Flipped Burden Prevents Issue Preclusion

Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist., No. G054617 (D4d3 May 29, 2019)

Collateral estoppel doesn’t apply when, during the first proceeding, the party seeking preclusion bore a lower burden of proof. Here, the prior case was an administrative employee benefits proceeding. In it, the employer bore the burden to prove that plaintiff was not an employee. It did not meet it. But now we’re in a whistleblower retaliation case where the plaintiff bears the burden to prove he is an employee. So plaintiff can’t rely on the defendant’s failure to meet its burden in the admin case for issue preclusion on the employment issue.

Reversed.

"This Vexatious Litigant Refuses to Stop Biting."

Colombo v. Kinkle, Rodiger & Spriggs, No. G055823 (D4d3 May 16, 2019)

Plaintiff here is a pro se that lost a case a long time ago and has been suing his attorneys over and over again since then. Four years ago, he got tagged with a pre-filing order under Code of Civil Procedure § 391.7. So he needs to get the presiding judge to sign off before he files any more cases pro se. He tried to sue the attorneys again. But the PJ said no, his claims were time-barred. He sought reconsideration, filed an appeal (which was deemed a writ) and came up zero on everything.

Meanwhile, he filed another lawsuit against the same lawyers. The PJ had turned over in the interim and current PJ (no doubt unawares of the last case) let him proceed. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings based on res judicata. The trial court granted the motion, but on the ground the case was time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirms, but on res judiciata grounds. The first prefiling denial was a final decision on the merits, so it operates as a bar.

Affirmed.

Can't Sneak in a Brand New Claim Like That

LeMere v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. B281843 (D2d8 May 14, 2019)

A demurrer was granted with leave to amend. When plaintiff amended, she also added a brand new cause of action. But she didn’t have leave to do that. So the trial court dismissed. Moreover, it had been more than a year since the original complaint had been filed. Plaintiff didn’t have any good reason why the new claim couldn’t have been alleged all along. And the claim was nonetheless legally defective. So the trial court was not required to afford her leave.

Affirmed.

What, Exactly, Are We Waiving?

Global Fin. Distribs. v. Superior Court, No. 291814 (D2d7 May 13, 2019)

The Code of Civil Procedure has two different statutes addressed to motions to dismiss or stay for forum nonconveniens—§§ 418.10 and 410.30. 

One Ruling Down...

Cohen v. Kabbalah Centre Int’l, No. B284446 (D2d8 May 7, 2019)

I really like this a short and amusingly written opinion by Justice Wiley, recently appointed to the 2/8, mostly affirming a summary judgment. It doesn’t have kooky references or anything like that. Just a lot of short, punchy sentences that make it an easy read. It’s not every day you get a published decision that disposes of half a dozen issues in just thirteen pages without feeling like it’s giving the short shift to anything.

CCP § 340.6 Applies to Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Attorneys

Connelly v. Bornstein, No. A152375 (D1d5 Mar. 28, 2019)

Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6 sets the statute of limitations for “[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.” There was a lengthy split of authority as to whether § 340.6 applied to claims other than attorney malpractice. That split was largely resolved in Lee v. Hanley in which the Supreme Court said the statute goes beyond malpractice, but only to cases based on an attorney’s breach of a duty that exists by virtue of being an attorney. So if, for instance, an attorney punches a witness after a heated deposition, the ordinary battery statute of limitations will apply.

Interpretation vs. Reference

Melendez v. S.F. Baseball Assocs. LLC, No. S245607 (Cal. Apr. 25, 2019)

A year and a half ago, the Court of Appeal held that the wage and hour claims in this case were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act because, even though the claims arise under state law, they factually depended on aspects of the employment relationship that were defined by a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court now weighs in to reverse.

The Court recognizes that the LMRA can preempt state claw claims that require interpretation of a CBA. But it doesn't necessarily preempt claims that merely reference a CBA. The difference can be fuzzy, but generally asks whether the court is called upon to resolve the meaning of an ambiguous term. Here, the wage-and-hour claims in this case require the court to look to a CBA to determine whether the plaintiffs were temporarily terminated, thus triggering an obligation under the Labor Code to pay them immediately. But the court does not need to engage in any interpretation to get the answer.

Court of Appeal reversed.