JCCP Rule Trumps Trial Preference Statute

Isaak v. Superior Court, No. A163675 (D1d1 Jan. 11, 2022)

This case deals with a trial preference motion brought by an elderly plaintiff in a coordinated proceeding under the Judicial Council Coordination Proceedings rules. There was no question that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements to get a trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure § 36, which requires that the plaintiff be more than 70 years old, that he or she have a substantial interest in the action, and that his or her health be such that an expedited trial is needed to prevent prejudice to the party’s interests. If those criteria are met, the movant is generally entitled to trial within 120 days. The question here, however, is whether the statutory regime governing complex, consolidated proceedings—§§ 404–404.9—and the related Rules of Court override § 36.

California civil procedure is unusual, in that the our Legislature maintains supremacy over it—we have no state equivalent of the Rules Enabling Act that lets the judiciary make procedural rules that have the full force of statutes. Generally, the Rules of Court can only fill interstitial gaps that are not addressed in the Code.

But the Legislature is still free to cede that power over specific issues. And it did so when it enacted the statutes that govern JCCP proceedings. Section 404.7 specifically authorizes the Judicial Council to enact rules to govern JCCP proceedings “notwithstanding any other provision of law[.]” As the Court explains, that permits the Rules of Court to supersede statuary procedures in the specific context of JCCP proceedings.

The relevant Rules of Court say that ordinary civil procedure rule should apply, but “if the prescribed manner of proceeding cannot, with reasonable diligence, be followed in a particular coordination proceeding, the assigned judge may prescribe any suitable manner of proceeding that appears most consistent with those statutes and rules.” R. Ct. 3.504(c). That means that the trial court has discretion to act contrary to ordinary civil procedure rules, provided the trial court’s rulings are conducive to the efficient management of a JCCP case and generally “consistent” with the spirit of the underlying rules.

So here, given § 404.7’s “notwithstanding” language, the trial court had the discretion to set trial inconsistent with § 36, “notwithstanding” the mandatory language in the statute. Because the trial court’s action was not inconsistent with Rule 3.504, it did not err when it denied the preference motion.

Writ denied.