Lofton v. Wells Fargo, No. A136626 (D1d3, as modified Nov. 20, 2014)
There are two wage-and-hour cases against Wells Fargo. One is a class action. The other is a 600 plaintiff mass joinder case with no certified class. One is in LA, the other in San Francisco. Although they are not coordinated, both cases allegedly resolve at the same mediation. The deal was that the class will settle for $19 million, the 600 plaintiffs will opt out, and then the 600 will settle for $6 million.
But when it comes time to get approval, the individuals don’t opt out. Instead, they file claims in the class settlement, apparently because that’s what their lawyers tell them to do. And nobody tells the court during the approval process that the individual case attorneys—the appropriately named “Initiative Legal Group”—now contend that the whole $6 million was to address their attorneys’ fees.
When one of the individual plaintiffs gets word of ILG’s initiative to steal the settlement fund from their clients, he sues ILG for breach of fiduciary duty. He also intervenes in the (already approved) class action case and gets a TRO from that court preventing ILG from dissipating the $6 million.
The court here affirms that injunction, finding: (1) that issuing the TRO was within the trial court’s ongoing jurisdiction over a class action settlement under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, which includes the authority to act in equity; (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO; (3) that ILG’s constitutional and privacy objections are bogus; and (4) that ILG’s Evidence Code § 1152 settlement privilege objections were harmless or unfounded.
Affirmed.
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Wednesday, November 12, 2014
SLAPP 101
Kenne v. Stennis, No. B242262 (D2d5 Oct. 21, 2014)
Unsurprisingly, a complaint based on making false police reports and filing meritless civil harassment petitions arises from protected activity, for anti-SLAPP purposes. Similarly unsurprising is that the plaintiff could not show a probability of success because her claims were barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b), as well as other policy-based privileges.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Unsurprisingly, a complaint based on making false police reports and filing meritless civil harassment petitions arises from protected activity, for anti-SLAPP purposes. Similarly unsurprising is that the plaintiff could not show a probability of success because her claims were barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b), as well as other policy-based privileges.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
Notice Not Necessary to Defaulted Discharged Debtor when Actually Acting Against Insurer
Weakly-Hoyt v. Foster, No. F067626 (D5 Oct. 21, 2014)
When a plaintiff seeks to recover against an insurance policy held by a bankrupt defendant, in order to obtain a default judgment, the plaintiff is only required to serve the insurer, not the defendant, with a statement of damages under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11. Because a defendant whose debts have been discharged in bankruptcy faces no potential liability, that defendant can’t object to the default on the grounds of insufficient notice. Affirmed.
When a plaintiff seeks to recover against an insurance policy held by a bankrupt defendant, in order to obtain a default judgment, the plaintiff is only required to serve the insurer, not the defendant, with a statement of damages under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11. Because a defendant whose debts have been discharged in bankruptcy faces no potential liability, that defendant can’t object to the default on the grounds of insufficient notice. Affirmed.
There's No Implied Consent Under the Stored Communications Act, But Coerced Consent Is AOK
Negro v. Superior Court, No. H040146 (D6 as modified Nov. 18, 2014)
Generally, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12, prohibits the provider of an electronic communications service from divulging the contents of communications stored on its service. This is why you ordinarily can’t subpoena Google for the contents of your opponent’s gmail account, which is just what the real party did in this writ case.
There is an exception, however, for when the subscriber gives its consent. But the consent cannot be implicit. It must be real consent-in-fact. Thus, to the extent the trial court here denied a motion to quash based on implicit consent by the subscriber, it erred.
That said, courts have nevertheless recognized that parties to litigation can be compelled by the court to give their consent, even though that doesn’t jibe with the concept of consent as commonly understood. Here, after the petitioner’s motion to quash was denied, he was ordered by a Florida court to consent to Google’s disclosing his gmail to the real party—his opponent in that litigation. He abided by the order, so there was effective consent to require Google to produce the documents.
Finally, the court rejects Google's argument that the Act immunizes it from participating in third party discovery. Thus, the court here declines to issue a writ requiring the trial court to quash the subpoena.
