Sass v. Cohen, No. B283122 (D2d2 Apr. 4, 2019)
Plaintiff brought Marvin and other claims against her ex-paramour, claiming to be entitled to half the value of various items of real and personal property acquired during the relationship. Defendant defaulted. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), which limits relief on a default judgment to that demanded in the complaint, the trial court awarded plaintiff almost $3 million, plus a constructive trust over one house. Defendant appeared and moved to vacate the judgment. But the trial court upheld the award, finding that § 580(a)’s limits don’t apply to an accounting-type claim where the defendant already has sufficient information to calculate an exposure.
Showing posts with label default judgments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label default judgments. Show all posts
Friday, April 12, 2019
Wednesday, January 9, 2019
According to Proof Ain’t Worth Jack
Yu v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. G054522 (D4d3 Jan. 4., 2019)
Although basically everyone does it, it’s not really proper to to demand unquantified “damages according to proof” in a complaint. In most cases, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a) requires a demand for money damages to state the amount of the demand. But it usually doesn’t matter, because a court can award relief irrespective of the prayer. § 580(a). Except, of course, in the case of a default judgment, for which an award more than the amount demanded is void as a matter of law. Id.; see also § 585(a), (b). Which means, effectively, if you allege “according to proof” you’ll need to amend to put in a number and re-serve process before you take a default. Or else you get zero.
The complaint here said according to proof and nobody bothered to amend to put in a number. So Plaintiff’s $1.2 million default judgment on a third party indemnity cross-claim assigned to her by the original defendant is void. Nor was the judgment saved by the fact that the cross-claim incorporated the original complaint—which contained a $10 million demand—by reference. The incorporation was expressly “for identification and informational purposes only.” Even if the cross-complaint could theoretically incorporate a demand contained in some other pleading—which seems like a questionable way to give notice—the reference here was too vague and equivocal to meet the general elements of the incorporation by reference doctrine.
Affirmed.
Although basically everyone does it, it’s not really proper to to demand unquantified “damages according to proof” in a complaint. In most cases, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a) requires a demand for money damages to state the amount of the demand. But it usually doesn’t matter, because a court can award relief irrespective of the prayer. § 580(a). Except, of course, in the case of a default judgment, for which an award more than the amount demanded is void as a matter of law. Id.; see also § 585(a), (b). Which means, effectively, if you allege “according to proof” you’ll need to amend to put in a number and re-serve process before you take a default. Or else you get zero.
The complaint here said according to proof and nobody bothered to amend to put in a number. So Plaintiff’s $1.2 million default judgment on a third party indemnity cross-claim assigned to her by the original defendant is void. Nor was the judgment saved by the fact that the cross-claim incorporated the original complaint—which contained a $10 million demand—by reference. The incorporation was expressly “for identification and informational purposes only.” Even if the cross-complaint could theoretically incorporate a demand contained in some other pleading—which seems like a questionable way to give notice—the reference here was too vague and equivocal to meet the general elements of the incorporation by reference doctrine.
Affirmed.
Tuesday, July 3, 2018
Be Careful What You Don't Pray For
Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Techs., Inc., No. D072624 (D4d1 May 25, 2018)
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
Seven Years' Default
Holloway v. Quetel, No. B259622 (D2d7 Dec. 14, 2015)
Plaintiff in this case, a pro se prisoner, has been trying since 2009 to get a default judgment for upaid rent on a property he owns. The case has already been reversed once because the trial court erroneously sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed several rounds of default papers, each of which was rejected by the trial court for various and sundry errors and omissions. In rejecting the papers, however, the trial court only made vague intimations about the nature of the defects, instead just sending Plaintiff back to try again. Ultimately, after several tries, the trial court decided it had enough and entered a defense judgment.
The court here reverses and remands for one more try. In dealing with a pro se, there’s a fine line between a judge’s ensuring appropriate access to the court and his or her advocacy on the pro se’s behalf. It’s obviously not fair for the court to act as an adjunct lawyer for a party, even one who lacks a lawyer of his own. But when a court rejects a pro se’s papers for failing to conform to the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Court, it doesn’t any cross the line for the trial court to actually point out what the defects are, so that the party will have notice and an honest chance to fix them. The trial court didn’t do that here, so the case goes back for one more mulligan.
Reversed.
Plaintiff in this case, a pro se prisoner, has been trying since 2009 to get a default judgment for upaid rent on a property he owns. The case has already been reversed once because the trial court erroneously sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed several rounds of default papers, each of which was rejected by the trial court for various and sundry errors and omissions. In rejecting the papers, however, the trial court only made vague intimations about the nature of the defects, instead just sending Plaintiff back to try again. Ultimately, after several tries, the trial court decided it had enough and entered a defense judgment.
The court here reverses and remands for one more try. In dealing with a pro se, there’s a fine line between a judge’s ensuring appropriate access to the court and his or her advocacy on the pro se’s behalf. It’s obviously not fair for the court to act as an adjunct lawyer for a party, even one who lacks a lawyer of his own. But when a court rejects a pro se’s papers for failing to conform to the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Court, it doesn’t any cross the line for the trial court to actually point out what the defects are, so that the party will have notice and an honest chance to fix them. The trial court didn’t do that here, so the case goes back for one more mulligan.
Reversed.
