Spector v. Spector, No. C084628 (D3 Jun. 4, 2018)
A family court in San Joaquin County overseeing the divorce of Rachelle and Phil Spector* ordered Phil to pay a certain amount of temporary spousal support. But after Phil’s attorney told the judge (in an email, cc Rachelle) that the ordered support exceeded his cash flow the Court decided to “sua sponte” reconsider and reduce the obligation. Wife objects—and because support orders are immediately appealable—appeals.
Tuesday, July 31, 2018
Thursday, July 26, 2018
Not Sticking Together
Jensen v. The Home Depot, Inc., No. E067002 (D5 May 31, 2018)
Home Depot gets sued by two employees. Their claims are based on similar disability discrimination theories. But it’s clear they don’t arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Home Depot specially demurred under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d) for misjoinder of plaintiffs, which the trial court granted, with leave. Then an amendment that leaves both Plaintiffs in and another demurrer, which Plaintiffs maybe didn’t oppose. And then another demurrer is granted without leave and a dismissal with prejudice is entered. Which seems kind of crazy, as it’s unclear why joining disparate plaintiffs, while inappropriate, means everyone should lose, effectively on the merits. Plaintiffs appeal.
Then one Plaintiff dismisses. That obviates the misjoinder. There is some debate is over whether the Court of Appeal should be a remand so that the now flying-solo plaintiff can just pursue her case alone or whether the appeal should just be dismissed as moot, leaving the judgment intact. The court takes the former approach, which makes sense.
Reversed.
Home Depot gets sued by two employees. Their claims are based on similar disability discrimination theories. But it’s clear they don’t arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Home Depot specially demurred under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d) for misjoinder of plaintiffs, which the trial court granted, with leave. Then an amendment that leaves both Plaintiffs in and another demurrer, which Plaintiffs maybe didn’t oppose. And then another demurrer is granted without leave and a dismissal with prejudice is entered. Which seems kind of crazy, as it’s unclear why joining disparate plaintiffs, while inappropriate, means everyone should lose, effectively on the merits. Plaintiffs appeal.
Then one Plaintiff dismisses. That obviates the misjoinder. There is some debate is over whether the Court of Appeal should be a remand so that the now flying-solo plaintiff can just pursue her case alone or whether the appeal should just be dismissed as moot, leaving the judgment intact. The court takes the former approach, which makes sense.
Reversed.
Wednesday, July 25, 2018
A More Precise Strike on Damages
Abbott Labs. v. Superior Court, No. D072577 (D4d1 May 31, 2018)
This is the second time I’ve had the pleasure of writing about one of my own cases recently. This one’s a little older, but I’ve just gotten to it in the cue. I’m not going to much about the merits, which deal with a local district attorney’s ability (or lack thereof) to seek statewide relief for alleged violations of the UCL.
This is the second time I’ve had the pleasure of writing about one of my own cases recently. This one’s a little older, but I’ve just gotten to it in the cue. I’m not going to much about the merits, which deal with a local district attorney’s ability (or lack thereof) to seek statewide relief for alleged violations of the UCL.
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
Service Abroad ...
Rockefeller Tech. Inv. (Asia) VII) v. Changzhou Sinotype Tech. Co., Ltd., No. B272170 (D2d3 Jun 1, 2018)
Plaintiff, a US-based investment fund, won a $414 million default arbitration judgment against Defendant, a Chinese company. Over a year later, ChinaCo moved to vacate, arguing, among other things, that it was never properly served. The superior court declined to vacate. Although ChinaCo wasn’t properly served under the Hague Convention, the court found that it had consented to mail service in the underlying agreement that was the subject of the dispute, so resort to the Hague wasn’t necessary.
Plaintiff, a US-based investment fund, won a $414 million default arbitration judgment against Defendant, a Chinese company. Over a year later, ChinaCo moved to vacate, arguing, among other things, that it was never properly served. The superior court declined to vacate. Although ChinaCo wasn’t properly served under the Hague Convention, the court found that it had consented to mail service in the underlying agreement that was the subject of the dispute, so resort to the Hague wasn’t necessary.
