Not a Prior Agreement

Williams v. Las Posas, No. B282513 (D2d6 Jun. 27, 2018)

Oh good. Another nursing home arbitration case. 

The Patient—who suffered a traumatic brain injury in a bike accident—had signed both an admittance agreement and a separate arb agreement. The arb agreement contained a broad clause that required any disputes arising from or related to the admittance agreement or any care provided by the nursing home go to arbitration. 

At some point, the nursing home let Patient wander off. He was found lying in a ditch several hours later. In worse shape than before. Litigation ensued.

In response to a motion to compel arbitration, Patient argued that an integration clause in the admittance agreement that “supersedes all prior agreements” made the arb agreement irrelevant. The trial court bought it. 

But that’s wrong. The Court of Appeal here says so because the arb agreement was signed after the admittance agreement. An integration clause that bars prior agreements does supersede a later-signed agreement to arbitrate. 

But Patient’s wife—also a plaintiff—never signed any of the agreements. That brings into play Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.1(c), which gives the court discretion to deny arbitration when a case joins claims by a non-arbitrable party and there is a risk of inconsistent results. The trial court, however, never reached this argument. Or, for that matter, an argument about unconscionability that was also raised. So the trial court needs to sort that all out on remand.

Reversed and remanded.