in this case. Notably, the cases in which clear sailing clauses have come under fire involve non-monetary settlements for the plaintiff class. In contrast, this case entailed a significant monetary award to the plaintiff class so there was no reason to believe that the only beneficiary of the litigation would be the plaintiff lawyers.
Affirmed.
**Update: The Supreme Court granted review of this case on Feb. 26, 2015.
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