Monday, July 16, 2018
This Is Not an Interpleader
Pacer Foreclosure, Inc. v. Alfalo, No. B268589 (D2d6 May 30, 2018)
Trustee conducts a foreclosure sale, which results in proceeds in excess of the loan. Borrower sues both Trustee and Buyer for wrongful foreclosure. Trustee then files an interpleader and deposited the excess funds with the court. But the trial court granted Borrower’s demurrer on the interpleader and dismissed the case. Its order permitted Trustee to apply for the release of funds, but it wouldn’t automatically release the funds to Buyer. Everyone appeals.
While the appeal is pending, Borrower settles with Buyer. Buyer agrees it doesn’t have claim to the excess funds that that it won’t object to their release to Borrower. Buyer then argues that the appeal is moot.
But it isn’t. Because whether Trustee’s complaint was a proper interpleader affects whether Trustee can recover fees out of the res, obtain a discharge, and be dismissed from the underlying wrongful foreclosure case.
In any event, the trial court was correct to grant the demurrer. This wasn’t a legit interpleader situation because Buyer never had a real claim against the excess funds. It just doesn’t make sense that a Buyer—who is actually paying the money in a foreclosure sale—would also have some claim to money it paid in excess of Borrower’s loan balance. Moreover Civil Code § 2924k literally required Trustee to disburse any proceeds net of the loan to the Borrower. This isn’t some situation where the res isn’t sufficient to satisfy competing liens by different lenders. Without a reasonable threat of double vexation, an interpleader doesn’t lie. And without an interpleader, Trustee has no claim for its fees.
And given the settlement, there is no doubt at all that nobody has any claim on the money except Borrower. So the trial court should give him his money.
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Trustee conducts a foreclosure sale, which results in proceeds in excess of the loan. Borrower sues both Trustee and Buyer for wrongful foreclosure. Trustee then files an interpleader and deposited the excess funds with the court. But the trial court granted Borrower’s demurrer on the interpleader and dismissed the case. Its order permitted Trustee to apply for the release of funds, but it wouldn’t automatically release the funds to Buyer. Everyone appeals.
While the appeal is pending, Borrower settles with Buyer. Buyer agrees it doesn’t have claim to the excess funds that that it won’t object to their release to Borrower. Buyer then argues that the appeal is moot.
But it isn’t. Because whether Trustee’s complaint was a proper interpleader affects whether Trustee can recover fees out of the res, obtain a discharge, and be dismissed from the underlying wrongful foreclosure case.
In any event, the trial court was correct to grant the demurrer. This wasn’t a legit interpleader situation because Buyer never had a real claim against the excess funds. It just doesn’t make sense that a Buyer—who is actually paying the money in a foreclosure sale—would also have some claim to money it paid in excess of Borrower’s loan balance. Moreover Civil Code § 2924k literally required Trustee to disburse any proceeds net of the loan to the Borrower. This isn’t some situation where the res isn’t sufficient to satisfy competing liens by different lenders. Without a reasonable threat of double vexation, an interpleader doesn’t lie. And without an interpleader, Trustee has no claim for its fees.
And given the settlement, there is no doubt at all that nobody has any claim on the money except Borrower. So the trial court should give him his money.
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Monday, July 9, 2018
Res Estoppel? Collateral Judicata?
Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., No B277513 (D2d4 May 29, 2018)
Named Plaintiff in this class action was a class member in Class Action #1, a prior wage and hour case against his Employer. Class Action #1 settled and, as a member of the settlement class, Plaintiff got some money. But now he’s a Named Plaintiff in Class Action #2, another wage and hour class action, against the same employer, with roughly the same class period, but on a new legal theory that wasn’t really litigated in Class Action #1. So the question is, do claim or issue preclusion, or the release entered in Class Action #1, bar Class Action #2?
The answer is yes. And the opinion gets that right. But it’s rather hard to follow and it does some weird stuff to getting to a result.
Named Plaintiff in this class action was a class member in Class Action #1, a prior wage and hour case against his Employer. Class Action #1 settled and, as a member of the settlement class, Plaintiff got some money. But now he’s a Named Plaintiff in Class Action #2, another wage and hour class action, against the same employer, with roughly the same class period, but on a new legal theory that wasn’t really litigated in Class Action #1. So the question is, do claim or issue preclusion, or the release entered in Class Action #1, bar Class Action #2?
