Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. B293153 (D2d6 Jun. 29, 2020)
A UCSB Student who appears to have been shabbily treated in the Title IX disciplinary process. In administrative mandamus proceedings, he won a PI requiring the school to revoke a temporary suspension. The school ultimately gave up and the case was dismissed as moot. Student moved for fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, which codifies the private attorney general doctrine. The trial court denied the motion.
A party can obtain fees under § 1021.5 when: (1) it is “a successful party” in an “action”; (2) the action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest”; (3) the action has conferred “a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, . . . on the general public or a large class of persons”; and (4) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.
The second part of the third element is the principal point of dispute here. How does an order that affects the college enrollment of a single student confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of people?
As the Court of Appeal explains, setting precedent on important constitutional issues can benefit the general public even when the relief sought is only individualized. Student’s litigation revealed a number of substantial due process problems with the way UCSB was handling Title IX investigations, and set an important precedent that a party could get a PI in an administrative mandamus case to enjoin a temporary suspension. Further, Student’s litigation will deter the school in failing to comply with it’s Title IX processes in the future, and appears to have motivated, so some degree, the Department of Education to get involved in obtaining a consent decree requiring USCB to promptly resolve investigations. Overall, the Court of Appeal says that’s enough to meet the third element.
Reversed.
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