Simonelli v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, No. H040488 (D6, as modified Sept. 28, 2015)
A homeowner filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus against sued a city, challenging its issuance of a development permit for the lot next to hers. But she didn’t join the developer. The superior court denied the writ for failure to join an indispensable party, and then refused to permit her to amend because here petition was supposedly too late under a ninety-day statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.6.
The court of appeal says the trial court was right on the first issue. Granting the writ would invariably affect the developer’s rights, which makes the developer a quintessential indispensable party § 389. But it got the statute of limitations issue wrong. Section 1094.6 applies to a writ challenging a local agency’s denial or revocation of a permit. It says nothing about a petition objecting to a granted permit application. So the homeowner should have been permitted to amend her petition to add the developer.
Reversed.
Showing posts with label indispensable parties. Show all posts
Showing posts with label indispensable parties. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 23, 2015
Friday, April 3, 2015
A Truly Indispensable Joint Tortfeasor?
Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. B253227 (D2d6 Mar. 3, 2015)
Defendants’ hillside collapsed into their neighbor’s property, allegedly because they had altered water courses and removed vegetation when they expanded their agricultural operations. Defendants were required to obtain planning approval from a Ventura County planning agency. For reasons unexplained in the opinion, the engineering work on that application was performed by an employee of Natural Resource Conservation Service, which is part of the federal government, and which was not joined as a defendant. Defendants moved to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure § 389 for failure to join an indispensable party.
Defendants’ hillside collapsed into their neighbor’s property, allegedly because they had altered water courses and removed vegetation when they expanded their agricultural operations. Defendants were required to obtain planning approval from a Ventura County planning agency. For reasons unexplained in the opinion, the engineering work on that application was performed by an employee of Natural Resource Conservation Service, which is part of the federal government, and which was not joined as a defendant. Defendants moved to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure § 389 for failure to join an indispensable party.
Sunday, October 20, 2013
Brothers Are Indispensable Parties in Family Showdown
Morrical v. Rogers, A137011 (D1d5 Oct. 10, 2013)
This case is a fight over the control of a very valuable family insurance business. The opinion features more characters than a Pynchon novel, and its plot is only slightly less confusing. To oversimplify (a little), the sister sued to invalidate a board election that resulted in the election of the defendants—some money managers that had dealings with her brothers. The grounds were that the brothers—who were the other shareholders in the company—had engaged in self-dealing in transactions related to the election, which rendered the election invalid under some provisions of the Corporations Code. But even though it was the brothers whose alleged fiduciary breaches formed the basis of the attempt to invalidate the election, only the money managers and their company were named as defendants. The brothers were not joined. After the court decided some issues under the Corporations Code, it went on to say that the brothers should have been joined as indispensable parties under Code of Civil Procedure § 389. Because the brothers’ breaches of their fiduciary duties as directors and majority shareholders formed the very basis of the election challenge, they were potentially prejudiced by the sister’s failure to join them. Indeed, their rights were necessarily affected by the judgment. Further, the fact that the brothers had litigation interests that were in line with the named defendants did not mean that the defendants adequately represented their interests in the case.
Reversed with orders to join the brothers on remand or dismiss.
This case is a fight over the control of a very valuable family insurance business. The opinion features more characters than a Pynchon novel, and its plot is only slightly less confusing. To oversimplify (a little), the sister sued to invalidate a board election that resulted in the election of the defendants—some money managers that had dealings with her brothers. The grounds were that the brothers—who were the other shareholders in the company—had engaged in self-dealing in transactions related to the election, which rendered the election invalid under some provisions of the Corporations Code. But even though it was the brothers whose alleged fiduciary breaches formed the basis of the attempt to invalidate the election, only the money managers and their company were named as defendants. The brothers were not joined. After the court decided some issues under the Corporations Code, it went on to say that the brothers should have been joined as indispensable parties under Code of Civil Procedure § 389. Because the brothers’ breaches of their fiduciary duties as directors and majority shareholders formed the very basis of the election challenge, they were potentially prejudiced by the sister’s failure to join them. Indeed, their rights were necessarily affected by the judgment. Further, the fact that the brothers had litigation interests that were in line with the named defendants did not mean that the defendants adequately represented their interests in the case.
Reversed with orders to join the brothers on remand or dismiss.
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