As a side point, the subscriber’s consent was provided after he filed his writ petition in this case. In relying upon the evidence of consent as a basis to deny the writ, the court notes an exception to the general rule that the record is static on appeal. An appellate court proceeding in mandate can consider all relevant evidence, including facts not existing until after the petition was filed, particularly when the additional evidence may validate an action that would otherwise have to be set aside. Something to keep in mind when engaged in writ practice in a fast-moving and still developing case.
Writ granted, but only to require the trial court to correct its basis for denying the motion to quash.
Generally, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12, prohibits the provider of an electronic communications service from divulging the contents of communications stored on its service. This is why you ordinarily can’t subpoena Google for the contents of your opponent’s gmail account, which is just what the real party did in this writ case.
There is an exception, however, for when the subscriber gives its consent. But the consent cannot be implicit. It must be real consent-in-fact. Thus, to the extent the trial court here denied a motion to quash based on implicit consent by the subscriber, it erred.
That said, courts have nevertheless recognized that parties to litigation can be compelled by the court to give their consent, even though that doesn’t jibe with the concept of consent as commonly understood. Here, after the petitioner’s motion to quash was denied, he was ordered by a Florida court to consent to Google’s disclosing his gmail to the real party—his opponent in that litigation. He abided by the order, so there was effective consent to require Google to produce the documents.
Finally, the court rejects Google's argument that the Act immunizes it from participating in third party discovery. Thus, the court here declines to issue a writ requiring the trial court to quash the subpoena.
As a side point, the subscriber’s consent was provided after he filed his writ petition in this case. In relying upon the evidence of consent as a basis to deny the writ, the court notes an exception to the general rule that the record is static on appeal. An appellate court proceeding in mandate can consider all relevant evidence, including facts not existing until after the petition was filed, particularly when the additional evidence may validate an action that would otherwise have to be set aside. Something to keep in mind when engaged in writ practice in a fast-moving and still developing case.
Writ granted, but only to require the trial court to correct its basis for denying the motion to quash.
One for the Right Side of "Arising From"
Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm, No. H037989 (D6 Oct. 21, 2014)
In a very thorough opinion, the court here gets the point that the Lunada court missed a few weeks ago. In determining whether the “arising from” prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been satisfied, the court should look to what acts the plaintiff contends constitute the allegedly wrongful or injurious conduct. (As opposed to other acts that, while having a causal significance to the story of the case, are not themselves the conduct that forms the basis of the claims.) If the defendant has engaged in protected conduct, but the plaintiff’s case does not actually arise from that conduct, the standard has not been met.
Thus, when the defendant enters a stipulation to put client funds into a trust account but plaintiff’s claim is that defendant wrongfully withdrew those funds, the case arises from the withdrawal, not the stipulation. And because there is nothing communicative or public-interest-related about taking money out of a bank account, protected activity is not the basis of the claim. So the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply.
Affirmed.
In a very thorough opinion, the court here gets the point that the Lunada court missed a few weeks ago. In determining whether the “arising from” prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been satisfied, the court should look to what acts the plaintiff contends constitute the allegedly wrongful or injurious conduct. (As opposed to other acts that, while having a causal significance to the story of the case, are not themselves the conduct that forms the basis of the claims.) If the defendant has engaged in protected conduct, but the plaintiff’s case does not actually arise from that conduct, the standard has not been met.
Thus, when the defendant enters a stipulation to put client funds into a trust account but plaintiff’s claim is that defendant wrongfully withdrew those funds, the case arises from the withdrawal, not the stipulation. And because there is nothing communicative or public-interest-related about taking money out of a bank account, protected activity is not the basis of the claim. So the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply.
Affirmed.
Monday, November 10, 2014
No Third Bites at the Apple
Nixon Peabody v. Superior Court, No B256873 (D2d4 Oct. 17, 2014)
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case in LA Superior and a related case in the C.D. Cal, which lead to the involuntary dismissal with prejudice of a third, related, federal case under the “two dismissal” rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(B) (second dismissal is counted as on the merits if plaintiff has previously dismissed a prior case “based on or including the same claim” ). Plaintiff then moved under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) to revive the LA Superior Court case, arguing that because its attorney had not informed it of the consequences of the dismissal, it should be relieved from default. The trial court said ok, but the court of appeal says no dice. Section 473(d) might permit relief when an attorney dismisses a client’s case without authorization, but it doesn’t apply when the attorney just fails to explain the consequences of a dismissal.