Friday, November 20, 2015
From Now on, Just Demand $1 Trillion . . .
Dhawan v. Biring, No. B257977 (D2d5 Oct. 28, 2015)
Plaintiff here what I and every lawyer who has filed a state court complaint arising from a business dispute has probably also done. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a)(2)—which says that “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded [in a non-personal injury case] the amount demanded shall be stated”—Plaintiff’s prayer for relief said only that he was entitled to damages “according to proof.” After all, in a case where the damages calculation likely depends on the testimony an expert who might not even be hired for many months, who wants to commit?
Generally it makes no difference. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), in a contested case the court can grant any relief consistent with the complaint, regardless of what’s in the prayer. But when defendant defaults, it becomes a bigger deal, because in those circumstances § 580(a) expressly prohibits any award of relief not demanded in the complaint.
Defendant here did default, however, and that put Plaintiff in a pickle. Amending his complaint to state the now-absolutely necessary damages demand would require Plaintiff to serve Defendant anew and thus effectively relieve Defendant from the entered default on the original complaint. What’s the chance a defendant defaults twice? So to avoid that option, Plaintiff served Defendant with a “statement of damages” under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11—which authorizes this practice in personal injury cases where, as an exception to the general rule, a plaintiff is not allowed to plead a damages number. The trial court ultimately entered a default judgment on the amount in the notice.
More than a year later, Defendant moved to vacate the judgment as void under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) because the damages exceeded those pleaded in the complaint. The court of appeal agrees, and reverses.
Because of the due process issues implicated in defaults, § 580 gets strictly construed. Prior cases have held, for instance, that if the number isn’t in the complaint, it’s not enough even if Defendant had actual notice of the damages. Given that, the court isn’t inclined to let § 425.11 serve as an end-around of the facial requirement under § 580 that an ordinary plaintiff plead his damages in his complaint. For the same reason, Plaintiff couldn’t smuggle notice of his regular damages onto his statement of his punitive damages—the amount of which which also can’t be pleaded—as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.115.
Further, a default judgment for more than demanded damages isn’t just voidable; it’s full-blown void. So it is subject to collateral attack under § 473(d), which doesn’t have the same time limits and factual predicates that apply to an attack on a merely voidable judgment under § 473(b).
Reversed.
Plaintiff here what I and every lawyer who has filed a state court complaint arising from a business dispute has probably also done. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure § 425.10(a)(2)—which says that “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded [in a non-personal injury case] the amount demanded shall be stated”—Plaintiff’s prayer for relief said only that he was entitled to damages “according to proof.” After all, in a case where the damages calculation likely depends on the testimony an expert who might not even be hired for many months, who wants to commit?
Generally it makes no difference. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a), in a contested case the court can grant any relief consistent with the complaint, regardless of what’s in the prayer. But when defendant defaults, it becomes a bigger deal, because in those circumstances § 580(a) expressly prohibits any award of relief not demanded in the complaint.
Defendant here did default, however, and that put Plaintiff in a pickle. Amending his complaint to state the now-absolutely necessary damages demand would require Plaintiff to serve Defendant anew and thus effectively relieve Defendant from the entered default on the original complaint. What’s the chance a defendant defaults twice? So to avoid that option, Plaintiff served Defendant with a “statement of damages” under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11—which authorizes this practice in personal injury cases where, as an exception to the general rule, a plaintiff is not allowed to plead a damages number. The trial court ultimately entered a default judgment on the amount in the notice.
More than a year later, Defendant moved to vacate the judgment as void under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) because the damages exceeded those pleaded in the complaint. The court of appeal agrees, and reverses.
Because of the due process issues implicated in defaults, § 580 gets strictly construed. Prior cases have held, for instance, that if the number isn’t in the complaint, it’s not enough even if Defendant had actual notice of the damages. Given that, the court isn’t inclined to let § 425.11 serve as an end-around of the facial requirement under § 580 that an ordinary plaintiff plead his damages in his complaint. For the same reason, Plaintiff couldn’t smuggle notice of his regular damages onto his statement of his punitive damages—the amount of which which also can’t be pleaded—as required under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.115.
Further, a default judgment for more than demanded damages isn’t just voidable; it’s full-blown void. So it is subject to collateral attack under § 473(d), which doesn’t have the same time limits and factual predicates that apply to an attack on a merely voidable judgment under § 473(b).
Reversed.
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Wage & Hour Violations Aren't "Personal Inuries" for Default Purposes
Rodriguez v. Cho, No. B256985 (D2d8 May 7, 2015)
Plaintiff, who cleans offices, filed a wage and hour case against defendant, her employer. The prayer in her complaint demanded damages to be proven at trial and a $10,000 civil penalty. Along with the complaint, she served a “statement of damages” demanding $3.2 million in general, special and punitive damages. Defendant defaulted. At the damages prove up, plaintiff’s prove-up documents sought a little less than $300k. The court ultimately entered a default judgment for about $130k.
Plaintiff, who cleans offices, filed a wage and hour case against defendant, her employer. The prayer in her complaint demanded damages to be proven at trial and a $10,000 civil penalty. Along with the complaint, she served a “statement of damages” demanding $3.2 million in general, special and punitive damages. Defendant defaulted. At the damages prove up, plaintiff’s prove-up documents sought a little less than $300k. The court ultimately entered a default judgment for about $130k.
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