The answer is yes. And the opinion gets that right. But it’s rather hard to follow and it does some weird stuff to getting to a result.
Friday, July 6, 2018
Get in Line, CalPERS!
PERS v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., No. C083355 (D3 May 29, 2018)
So there’s an issue regarding the interpretation of the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act that keeps coming up in administrative appeals before the CalPERS board. Instead of riding one of those appeals through administrative mandamus to obtain a definitive interpretation, CalPERS’s executive filed a declaratory relief action in Sacto Superior, suing a public agency and a union. But it can’t do that.
When a statutory scheme directs disputes into an administrative proceeding, litigants—including the government—need to work through that scheme to obtain the relief they seek. Unless the statutes foresee the filing of an independent, de novo, civil action—as was the case in the recently-decided Taswell case—that means going though the administrative appeals process and then seeking review of the results of that process through a writ of administrative mandamus. CalPERS can’t just jump that line by seeking declaratory relief. Its efforts to do so in this case are barred for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies.
Affirmed.
So there’s an issue regarding the interpretation of the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act that keeps coming up in administrative appeals before the CalPERS board. Instead of riding one of those appeals through administrative mandamus to obtain a definitive interpretation, CalPERS’s executive filed a declaratory relief action in Sacto Superior, suing a public agency and a union. But it can’t do that.
When a statutory scheme directs disputes into an administrative proceeding, litigants—including the government—need to work through that scheme to obtain the relief they seek. Unless the statutes foresee the filing of an independent, de novo, civil action—as was the case in the recently-decided Taswell case—that means going though the administrative appeals process and then seeking review of the results of that process through a writ of administrative mandamus. CalPERS can’t just jump that line by seeking declaratory relief. Its efforts to do so in this case are barred for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies.
Affirmed.
Thursday, July 5, 2018
A Good Day for Access to Justice
Jameson v. Desta, No. S230899 (Cal. Jul. 5, 2018).
The Court of Appeal decision in this case bothered me so much that I contacted the plaintiff and offered to represent him pro bono. We got review granted back in 2016. Today, the Court held in our favor in a 7-0 opinion by the Chief Justice. The short and slightly oversimplified of it is that the right to equal access to the courts requires state courts to provide indigent litigants with an official court reporter to transcribe their trials. But you should read it for yourself. There’s a lot of other good stuff in there too.
Court of Appeal reversed.
The Court of Appeal decision in this case bothered me so much that I contacted the plaintiff and offered to represent him pro bono. We got review granted back in 2016. Today, the Court held in our favor in a 7-0 opinion by the Chief Justice. The short and slightly oversimplified of it is that the right to equal access to the courts requires state courts to provide indigent litigants with an official court reporter to transcribe their trials. But you should read it for yourself. There’s a lot of other good stuff in there too.
Court of Appeal reversed.
Have at It, Court of Chancery . . .
Bushansky v. Soon-Shiong, No. D072213 (D4d1 May 25, 2018)
Over the past decade, it has become increasingly prevalent for corporations to enact what are called forum-selection bylaws. These require stockholders who sue the company or its directors in stockholder litigation to bring their claims only in the state of incorporation, usually Delaware. Because bylaws are, more or less, a contractual arrangement between the company and its stockholders, the theory is that the bylaws are an enforcible forum selection contract. The Delaware Supreme Court agrees, and has held that they are enforceable. I’m not aware of a reported California appellate decision that’s given a thumbs-up, but the parties in this case seem to agree that the bylaw here is valid and enforceable. They just disagree that it applies.
Over the past decade, it has become increasingly prevalent for corporations to enact what are called forum-selection bylaws. These require stockholders who sue the company or its directors in stockholder litigation to bring their claims only in the state of incorporation, usually Delaware. Because bylaws are, more or less, a contractual arrangement between the company and its stockholders, the theory is that the bylaws are an enforcible forum selection contract. The Delaware Supreme Court agrees, and has held that they are enforceable. I’m not aware of a reported California appellate decision that’s given a thumbs-up, but the parties in this case seem to agree that the bylaw here is valid and enforceable. They just disagree that it applies.