Writ granted.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its case in LA Superior and a related case in the C.D. Cal, which lead to the involuntary dismissal with prejudice of a third, related, federal case under the “two dismissal” rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(B) (second dismissal is counted as on the merits if plaintiff has previously dismissed a prior case “based on or including the same claim” ). Plaintiff then moved under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d) to revive the LA Superior Court case, arguing that because its attorney had not informed it of the consequences of the dismissal, it should be relieved from default. The trial court said ok, but the court of appeal says no dice. Section 473(d) might permit relief when an attorney dismisses a client’s case without authorization, but it doesn’t apply when the attorney just fails to explain the consequences of a dismissal.
Writ granted.
Saturday, November 8, 2014
The Decider Decides
Network Capital Funding Corp. v. Papke, No. G049172 (D4d3 Oct. 9, 2014)
The court rules that an arbitration agreement between a company and one of its employees did not clearly leave it up to the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration would be permissible. The issue was thus a question of substantive arbitrability for the court to decide. Moreover, the trial court did not err in deciding that the agreement did not, in fact, permit class arbitration.
Affirmed.
**Note: The Supreme Court granted review on January 14, 2015, likely to resolve the split of authority on who decides the issue of the permissibility of class-wide arbitration that was addressed in Sandquist, in which review had been granted two months prior.
The court rules that an arbitration agreement between a company and one of its employees did not clearly leave it up to the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration would be permissible. The issue was thus a question of substantive arbitrability for the court to decide. Moreover, the trial court did not err in deciding that the agreement did not, in fact, permit class arbitration.
Affirmed.
**Note: The Supreme Court granted review on January 14, 2015, likely to resolve the split of authority on who decides the issue of the permissibility of class-wide arbitration that was addressed in Sandquist, in which review had been granted two months prior.
Friday, November 7, 2014
Cop Union Is a Private AG Too
Indio Police Command Unit Assoc. v. City of Indio, No. G050051 (D4d3 Oct. 9, 2014)
The court here upholds an attorneys’ fee award under the private attorney general doctrine. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5. Plaintiffs—a police officers’ union—sued to enforce a statutory collective bargaining right. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that that right was an important right affecting the public interest, which is the factual predicate to awarding fees under the doctrine. Similarly, the court did not err in finding that the other two elements of the doctrine—that the litigation convey a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, and that there are financial burdens that disincentivize private enforcement—were satisfied.
Affirmed.
The court here upholds an attorneys’ fee award under the private attorney general doctrine. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5. Plaintiffs—a police officers’ union—sued to enforce a statutory collective bargaining right. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that that right was an important right affecting the public interest, which is the factual predicate to awarding fees under the doctrine. Similarly, the court did not err in finding that the other two elements of the doctrine—that the litigation convey a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, and that there are financial burdens that disincentivize private enforcement—were satisfied.
Affirmed.
Runaway anti-SLAPP Decision Eats Declaratory Relief
Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez, No. B243205 (D2d5 Oct. 9, 2014)
This opinion says that when a claim seeking a declaration of non-liability under the CLRA is met with an anti-SLAPP motion, the declaratory relief cause of action “arises from” the defendants’ CLRA notice letter. Under the test it states, a declaratory relief claim satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis so long as a communication between the parties is needed to show a live controversy. Taken at face value, that would mean that any declaratory relief claim seeking a declaration of non-liability satisfies the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. That can’t be the law.
This opinion says that when a claim seeking a declaration of non-liability under the CLRA is met with an anti-SLAPP motion, the declaratory relief cause of action “arises from” the defendants’ CLRA notice letter. Under the test it states, a declaratory relief claim satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis so long as a communication between the parties is needed to show a live controversy. Taken at face value, that would mean that any declaratory relief claim seeking a declaration of non-liability satisfies the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. That can’t be the law.
Guilty, Guilty, Guilty!
