Sahei v. White Memorial Med. Cntr., No. B283217 (D2d8 Mar. 14, 2018)
Under California law, special protections are required before party can agree to arbitrate claims brought under the Ralph and Bane Civil Rights Acts. See Civil Code § 51.7, 52.1. These protections, however, are preempted by the FAA, which doesn’t permit states to enact special rules that discriminate against or are hostile to arbitration. On the other hand, preemption won’t apply if the agreement isn’t governed by the FAA or if parties nonetheless agree that their agreement to arbitrate will be governed exclusively by preempted California law.
In this case, the parties’ agreement specifically carved out from the scope of arbitration several categories of generally non-arbitrable claims, as well as “any claim that is non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal law.” So the question comes down to contract interpretation: Does “applicable state law” mean the Ralph and Bane Acts as written, or as applied, i.e., baking in the fact that their anti-arbitration provisions are preempted. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in DIRECTV v. Imbrugia, the Court takes the as-applied approach. “Applicable state law” incorporates the idea that some state laws are preempted, so the FAA trumps the Ralph and Bane Acts on the arbitrability question.
Reversed.
Showing posts with label civil rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil rights. Show all posts
Thursday, April 26, 2018
Monday, January 11, 2016
Trial Court Must Show Its Work on Lodestar
Kerkeles v. City of San Jose, No. H040919 (D6 Dec. 18, 2015)
The settlement agreement in a civil rights case permitted Plaintiff to seek an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 from the court. Under § 1988, fees are computed using a lodestar—hours times reasonable rate, potentially adjusted by a multiplier. But the unadjusted rate times time measure is presumptively the reasonable fee. And, as the court here explains, in making that calculation, a trial court needs to show its work.
If a trial court questions the time time spent or whether the rates are market, it needs to explain its adjustments. In particular, if it thinks the time spent is excessive, it needs to give a specific reasoned basis for the reduction—shaving a substantial percentage off the top of total hours is viewed as suspect. Here, the trial court reduced plaintiff’s lawyer’s hours by half, without giving any reasoned explanation. That reduction—which the court here calls a ”draconian, blanket reduction in complete and uncritical conformance to the defendants’ proposals”—would not fly.
As to the rates, the fee applicant party bears the burden of showing its rates are reasonable in the relevant market. The opposing party can rebut that showing. If the trial court makes a reasoned determination, its computation merits significant deference, given the trial judge’s awareness of his or her own legal community. But the trial court here didn’t make any such reasoned determination here. So it needs to do that on remand too.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
The settlement agreement in a civil rights case permitted Plaintiff to seek an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 from the court. Under § 1988, fees are computed using a lodestar—hours times reasonable rate, potentially adjusted by a multiplier. But the unadjusted rate times time measure is presumptively the reasonable fee. And, as the court here explains, in making that calculation, a trial court needs to show its work.
If a trial court questions the time time spent or whether the rates are market, it needs to explain its adjustments. In particular, if it thinks the time spent is excessive, it needs to give a specific reasoned basis for the reduction—shaving a substantial percentage off the top of total hours is viewed as suspect. Here, the trial court reduced plaintiff’s lawyer’s hours by half, without giving any reasoned explanation. That reduction—which the court here calls a ”draconian, blanket reduction in complete and uncritical conformance to the defendants’ proposals”—would not fly.
As to the rates, the fee applicant party bears the burden of showing its rates are reasonable in the relevant market. The opposing party can rebut that showing. If the trial court makes a reasoned determination, its computation merits significant deference, given the trial judge’s awareness of his or her own legal community. But the trial court here didn’t make any such reasoned determination here. So it needs to do that on remand too.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
Monday, December 14, 2015
A $138 Mistake.
King v. California, No. B257676 (D2d1 Nov. 18, 2015)
This is an appeal of a verdict in a civil rights case. A jury awarded damages against some CHP officers it found to have unreasonably searched the plaintiff. Most of the opinion deals with civil rights stuff like the sufficiency of the evidence of unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity. The court does, however, address two minor procedural points.
First, it affirms the exclusion of expert testimony from a police policy and practice expert on relevance grounds. The expert offered testimony about CHP policy, but plaintiff didn’t sue the officers for violating policy. He sued them for violating the Fourth Amendment. And since the court didn’t need some expert say what the Fourth Amendment means, the testimony was properly excluded.
The court also affirms a very small—$138—award of economic damages over a claim of inconsistent verdicts. The jury had found no liability on battery, excessive force or similar theories, but it did find the search and seizure were unreasonable. The $138 represented plaintiff’s medical expenses incurred as a result of allegedly being roughed up during the search. The jury was instructed (without objection from defendants) that Plaintiff was entitled to compensation due to any harm incurred by the officers. Based on those instructions, it was not unreasonable or in for the jury to award the expenses as damages, even if it found no liability on claims more commonly associated with compensation for physical injuries. While the court here intimates that the instructions might have been problematic, nobody challenged them. So a denial of a new trial on inconsistency grounds would be upheld because the verdict was entirely consistent with the charge given to the jury.
Affirmed in relevant part.
This is an appeal of a verdict in a civil rights case. A jury awarded damages against some CHP officers it found to have unreasonably searched the plaintiff. Most of the opinion deals with civil rights stuff like the sufficiency of the evidence of unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity. The court does, however, address two minor procedural points.
First, it affirms the exclusion of expert testimony from a police policy and practice expert on relevance grounds. The expert offered testimony about CHP policy, but plaintiff didn’t sue the officers for violating policy. He sued them for violating the Fourth Amendment. And since the court didn’t need some expert say what the Fourth Amendment means, the testimony was properly excluded.
The court also affirms a very small—$138—award of economic damages over a claim of inconsistent verdicts. The jury had found no liability on battery, excessive force or similar theories, but it did find the search and seizure were unreasonable. The $138 represented plaintiff’s medical expenses incurred as a result of allegedly being roughed up during the search. The jury was instructed (without objection from defendants) that Plaintiff was entitled to compensation due to any harm incurred by the officers. Based on those instructions, it was not unreasonable or in for the jury to award the expenses as damages, even if it found no liability on claims more commonly associated with compensation for physical injuries. While the court here intimates that the instructions might have been problematic, nobody challenged them. So a denial of a new trial on inconsistency grounds would be upheld because the verdict was entirely consistent with the charge given to the jury.
Affirmed in relevant part.
Monday, August 24, 2015
So Much for Gatekeeping . . .
Green v. City of Riverside, No. D067424 (D4d1 Jul. 29, 2015)
This case arises from the kind of unfortunate interaction between the cops and the mentally ill that seems to happen every day nowadays. An obviously unstable guy is found dancing in the sprinklers at a church in Hemet, wearing only his underwear and saying crazy stuff. Someone calls 911. Cops show. Things escalate. There’s a confrontation. Tasing ensues. Three times. An asphyxiation-friendly move gets used to put the cuffs on. The guy winds up brain dead. And then fully dead. The coroner pins it on a “bad heart.” And a trial before a Riverside jury results in a defense verdict.
This case arises from the kind of unfortunate interaction between the cops and the mentally ill that seems to happen every day nowadays. An obviously unstable guy is found dancing in the sprinklers at a church in Hemet, wearing only his underwear and saying crazy stuff. Someone calls 911. Cops show. Things escalate. There’s a confrontation. Tasing ensues. Three times. An asphyxiation-friendly move gets used to put the cuffs on. The guy winds up brain dead. And then fully dead. The coroner pins it on a “bad heart.” And a trial before a Riverside jury results in a defense verdict.
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