Anti-Vaxer Benchslap!
Brown v. Smith, No. B279936 (D2d Jul. 2, 2018)
Talk about calling bullshit. The Court here took judicial notice that the factual allegation at the core of Plaintiffs’ theory was false and thus that it didn’t need to be taken as true in their complaint. Because Plaintiffs are antivaxers. And because it is not really debatable, California courts have been taking judicial notice of the fact that vaccines are safe and effective since 1925. Which pretty much dooms plaintiffs’ case, in which they claim that their nonsensical anti-scientific feelings give them a constitutional right for their kids to spread measles to other kids in Disneyland.
Affirmed.
Talk about calling bullshit. The Court here took judicial notice that the factual allegation at the core of Plaintiffs’ theory was false and thus that it didn’t need to be taken as true in their complaint. Because Plaintiffs are antivaxers. And because it is not really debatable, California courts have been taking judicial notice of the fact that vaccines are safe and effective since 1925. Which pretty much dooms plaintiffs’ case, in which they claim that their nonsensical anti-scientific feelings give them a constitutional right for their kids to spread measles to other kids in Disneyland.
Affirmed.
Tuesday, July 3, 2018
Be Careful What You Don't Pray For
Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Techs., Inc., No. D072624 (D4d1 May 25, 2018)
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
I covered the issues in this case three years ago in the Dhawan case. But just in case you forgot, Code of Civil Procedure § 580 says a plaintiff can’t get a default judgment for more relief than is demanded in the complaint. That’s true even when the defendant, before defaulting, gets actual notice of the actual amount of damages the plaintiff will demand. So in Dhawan, plaintiff’s effort to give the a statement of damages like that required for punitive damages was held insufficient. And here, Defendant learned what Plaintiff’s demand was in a mediation. But knowing is not enough. To authorize a default judgment the actual number needs to be demanded in the complaint.
So if a plaintiff does the typical state court plaintiff thing and pleads damages according to proof in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold for an unlimited civil case—which technically violates § 425.10—it can’t lawfully recover a default judgment over $25 grand. To get more, it will need to amend to put in a number and make sure the defendant gets served with the new complaint before putting them into default. Otherwise, the judgment is void, and can be attacked years after the fact. Which is what happened here.
Reversed.
Monday, July 2, 2018
Public Posting Is Consent Under the SCA
Facebook v. Superior Court, No. S230051 (Cal. May 24, 2018)
Back in 2017, the Court of Appeal held that the Stored Communications Act prevented a criminal defendant from subpoenaing Facebook and Instagram for copies of the social media posts of a murder victim and witnesses in the case. The Supreme Court granted review, but then independently raised an issue that wasn’t really addressed by the Court of Appeal: The SCA contains an exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3), which permits an electronic communications provider to disclose materials for which the user has consented to disclosure.
According to the Court here—in a unanimous opinion by the Chief Justice—that should include social media posts that a user has made available to the public, without restrictions. It does not, however, extend to posting whose access is limited only to “friends” or with other restrictions, regardless of how many people are permitted to see it. So the Court reverses the Court of Appeal and remands to the trial court to address a host of issues regarding the scope of consent and the providers’ ability to comply.
Court of Appeal reversed, in part.
Back in 2017, the Court of Appeal held that the Stored Communications Act prevented a criminal defendant from subpoenaing Facebook and Instagram for copies of the social media posts of a murder victim and witnesses in the case. The Supreme Court granted review, but then independently raised an issue that wasn’t really addressed by the Court of Appeal: The SCA contains an exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3), which permits an electronic communications provider to disclose materials for which the user has consented to disclosure.
According to the Court here—in a unanimous opinion by the Chief Justice—that should include social media posts that a user has made available to the public, without restrictions. It does not, however, extend to posting whose access is limited only to “friends” or with other restrictions, regardless of how many people are permitted to see it. So the Court reverses the Court of Appeal and remands to the trial court to address a host of issues regarding the scope of consent and the providers’ ability to comply.
Court of Appeal reversed, in part.
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