Does the UCL Bootstrap Torts?

Penuma Int’l, Inc. v. Cho, No. A151536 (D1d1 Jun. 24, 2016)

A dispute between an Employee and his former Employer. Employee, who had set up Employer’s email domain, failed to turn it over after he left for a competitor. Although a flurry of claims and cross-claims were alleged, the only one for which liability was found was trespass to chattels. Employer appealed, among other things, the dismissal of its claim under the Unfair Competition Law.

Employee denied employer some use over the domain, but not enough to constitute conversion. The Court holds that is not enough to bootstrap the tort into a claim for an “unlawful” violation under the UCL. The “unlawful” standard is often articulated to include practices made unlawful under “court-made law.” But in a sparse analysis, the Court of Appeal here finds that a “non-criminal tort,” without more, is insufficient as a “specific law” to serve as the basis of an unlawfulness claim.* And in any event, since the UCL didn’t afford any additional relief, it’s basically an academic point.

Affirmed.

*This is actually a tricky question, and the short-shrift analysis the Court gives it here is not ideal. The Court didn’t need to reach the issue since it didn’t afford any additional remedy. But since an alternative holding is not dicta in California, arguably, the decision here is precedential in a case where the UCL were to afford some basis additional relief. E.g., a civil enforcement case where a public prosecutor sought penalties grounded in “unlawful” violations grounded in tort.