CB Richard Ellis v. Tera Nova Consultants, No. G049803 (D4d3 Oct. 7, 2014)
During an effort put a defunct LLC’s members on the hook for its debts, the trial court let the jury see an arbitral ruling—complete with reasoning and factual findings—against the LLC that was the basis of those debts. That was error in that it potentially suggested that the defendants—nonparties in the arbitration—might be bound by the award. The ruling was also hearsay. The court, however, finds the mistake harmless.
There’s also a jury misconduct issue. Two jurors submitted very brief declarations under Evidence Code § 1150 that another juror had said he knew the defendants and that they were “guilty, guilty, guilty.” That juror, however, submitted a detailed declaration saying he did nothing of the sort, and the court finds that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on the detailed declaration to deny a new trial motion. That seems right. But as I’ve said before, our courts really need to get out of this business altogether.
Affirmed.
During an effort put a defunct LLC’s members on the hook for its debts, the trial court let the jury see an arbitral ruling—complete with reasoning and factual findings—against the LLC that was the basis of those debts. That was error in that it potentially suggested that the defendants—nonparties in the arbitration—might be bound by the award. The ruling was also hearsay. The court, however, finds the mistake harmless.
There’s also a jury misconduct issue. Two jurors submitted very brief declarations under Evidence Code § 1150 that another juror had said he knew the defendants and that they were “guilty, guilty, guilty.” That juror, however, submitted a detailed declaration saying he did nothing of the sort, and the court finds that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on the detailed declaration to deny a new trial motion. That seems right. But as I’ve said before, our courts really need to get out of this business altogether.
Affirmed.
Saturday, November 1, 2014
The ESI Dream of the '90s Is Alive in State Court
Vasquez v. Cal. Sch. of Culinary Arts, No. B250600 (D2d2 Sept. 26, 2014)
In responding to a business records subpoena for student loan files, Sallie Mae jerked around some plaintiff lawyers and was cagey about the cost and burden of compliance. After Sallie Mae’s motion to quash was denied, the trial court awarded about $20k in sanctions because its resistance was not substantially justified. In an opinion that addresses Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.8—rarely cited in any opinion—the court affirms.
The court first notes that the fact that a subpoena seeks ESI from a third party does not automatically make it unduly burdensome. (Because it’s not, like, 1990!) It also rejects Sallie Mae’s argument that “documents” didn’t exist because the information was contained in an electronic database and producing what plaintiffs wanted would entail the creation of “new” documents. That the court's reasoning is based on a 2006 federal district court case—there is no California authority on point—is itself telling on the discouraging state of the state of the art on ESI discovery law in California state court.
So the rule is that if you want database information from a third party, you can get it, so long as it is maintained in a way that, even with some work, it can be extracted from the database. You do, however, have to pay the costs of extraction. On the other hand, the third party is obliged to provide a reasonable estimate of the costs of compilation. And if the third refuses to do so and acts unreasonably, it will subject to sanctions for a lack of substantial justification.
Affirmed.
In responding to a business records subpoena for student loan files, Sallie Mae jerked around some plaintiff lawyers and was cagey about the cost and burden of compliance. After Sallie Mae’s motion to quash was denied, the trial court awarded about $20k in sanctions because its resistance was not substantially justified. In an opinion that addresses Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.8—rarely cited in any opinion—the court affirms.
The court first notes that the fact that a subpoena seeks ESI from a third party does not automatically make it unduly burdensome. (Because it’s not, like, 1990!) It also rejects Sallie Mae’s argument that “documents” didn’t exist because the information was contained in an electronic database and producing what plaintiffs wanted would entail the creation of “new” documents. That the court's reasoning is based on a 2006 federal district court case—there is no California authority on point—is itself telling on the discouraging state of the state of the art on ESI discovery law in California state court.
So the rule is that if you want database information from a third party, you can get it, so long as it is maintained in a way that, even with some work, it can be extracted from the database. You do, however, have to pay the costs of extraction. On the other hand, the third party is obliged to provide a reasonable estimate of the costs of compilation. And if the third refuses to do so and acts unreasonably, it will subject to sanctions for a lack of substantial justification.
Affirmed.
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