Monday, October 2, 2017

A Hot Mess of Preclusion

F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim, No. G052460 (D4d3 Sept. 19, 2017)

This is a civil rights case over a police shooting with a complicated procedural history. Plaintiff first filed in federal court, bringing a § 1983 claim as well as several pendant state claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the § 1983 and declined ongoing supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). A three judge 9th Circuit panel upheld the district court’s opinion on appeal. Plaintiff sought review en banc.

In the meantime, plaintiff refiled his state claims in state court. But since they were premised on the same factual scenario as the federal claims and governed by similar standards, the superior court found that the state claims were barred by the collateral estoppel effect of the federal judgment, even though the appeals were not final. (Federal preclusion applies from the entry of judgment, even when appeals are pending.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

But then the 9th Circuit granted review en banc and eventually reversed its the panel decision and the district court as well. Cert was eventually denied.

So plaintiffs filed a new state court case and moved to have the prior judgment vacated. The superior court denied the motion and the Court of Appeal denied a writ. The superior court then dismissed the new case, on res judicata grounds—the prior dismissal barred the new case, even though the preclusion that served as the basis of that case’s dismissal would no longer apply. Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff first argues that the en banc opinion automatically wipes out the first state court judgment. But that’s not consistent with the law. Under § 16 of the Restatement of Judgments—which is generally followed in California—when a judgement in case #2 is based on a judgment in case #1, the vacation of judgment #1 does not automatically nullify judgment #2. Instead, it subjects judgment #2 to being set aside through a procedurally appropriate vehicle. 

Nor can Plaintiff collaterally attack or obtain equitable relief from the earlier state court judgment. Restatement § 73 suggests that it is appropriate to give relief from a second judgment when it is based on an earlier judgment that is substantively vacated. That’s a grounds for relief from judgment that is specially enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). But for weird historical reasons, California does not have a clean Rule 60(b) analog.  

California does permit the equitable setting aside of a judgment—whether by motion filed in the original case or by filing a separate equitable action. But the grounds for that are very narrow. To vacate, a judgment needs to be facially void or the product of extrinsic fraud. While extrinsic fraud can be hard to define, there’s no way that the 9th Circuit’s en banc order turned the judgment in the first state case into a product of extrinsic fraud. So none of California’s procedural vehicles to set aside a judgment that was based on an earlier judgment that was reversed apply to the circumstances presented here.

At this point, the Court of Appeal is pretty boxed in. Because the judgment in the first case is final—indeed, affirmed on appeal—there isn’t any state law procedure to let plaintiff out from under that judgment. That’s the case even though the result is indisputably wrong, based as it is on the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment that was subsequently overturned.

So the court uses the only tool left. There’s an exception to res judicata when recognizing the effect of the first judgment would work a manifest injustice. An exception that is mostly recognized in cases that say that it doesn’t apply. But given the “highly unusual, even extraordinary” circumstances of the case, the court finds that the exception applies here. The essential concerns motivating preclusion doctrines aren’t present here. Indeed, applying preclusion runs contrary to the idea that cases deserve to be decided on the merits. And since the only merits decision in this case that informed the preclusion rulings was overturned as wrongly decided, the court declines to recognize the preclusive effect of the first judgment.

Reversed.

FWIW, I suppose there is a second option, but not in this court. The federal case is going back to the district court for trial. Given that theres now a federal claim for the state claims to be pendent to, plaintiff could add the state claims back there, and they should relate back to the federal claim for staute of limitations purposes, since they are all based on the same conduct. But I get why the court here sees the need to step in to avoid an injustice.

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